Why Civil Resistance Works, Study Guides, Projects, Research of History

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Why Civil Resistance Works

Erica Chenoweth, Ph.D.

Wesleyan University

April 8, 2010

Project Scope

• The Project Does Not:
  • Explain the emergence of different campaigns
  • Examine cases outside of the three issue areas (i.e., civil rights, anB‐war, etc.)
  • Argue that nonviolent campaigns are morally superior to violent campaigns
  • Establish a formula for campaign success
  • Focus on the human experience of conflict
• Goals of the Project:
  • Assess the empirical validity of the convenBonal wisdom
  • Compare trends in the outcomes of nonviolent and violent campaigns
  • Explore the condiBons under which campaigns succeed and fail
  • Make some claims about the strategic uBlity of different approaches to poliBcal contestaBon

Introducing NAVCO

• Nonviolent and Violent Campaign Outcomes Dataset
  • 323 campaigns from 1900‐
  • Ideal types: nonviolent and violent
  • Campaign goals: regime change, anB‐occupaBon,

secession

• Unit of analysis: campaign end year
• Examples of typical variables
  • Campaign peak membership
  • Security force defecBons
  • Violent government repression
  • Material support received from a foreign state
  • Regime type, regime capabiliBes, country populaBon, etc.

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 1940‐1949 1950‐1959 1960‐1969 1970‐1979 1980‐1989 1990‐1999 2000‐ Nonviolent Violent Figure 2. Success Rates by Decade, 1940‐ p=.

The Puzzle

Why has nonviolent resistance been more effecBve than violent insurgency in the 20 th century?

Explaining ParBcipaBon in Nonviolent Resistance

• Lower physical barriers
• Lower informaBonal barriers
• Lower moral barriers
• Fewer commitment problems

9.5 10 10 10 10.

10.5 11 11 11 11.

11.5 12 12 12 Logged Membership, fitted values Logged Membership, fitted values Logged Membership, fitted valuesViolent Campaigns Violent Campaigns Violent CampaignsNonviolent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns Figure 1. The Effects of Campaign Type on Campaign ParBcipaBon p=.

0 0

. .2. . .4. . .6. . .8 5 5 510 10 1015 15 155 5 510 10 1015 15 15 Violent Campaigns Violent Campaigns Violent CampaignsNonviolent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns Nonviolent CampaignsPr(defect) Pr(defect) Pr(defect)log members log members log members Figure 3. The Effects of Campaign Membership on the Probability of Security Force DefecBons, by Campaign Type p=.

The Effects of Repression

• Though repression is quite common against nonviolent and violent campaigns, its effects vary - Violent campaigns facing government repression

are less than 20% likely to succeed

• Nonviolent campaigns facing repression are over

46% likely to succeed

• Backfire ohen results from government repression
• The state cannot repress all of the people all of the Bme.

The Consequences of Insurgency

• Violent campaigns create “structural violence” long aher the insurgency ends
• Nonviolent campaigns are more likely to improve governance and stability - Democracy - Civil peace

Post‐Conflict Regime Type

Violent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns Probability of Being a Democracy Five Years a;er the Conflict Has Ended

P=.

Post‐Conflict Civil War Onset

Violent Campaigns Nonviolent Campaigns Probability of Experiencing a Civil War within Ten Years of the End of the Conflict

P=.

Study LimitaBons

• Considers only ideal types
  • Nonviolent and violent campaigns
  • Two broad categories of goals
• Over‐aggregated unit of analysis
  • Campaign as the unit of analysis, rather than different

tacBcal choices (or non‐events)

• Fails to capture the iteraBve nature of the conflict

(inter‐group and campaign vs. state interacBons) over

Bme.

• StaBsBcs show only correlaBon, not causaBon.