Fire
Managementtoday
Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003
United States Department of Agriculture
Forest Service
WILDLAND FIRE
BEHAVIOR CASE
STUDIES AND
ANALYSES: PART 2
WILDLAND FIRE
BEHAVIOR CASE
STUDIES AND
ANALYSES: PART 2
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Understanding Wildland Fire Behavior: A Case Study Approach, Lecture notes of Meteorology
The importance of wildland fire behavior case studies for land managers. It provides examples of significant wildfires in Australasia and outlines guidelines for preparing a wildland fire behavior report. The document emphasizes the need for observing and documenting wildland fires to improve our understanding of fire behavior for effective management.
What you will learn
- How can the Haines Index be used to predict potential large fire growth?
- What are some challenges in predicting and managing extreme fire behavior?
- What are some notable wildfires in Australasia and what were the key findings from their studies?
- How can observing and documenting wildland fires improve our understanding of fire behavior?
- What information should be included in a wildland fire behavior case study report?
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Fire
Management today
Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003
United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service
WILDLAND FIRE
BEHAVIOR CASE
STUDIES AND
ANALYSES: PART 2
WILDLAND FIRE
BEHAVIOR CASE
STUDIES AND
ANALYSES: PART 2
Editor’s note: This issue of Fire Management Today continues a series of reprinted articles, some of them decades old. Although the articles appear in today’s format, the text is reprinted largely verbatim and therefore reflects the style and usage of the time. We made minor wording changes for clarity, added inter- titles and metric conversions where needed, and occasionally broke up paragraphs to improve readability. All illustrations are taken from the original articles.
Erratum In Fire Management Today 63(3) [Summer 2003], the article by Banks and Little contains an error noted in Fire Control Notes 26(1) [Winter 1965], page 15. The third sentence in column 3 on page 76 should read: “More recent burns that left some surface fuel remaining only reduced the damage, but others that removed nearly all the fuels did stop the fire.”
Fire Management Today is published by the Forest Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC. The Secretary of Agriculture has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Fire Management Today is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, at: Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: 202-512-1800 Fax: 202-512- Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402- Fire Management Today is available on the World Wide Web at http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/fmt/. Ann M. Veneman, Secretary April J. Baily U.S. Department of Agriculture General Manager Dale Bosworth, Chief Robert H. “Hutch” Brown, Ph.D. Forest Service Managing Editor Jerry Williams, Director Madelyn Dillon Fire and Aviation Management Editor Carol LoSapio Guest Editor Martin E. Alexander, Ph.D., and David A. Thomas Issue Coordinators The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, or marital or family sta tus. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program information (Braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s TARGET Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TDD). To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 1400 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice and TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer. Disclaimer: The use of trade, firm, or corporation names in this publication is for the information and convenience of the reader. Such use does not constitute an official endorsement of any product or service by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Individual authors are responsible for the technical accuracy of the material presented in Fire Management Today.
WILDLAND FIRE BEHAVIOR
CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSES:
OTHER EXAMPLES, METHODS, REPORTING
STANDARDS, AND SOME PRACTICAL ADVICE
M.E. Alexander and D.A. Thomas
C
ase studies done in one country can be applied to another, if fuel type characteristics are rel evant, by interpreting burning con ditions through the other country’s fire danger rating system.
This special issue of Fire Manage ment Today constitutes the second installment of articles involving fire behavior case studies and analyses of wildland fires. All arti cles in this series appeared in past issues of Fire Management Today or its predecessors. The 18 articles in this issue are in chronological order, from 1967 to 2001.
In the lead article to the first installment ( Fire Management Today , volume 63(3) [Summer 2003]), we overviewed the value, approaches, and practical uses of fire behavior case studies and analyses (Alexander and Thomas 2003). Here we point out examples of case studies published elsewhere (both nationally and international ly) and offer some general thoughts on wildland fire behavior observa tion and documentation.
Other Examples of Case Studies Fire Management Today and its predecessors have certainly not been the only source or outlet for
Marty Alexander is a senior fire behavior research officer with the Canadian Forest Service at the Northern Forestry Centre, Edmonton, Alberta; and Dave Thomas is the regional fuels specialist for the USDA Forest Service, Intermountain Region, Ogden, UT.
case studies. In the last issue of the journal, we cited some examples of other sources (Alexander and Thomas 2003). Others are cited below.
USDA Forest Service fire research ers, in collaboration with other investigators, have published a number of case studies in the form of journal articles, conference papers, and in-house station publi cations. Notable examples include studies on the:
- 1965 Hellgate Fire, western Virginia (Taylor and Williams 1968);
- 1966 Gaston Fire, central South Carolina (DeCoste and others 1968);
- 1966 Loop Fire, southern California (Countryman and oth ers 1968);
- 1967 Sundance Fire, northern Idaho (Anderson 1968);
- 1968 Canyon Fire, southern California (Countryman and oth ers 1969);
- 1971 Little Sioux Fire, northeast ern Minnesota (Sando and Haines 1972);
- 1971 Air Force Bomb Range Fire, eastern North Carolina (Wade and Ward 1973);
- 1980 Mack Lake Fire, northern
The most important thing to record is the position of the head fire at various times—the more observations, the better.
Lower Michigan (Simard and others 1983);
- 1990 Dude Fire, northern Arizona (Goens and Andrews 1998); and the
- 1994 South Canyon Fire, west- central Colorado (Butler and oth ers 1998).*
In the 1990s, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) pro duced several case studies, in very glossy formats, on the following wildfires:
- 1989 Black Tiger Fire, central Colorado (NFPA 1990);
- 1990 Stephan Bridge Road Fire, northern Lower Michigan (NFPA 1991);
- 1991 Spokane area fires, north eastern Washington (NFPA 1992a); and
- 1991 Oakland–Berkeley Hills Fire, west-central California (NFPA 1992b).
A few of these U.S. case studies are available on the World Wide Web or in hard copy for a nominal fee through the National Fire Equipment System (NFES 2003).
- For an overview of this excellent publication, see the very fine summary prepared by Butler and others (2001) on page 77 in this issue of Fire Management Today.
Fire Management Today
The challenge of writing a case study report is to distill the mass of information into a coherent summary.
Canadian Forest Service fire researchers have also formally pre pared several case studies over the years on the following wildfires:
- 1964 Gwatkin Lake Fire, eastern Ontario (Van Wagner 1965);
- 1968 Lesser Slave Fire, central Alberta (Kiil and Grigel 1969);
- 1971 Thackeray and Whistle Lake Fires, northeastern Ontario (Walker and Stocks 1972);
- 1980 DND-4-80 Fire, east-central Alberta (Alexander and others 1983);
- 1986 Terrace Bay 7/86 Fire, north-central Ontario (Stocks 1988); and
- 2001 Duffield Fire, central Alberta (Mottus 2002).
Australasian fire researchers have also made numerous contribu tions, including studies on the fol lowing wildfires:
- 1955 Balmoral Fire, South Island of New Zealand (Prior 1958);
- 1958 Wandilo Fire, South Australia (McArthur and others 1966);
- 1977 Western District fires, Victoria (McArthur and others 1982);
- 1979 Caroline Fire, South Australia (Geddes and Pfeiffer 1981);
- 1983 Ash Wednesday fires, South Australia (Keeves and Douglas 1983);
- 1991 Tikokino Fire, North Island of New Zealand (Rassmusen and Fogarty 1997);
- 1994 Karori fires, North Island of New Zealand (Fogarty 1996);
- 1995 Berringa Fire, west-central Victoria (Tolhurst and Chatto 1998); - 2002 Atawhai Fire, South Island of New Zealand (Peace and Anderson 2002); and - 2003 Miners Road Fire, South Island of New Zealand (Anderson 2003).
The Australians have also pub lished several case studies analyz ing the effectiveness of fuel reduc tion burning on subsequent fire behavior and on fire suppression of high-intensity wildfires (e.g., Buckley 1992; Underwood and oth ers 1985).
Case studies have been undertaken by fire researchers in other coun tries as well (Cruz and Viegas 1997; Dentoni and others 2001). It is worth noting that one can extend the usefulness of wildland fire case studies done in one country to another, provided that the fuel type characteristics are relevant, simply by interpreting the burning condi tions through the use of the other country’s fire danger rating system (e.g., Alexander 1991, 1992, 2000; Alexander and Pearce 1992a, 1993).
Field Observations and Records Whereas no recipe or step-by-step procedural manual on wildland fire observations presently exists, a good number of general references are available (Alexander and Pearce 1992b; Burrows 1984; Cheney and Sullivan 1997; Chester and Adams 1963; Rothermel and Rinehart 1983; Turner and others 1961). Moreover, the various case studies already published offer guidance themselves.
Wildland fire observation and doc umentation can be broken into four distinct stages or phases:
- Detection,
- Initial attack,
- Later stages of suppression, and
- After containment. Some of the information on the early phases of a wildland fire is normally recorded as part of the operational procedures related to completing the individual fire report, although additional data might be requested (e.g., Haines and others 1985). However, if we are to acquire high-quality data (Donoghue 1982), then we need to emphasize the importance of fire behavior observation/documenta tion for our initial-attack firefight ers so that we get their “buy-in.”
Although myriad things might be recorded between the time of ini tial attack and the time when a fire is finally deemed “out,” the most important thing to record is the position of the head fire at various times—the more observations, the better. From these observations, the rates of fire spread and intensi ty can be calculated. At times, these observations are difficult to make, for a variety of reasons, such as limited visibility and logistical issues (see the sidebar on page 6). When they can be made, they must be coupled with observations or measurements of wind velocity.
Although advances in photography, remote sensing and weather moni toring technology over the years have greatly facilitated matters (Anderson 2001; Dibble 1960; Lawson 1975; Ogilvie and others 1995; Schaefer 1959, 1961; Warren and Vance 1981), good representa tive or site-specific wind readings, for example, are still difficult to obtain. In this regard, one should not discount the relative value of
Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003
If one isn’t careful, the plethora of information can stymie even the most dedicated case study author.
After compiling all the information required to produce a case study report, one must write it up. The challenge is to distill the mass of information into a coherent sum mary. To assist in this process, we suggest a certain format (see the sidebar below). The case study by Pearce and others (1994) is a good example of a very concise report based on this format.
Other sections could be added to the format, such as fire effects on
people (both firefighters and the public), homes, and ecosystems. The suppression strategy and tac tics could also be addressed, including any associated human factors.
However, as Thomas (1994) points out, not all of us are writers. Some might wish to follow a one- or two- page format (e.g., McAlpine and others 1990 [figure 2]). Ideally, it should include a photograph or two and additional weather prod
ucts (surface and upper air charts and profiles of temperature/mois ture and winds aloft).
Some General Advice and Lessons Learned We offer the following practical advice in preparing wildland fire behavior case studies. Our thoughts and comments are based on actual lessons learned from preparing case studies (e.g., Carpenter and others 2002; Pearce and others 1994).
Suggested Outline for Preparing a Wildland Fire Behavior Case Study Report
These guidelines are based in part activity; suppression strategy present hourly weather on those originally prepared by and tactics employed; mopup observations, if relevant; M.E. Alexander for use in three difficulty; fire progress map denote location of weather advanced fire behavior courses showing point of origin; final station(s) on regional map sponsored by the National Rural area burned and perimeter; or fire progress map and Fire Authority in New Zealand in ground and aerial photos, comment on the relevance 1992–93. The guidelines were where possible. of the readings to the fire subsequently used in six wildland 3. Details of the Fire area, including notes about fire behavior specialist courses Environment: the station’s instrumenta sponsored by the Canadian • Topography— Review major tion.** Interagency Forest Fire Centre in features; include topograph- 4. Analysis of Fire Behavior: Hinton, Alberta, in 1996–2001. ic map and photos, if perti- For example, discuss the fire’s nent. behavior in relation to the
1. Introduction: Significance of • Fuels— Describe the princi- characteristics of the fire the fire, including regional pal fuel type(s); include a environment and the suc map with fire location. vegetation cover type map cess/failure of the suppression 2. Fire Chronology and and any photos, if possible.* operations. Development: Cause; time of • Fire Weather— Describe 5. Concluding Remarks: For origin and/or detection; initial prefire weather as appropri- example, what did you learn attack action; forward spread ate; summarize synoptic about predicting fire behavior and perimeter growth; fire weather features and and fire behavior documenta characteristics, such as spot- include surface map; pres- tion from this assignment? ting distances and crowning ent daily fire weather obser vations; present fire danger **It is a good idea to^ cultivate a long-term relation *Detailed work on fuel characteristics (e.g., ship with your local fire weather meteorologist/fore amounts by fuel complex strata, moisture content ratings, including drought caster and seek their assistance as a cooperator. of live fuels) will depend on the situation and the (^) indexes, and append month- specific need. Generalizations are often satisfactory for most purposes. ly fire weather record form;
Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003
Form your own view of what happened only after interviewing many firefighters and getting multiple perspectives.
Motivation. It is often very difficult to find the motivation to write a case study. On all wildland fires, other demands and the rapidity of events can be discouraging. Moreover, no policy or regulation requires a case study. It must come from your own motivation and sense of professionalism. Lesson Learned: As a practitioner, make it a habit to always prepare at least a one- to two-page case study. You will be richly rewarded, for it will force you to reflect on why a fire behaved the way it, honing your skills as a predictor of fire behavior (see the sidebar).
Your Standard Is Too High. There is a human tendency to establish goals that are nearly impossible to reach. Lesson Learned: Limit the length and depth of the report to the time available. Don’t think you have to write a research report that meets the quality standards of a fire laboratory publication. A sim
ple, short case study, told from your individual perspective, is bet ter than no case study at all.
Organization. Just as we must practice our fire behavior predic tion skills before going on a wild fire, so it is also important to men tally prepare ourselves for writing a case study. Lesson Learned: Get organized before the fire season begins. Prethink how you are going to prepare your case studies. Ask yourself what generic fire behavior information you are going to need (such as fire danger ratings, remote automatic weather station data, or fuel moisture readings), and prepare yourself to quickly access the information. Useful Webpages include the Western Regional Climate Center (http://www.wrcc.dri.edu) and the U.S. Drought Monitor (http://www.drought.unl.edu). Become familiar with such sources before the fire occurs. Finally, be
systematic in your collection of data. An indexed, three-ring note book constructed around the themes of observed fire behavior, such as fuels, topography, and weather, will help you organize pertinent information for easy retrieval.
Information Overload. The amount of information available about the fire environment can be overwhelming. If one isn’t careful, the plethora of information can stymie even the most dedicated case study author. Lesson Learned: Don’t try to use or validate every fire danger, fire weather, or fire behavior model available. Decide which model you want to use for your case study and stick to it. For example, ask yourself whether the BEHAVE fire behavior prediction system would meet your need as opposed to FARSITE. Think about the amount of time you have avail able to run various models. Pick the
Why Write a Case Study?
Luke and McArthur (1978) give a good rationale for writing wildland fire behavior case studies, even on small incidents:
Inquiries should be made into all A map showing the perimeter of a At the conclusion of the analysis fires as soon as possible after they fire at progressive time intervals it should be possible to prepare a have been controlled. Even short provides the best basis for a case précis of the reasons for success descriptions of very small fires history analysis. This should be or failure, not for the purpose of have a value.* Recording the accompanied by descriptions of taking people to task for errors of details of large fires is vital fire behavior related to weather, judgment, but solely to ensure because success in the future fuel and topography, and details of that the lessons that have been depends largely on knowledge the manning arrangements, strat learnt contribute to the success of gained in the past. egy and tactics employed during future suppression operations. each suppression phase. *It is true that we do naturally tend to focus solely on just the conflagration type wildland fires.
Particular attention should be given to initial attack action.…
Fire Management Today
Chandler’s comment is still valid for everyone involved in wildland fire, not just scientists and forecast ers.
We should be observing/document ing wildland fires and preparing case studies not for fear of litiga tion (Underwood 1993), but rather to improve our understanding of fire behavior for the safe and effec tive management of wildland fires (Countryman 1972). If every fire manager and fire researcher made it a personal goal to produce one case study per year, regardless of size, just think how many case studies could be produced in a 20 to 35-year career! As it stands now, less than one-tenth of 1 percent of all wildland fires are properly ana lyzed and documented. We must do better.
Acknowledgments
The authors offer their sincerest heartfelt appreciation to Hutch Brown, Madelyn Dillon, and Carol LoSapio, editors of Fire Manage ment Today , for their significant contributions to this special issue, and to April Baily, the journal’s general manager, for supporting the concept of these special issues on wildland fire behavior. Their dedication and outstanding editori al abilities have brought “life” to many of the articles contained in this issue that have long been for gotten.
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Fire Management Today
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NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 1990. Black Tiger Fire case study. Quincy, MA: NFPA. [Reprinted as: National Fire Equipment System Publication NFES 2130 by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Boise, ID.] NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 1991. Stephan Bridge Road Fire case study. Quincy, MA: NFPA. [Reprinted as: National Fire Equipment System Publication NFES 2176 by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Boise, ID.] NFPA (National Fire Protection Association). 1992a. Firestorm ’91 case study. Quincy, MA: NFPA. NFPA (National Fire Protection Associa tion). 1992b. The Oakland/Berkeley Hills Fire. Quincy, MA: NFPA. Ogilvie, C.J.; Lieskovsky, R.J.; Young, R.W.; Jaap, G. 1995. An evaluation of forward- looking infrared equipped air attack. Fire Management Notes. 55(1): 17–20. Pearce, G.; Anderson, S. 2002. Wildfire doc umentation: The need for case studies illustrated using the example of “The Atawhai Fire of 7 May 2002: A case study. “Fire Tech. Trans. Note 2.6. Christchurch, NZ: New Zealand Forest Research, Forest and Rural Fire Research Programme. [http://www.forestresearch. co.nz/five]. Pearce, H.G.; Morgan, R.F.; Alexander, M.E.
- Wildfire behaviour case study of the 1986 Awarua wetlands fire. Fire Technol. Transfer Note No. 5. Rotorua and Wellingon, NZ: New Zealand Forest Research Institute and National Rural Fire Authority. [http://www/forestresearch.co.nz/fire] Pirsko, A.R.; Sergius, L.M.; Hickerson, C.W.
- Causes and behavior of a tornadic fire-whirlwind. Res. Note PSW–61. Berkeley, CA: USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station. Prior, K.W. 1958. The Balmoral Forest Fire. New Zealand Journal of Forestry. 7(5): 35–50. Rassmusen, J.H.; Fogarty, L.G. 1997. A case study of grassland fire behaviour and suppression: the Tikokino Fire of 31 January 1991. FRI Bull. No. 197, For. Rural Fire Sci. Tech. Ser. Rep. No. 2. Rotorua and Wellington, NZ: New Zealand Forest Research Institute and National Rural Fire Authority. [http://www/forestresearch.co.nz/fire] Rothermel, R.C.; Rinehart, G.C. 1983. Field procedures for verification and adjust ment of fire behavior predictions. Gen. Tech. Rep. INT–142. Ogden, UT: USDA Forest Service, Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station. [Reprinted as: National Fire Equipment System Publication NFES 2183 by the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Boise, ID.]
Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003
THE CAROLINA BLOWUP
Keith A. Argow
A
pril 1, 1966, was not a day for April Fool jokes in the coastal pinelands of North and South Carolina. It was an explosive fire day unrivaled in recent times. In those hot 24 hours, 72,000 acres (29,000 ha) in the two States were burned, 3,000 acres (1,200 ha) per hour. It was a Black Friday for more than 50 families whose homes were destroyed.
A news release from the South Carolina State Forester’s office in Columbia summed up the situa tion: “The driest March in ten years created the forest fire danger that exploded on Friday, April 1st, into an almost uncontrollable situation. In three days, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, 480 wildfires burned 70,000 acres (28,000 ha) bringing the total; fire loss since July 1965 to 4,800 wildfires burning 120, acres (48,000 ha) of woodland.
This was the greatest loss in 11 years. Before the rains came on April 4, the forest area burned in the two Carolinas during this explosive period reached 144, acres (58,000 ha). The largest fires were in the coastal pinelands, but damage was not limited to that area as numerous fires sprang up across the Piedmont.
The conflagration came as no real surprise to forest protection per sonnel. A very dry March had fol lowed a dry winter.
When this article was originally published, Keith Argow was an instructor in the School of Forestry at North Carolina State College, Raleigh, NC.
- The article is reprinted from Fire Control Notes 28(1) [Winter 1967]: 3, 15.
On March 30, a meteorologist from the U.S. Forest Service’s South eastern Forest Fire Laboratory in Macon, Ga., telephoned the State forestry headquarters in Raleigh, N.C., and Columbia, outlining the full danger of the unstable weather conditions. Wind and pressure pat terns such as these had come to the South before. They usually meant trouble on going fires.
The North Carolina State Forester immediately cancelled all burning permits and prohibited use of fire near woods. Yet even with this pre ventive measure, fire crews in the Tarheel State fought 273 wildfires covering 18,000 acres (7,200 ha) on the last 2 days of March.
In South Carolina on the same day, the Forestry Commission closed all State parks to public use. On the evening of March 31, the governor issued a proclamation prohibiting the use of fire adjacent to wood lands—the first time this had ever been done. (The authority was pro vided in a law passed after the dis astrous 1954-55 fire season, when 7,000 fires burned 159,000 acres (64,000 ha).)
April 1 April 1 dawned clear and windy. The 10 a.m. report from Jones Lake tower on North Carolina’s Bladen Lakes State Forest showed a high spread index, fuel moisture of 6 percent, and a steady wind of 18 miles per hour (29 km/h) from the southwest.
It was a Black Friday for more than 50 families whose homes were destroyed.
By early afternoon rural residents and travelers in the Carolinas knew there was a serious fire situation. They didn’t have to be told over the radio or see it in the news. They could smell the smoke and feel it burn their eyes.
The steady southwest winds were flowing between two areas of high pressure. One of the systems had recently passed out into the Atlantic. The second, a fast-moving cold front, was coming in from the Mississippi Valley. At 7 a.m. the leading edge was over the Great Smoky Mountains. By 1 p.m. it was in the Piedmont crossing over Charlotte and Winston-Salem. That evening it reached the Atlantic coast, bringing thunderstorms to Wilmington, N.C.
As the front hit, prevailing winds were pushed eastward by the strong winds within the system. This meant a 90-degree wind change as it passed. Fires that had made a narrow run to the northeast quick ly turned southeast, their long flanks becoming new wide heads.
The Ammon Fire One of the blazes that got the most publicity threatened the little town of Ammon, N.C., for 2 days and blackened 17,000 acres (6,900 ha) around it. The smoke was first reported at 1:30 p.m. on April 1. Rumor was that someone had been burning off an area to improve duck hunting, but no one was quite sure who it was.
Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003
By early afternoon rural residents and travelers in the Carolinas knew there was a serious fire situation.
Forty minutes later a forestry truck on patrol radioed that a second fire was coming out to the highway from nearby Black Lake. Crews just completing control lines on the White Oak fire only 15 miles ( km) away rushed to both new blazes.
Reconnaissance aircraft swung over from the large Newton Crossroads fire a scant 20 miles (32 km) east ward and advised ground crews on the course of the flames and the best control action.
The fire towers, now nearly all socked in by smoke, relayed urgent radio messages between headquar ters and the men on the firelines. “Fire reported across from Melvin’s store.” “Fire has jumped the South River into Sampson County.” “Fire burning two homes and a half- dozen farm buildings on Beaver Dam Church Road.” Fire was every where!
By 3 p.m. the Ammon fire had jumped Cedar Creek Road and was headed toward the settlements. The district dispatcher reluctantly pulled a unit off the Black Lake fire, now only 10 miles (16 km) away, and committed his last reserve tractor plow.
Still the flames continued their advance. Air tankers of the North Carolina Forest Service cooled hot
spots and were credited with help ing volunteer fire companies save several homes and outbuildings.
Evening came with a smoky orange light. Down in the swamp the fire rumbled. The cane went up with a crackle that sounded like a rifle platoon in action.
The cold front hit the Ammon fire at 7 p.m. As expected, the flames changed direction. Already the Whiteville District Forester was headed toward N.C. Highway 242 which now lay in front of the fire. Control was impossible now, but he wanted to be sure everyone was out of the way.
Flame—150 Feet High Smoke was intense. The fire could be heard in the distance, and the glow of the flames appeared through the forest. The pines across the highway exploded into what he described as a sheet of flame 150 feet (45 m) high.
Simultaneously, three lightning bolts from the thunderheads over head accompanying the cold front struck the main fire. As rapidly as it came, the fire moved on, throwing burning limbs and brands 1, feet (300 m) ahead of it. Finally, the skies opened up with a brief down pour that knocked the flames out of the trees until there was nothing but flickering snags in the night.
Tractor units spent the night plow ing lines, but without the flames to guide them it was hard to locate the leading edges in the dark. The situation was made more difficult by the many small spot fires that were scattered out ahead as far as a quarter of a mile (0.4 km).
The thundershower was only tem porary relief. Severe burning condi tions were forecast for the next day. Again and again crews sought to strengthen their plowlines, but the backfires would not burn. Without fire, they were unable to construct a fire-break wide enough to hold a new onslaught.
As expected, a drying wind came up with the sun on April 2. By mid morning the scattered embers were fanned to life. Crews worked in vain. Flames were rolling again and took little notice of the lines that had been plowed across their path. The Ammon fire had places to go and another 10,000 acres (4, ha) to burn before a general rain and a massive control effort would contain it 2 days later.
Yes, April 1, 1966, will be long remembered in the Carolina pinelands. But the severe test was well met by courageous firecrews and modern equipment.
Fire Management Today
The key to identifying the stability of the atmosphere is interpretation of the early morning radiosonde observation, including temperature, humidity, and wind from the ground upward.
burning out of control. Aerial tankers, as well as hand crews, had been ineffective against this fire. The Oklahoma Division of Forestry reported a total of 35 fires that burned 7,669 acres (3,103 ha), while one fire roared over 2, acres (841 ha). Arkansas (State and National Forests) had a total of 142 fires which burned 12,559 acres (5,082 ha).
Air Stability the Key When fire weather conditions are conducive to many fires (i.e. large precipitation deficiency, and low relative humidities) the fire weath er meteorologist gives special attention to the stability of the atmosphere. The key to identifying this situation is interpretation of the early morning radiosonde
observation, including tempera ture, humidity, and wind from the ground upward, thousands of feet. The fire control agency, informed of dangerously unstable atmospher ic conditions by the fire weather meteorologist, is warned to expect erratic fire behavior. ■
Fire Management Today
JET STREAM INFLUENCE ON THE WILLOW
FIRE
John H. Dieterich
O
n June 13–17, 1956, the Dudley Lake Fire burned 21,389 acres (8,555 ha) on the Chevelon Ranger District of the Sitgreaves National Forest in Arizona. Nineteen years later, on June 17–19, 1975, the Willow Fire, burning on the same ranger dis trict and under remarkably similar conditions of fuel, weather, and topography, burned 2,850 acres (1,140 ha).
Following the Dudley Lake Fire, Vincent Schaefer, writing in the Journal of Forestry (Vol. 55, No. 6, June 1957), summarized the rela tionship between the jet stream and 23 large fires in the West dur ing the 1955 and 1956 fire seasons. His article was prompted in part by the unusual fire behavior observed on the Dudley Lake Fire, and in part by his interest in the jet stream as a dominant factor in the behavior of these problem fires.
As we began to put together the story of the Willow Fire, it became apparent that here was another case that could be added to Schaefer’s list of destructive fires that burned under the influence of the jet stream. While there were some rather obvious differences between the two fires—the most important being in area burned— there were a sufficient number of
When this article was originally published, John Dieterich was a research forester for the USDA Forest Service, Forest Hydrology Laboratory, Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, Tempe, AZ.
- The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 37(2) [Spring 1976]: 6–8.
The weather pattern on the two fires, particularly with regard to the jet stream, appeared to have been generated under nearly identical conditions.
Aerial view of wind-driven smoke column from the Dudley Lake Fire, June 14, 1956. The smoke column remained remarkably intact for several miles downward and was still readily identifiable in the vicinity of Mesa Verde National Park, 210 miles (340 km) to the northeast.
similarities to make the two fires interesting from a direct compari son standpoint.
Description of the Area The locations of the Dudley Lake and Willow Fires are shown in fig ure 1. On the Dudley Lake Fire, 18 percent of the area was in pri vate holdings (Aztec Land Co.)
while on the Willow Fire, 41 per cent of the area burned was being managed, at least in part, by Southwest Forest Industries. The Forest Service, however, provides fire protection for these lands within the protection boundaries.
Both fires were man-caused, and both occurred in terrain typical of the Mogollon Rim country—a flat
Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003
By current fuel treatment standards, even our best efforts at fuel reduction do not appear to provide much assistance in the control of high-intensity wind-driven fires.
the Dudley Lake Fire was estimated at 15,300 Btu/s/ft (126, cal/s/cm) and on the Willow Fire at 12,750 Btu/s/ft (105,315 cal/s/cm). The difference between these two was not sufficient to explain the difference in the final size of the two fires. More important is the fact that the Dudley Lake Fire burned as a high-intensity fire for nearly twice as long as the Willow Fire.
By way of comparison, the Sundance Fire in northern Idaho— considered a very high intensity fire—yielded an estimated maxi mum intensity of 22,500 Btu/s/ft (185,850 cal/s/cm) during its maxi mum run.
Fire Suppression Load
There was a considerable difference between the fire load being experi enced by the Forest Service’s Southwestern Region in 1956 and the number of fires burning when the Willow Fire broke out. During the 12-day period from June 8 to June 20 in 1956, eight Class E fires in addition to the Dudley Lake Fire were controlled or in the process of being controlled. Over 90,000 acres (36,000 ha) burned in Arizona in 1956—nearly three times the run ning 5-year average of 32,600 acres (13,040 ha).
During the Willow Fire the Region wasn’t experiencing this type of fire
load; in fact, the Willow Fire was the first big fire of any conse quence in the Region in 1975. Over 1,100 men were used on the Willow Fire, while only 750 men were employed on the Dudley Lake Fire, even though it was several times larger. Fire suppression costs on the Willow Fire were estimated at nearly $700,000, four times the suppression costs on the Dudley Lake Fire ($175,000). The per-acre suppression costs were about 30 times as high on the Willow Fire ($245.61) as they were on the Dudley Lake Fire ($8.18)—a fact that shouldn’t surprise anyone.
There were some interesting simi larities in the fire suppression measures taken on the two fires. On the Dudley Lake Fire, only hand crews and heavy equipment were used because, in 1955 and 1956, aircraft were just beginning to be tested for dropping water on fires. On the Willow Fire, most of the suppression effort also came from hand crews and heavy equipment because the winds were so strong that aircraft use was limited to the early morning hours.
Lessons Learned In summary, the following facts are evident:
- First, forecasting unusually strong surface winds, especially those that are associated with the
jet stream or abrupt changes in pressure patterns, is perhaps the most important single activity for the fire weather forecaster. Forecasting units may currently be doing this operationally, but additional “red flag” emphasis should be given to these situa tions when they occur.
- Second, when fires start under these severe wind conditions, or if fires that are burning come under the influence of winds over 30 miles per hour (48 km/h), the chances are good that they will continue to spread until the weather changes, or until they run out of fuel.
- Finally, by current fuel treatment standards, even our best efforts at fuel reduction do not appear to be adequate to provide much assistance in the control of high- intensity wind-driven fires such as the Dudley Lake and Willow Fires. If fuel treatment is the answer, it will need to be done on a level that is far more extensive (area) and intensive (fuel reduc tion) than we are now accom plishing—even on our best fuel breaks.
Reference Byram, G.M. 1959. Combustion of forest fuels. In: Davis, K.P., ed. Forest fires: Control and use. New York, NY: McGraw- Hill, Inc.: 61–89. ■
Volume 63 • No. 4 • Fall 2003
PREDICTING MAJOR WILDLAND FIRE
OCCURRENCE
Edward A. Brotak and William E. Reifsnyder
D
uring a drought period when the build-up index is very high, wildfires are common. On some days, these small fires quickly get out of hand, and some become major fires. Obviously, any forecasting method which could determine when these major fires were likely to occur would be most useful. The following details such a predictive scheme from readily available weather maps. No calcu lations are necessary, just recogni tion of certain clearly defined situ ations.
Using Weather Maps The original data analyzed consist ed of 52 fires, each burning 5, acres (2,000 ha) or more, in the Eastern United States from 1963 to 1973 (see fig. 1). Of particular con cern were major fire runs, periods of time when the fire was probably uncontrollable due to the prevail ing weather conditions. Figure 2 is an idealized surface map showing where these major fire runs oc curred in relation to the existing fronts and high and low pressure areas. Certain regions were obvi ously prone to large fires.
The region immediately behind a dry cold front is the most danger ous. Strong, shifting winds are the
When this article was originally published, E.A. Brotak was a research assistant and W.E. Reifsnyder was a professor of forest meteorology at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, New Haven, CT.
- The article is reprinted from Fire Management Notes 38(2) [Spring 1977]: 5–8. It is based on A Synoptic Study of the Meteorological Conditions Associated With Major Wildland Fires, E.A. Brotak’s Ph.D. dissertation at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.
Dangerous frontal situations will be characterized by strong winds, a tight pressure gradient, and little or no precipitation with the frontal passage.
Figure 1— Locations of all fires.
apparent cause. Strong southerly winds ahead of the cold front can also cause control difficulties. Obviously, if significant precipita tion occurs with the frontal pas sage, fire danger will not be great.
Another region of great danger is the warm sector of a strong low pressure area (as indicated by the cluster of runs to the east–south east of the low in figure 2). There were two different types of low pressure areas involved with major fires. One was the Rocky Mountain low which produced dangerous fire
conditions in the Plains and Mid western States. The other kind of low was a storm which moved east erly through southern Canada pro ducing dangerous fire conditions in the Great Lakes States and in northern New England. Major lows in the Eastern United States are almost always accompanied by pre cipitation.
If only the surface maps are avail able, then these dangerous situa tions can only be distinguished from other similar situations by a closer examination of the map.
Fire Management Today