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THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN
DIPLOMACY:
WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS
D γ far the most influential American revisionist in terpreter of the origins of the Cold War has been William Appleman Williams. As early as 1952, a time when the political and intellectual climate was most uncongenial to such interpretations, Williams's American-Russian Rela tions, 1781-1947 anticipated many of the themes later revisionists would amplify. Then, in 1959, his more so phisticated The Tragedy of American Diplomacy ap peared, a book which a sympathetic scholar has called "perhaps the finest interpretive essay on American for eign policy ever written," and which even an unfriendly reviewer conceded was "brilliant."^1 In addition to his own writing, Williams inspired a number of younger scholars —some his own students—who themselves went on to publish variations on his themes. It is scarcely an exag geration to say that much of the existing revisionist, or "New Left," literature on the subject amounts to little more than extended footnotes on interpretations Williams first put forward. (^1) (Cleveland: World, 1959; rev. and enl. edn., New York: Dell, 1962.) The first quotation is from David Horowitz's The Free World Colossus (rev. edn., New York: Hill and Wang, 1971), 4; the second from A. A. Berle, Jr.'s review of Williams's book in the New York Times Book Review, February 15, 1959.
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
In his earlier work, American-Russian Relations, Wil-
liams candidly admitted that the dearth of available docu-
ments limited him to presenting "no more than a review
of the central features of recent relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union."^2 Yet the basic
framework upon which he would later elaborate was
made clear. Contradicting the prevailing notion that the
Cold War had come about through the actions of an
aggressive and expansionist Soviet Union, Williams ar-
gued that the United States itself bore the primary re-
sponsibility. Even before Pearl Harbor, he wrote, Ameri-
can policymakers had committed themselves to achieving
a postwar world dominated by an alliance between Great
Britain and the United States. By attempting to force
upon Russia this Anglo-American world order without
regard to her minimum security needs, American leaders
forced an essentially conservative Soviet Union into act-
ing unilaterally in her own defense. Williams's analyses
of the means through which the United States supposedly
tried to coerce Russia—manipulation of Lend Lease and
loans, brandishing atomic weapons, etc.—would later be-
come staple items in revisionist fare.^8
It was in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, partic-
ularly the revised edition of 1962 (by which time impor-
tant sources such as the Potsdam Papers had become
available), that Williams spelled out his more mature
views. The "tragedy" of American foreign policy, he con-
tended, was the evolution of the Open Door Policy "from
a Utopian idea into an ideology, from an intellectual out-
(^2) American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1952), 258. (^3) Ibid., Chapter IX.
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
classic personification of the entire Open Door Policy."^6 He and his advisors pursued ends that made the Cold War inevitable. In contrast with the United States' global pretensions, according to Williams, Russian objectives were far more limited. Stalin resolved the contradiction between "the expansive prophecy of Marx about world revolution" and "a realistic, Marxian analysis of world conditions" in a most conservative manner.^7 He was adamant on only three points: Russia must obtain friendly governments on her western periphery, the wherewithal to rebuild her war- torn economy, and guarantees that Germany would not again become a threat to her safety. Everything else was negotiable. Had the United States helped—or merely per mitted—Russia to gain these modest ends, there would have been no Cold War. But in their quest for an Open Door in Eastern Europe (which to Williams meant the existence of pro-Western governments there), American leaders contested the first of Russia's minimum condi tions and subsequently pursued strategies which jeopard ized the other two. The mortal weakness of Williams's interpretation lay in his inability to produce even the scantiest evidence that American pohcymakers actually regarded an Open Door in Eastern Europe as the critical factor, rather than as one of many subsidiary goals, in relations with Russia. In lieu of such evidence he quoted a number of govern ment officials and businessmen on the overall importance of trade and investment in the postwar world.^8 None of the statements cited were made with any particular ref- β Ibid., 205, 239. 7 Ibid., 206. (^8) Ibid., 232-239.
WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS
erence to Eastern Europe, however, nor did Williams even try (except through his own repeated assertions) to demonstrate that the authors of those comments consid- ered Eastern Europe as a very important factor in their assessments. Using the same procedures he could have as convincingly shown that American leaders were desper- ately concerned with achieving an Open Door in even the most insignificant areas. In the single passage where he did put forward mate- rial having to do specifically with Eastern Europe, Wil- liams wrote as follows:
By the end of the month, in preparation for the Potsdam Conference, the American position concerning the coun- tries of eastern Europe had become clear and firm. The United States planned "to insist on the reorganization of the present governments or the holding of free general elections." The broad objective was phrased in the clas- sic terms of the Open Door Policy: "To permit Ameri- can nationals to enter, move about freely and carry on commercial and government operations unmolested in the countries in question." The goal was "access, on equal terms, to such trade, raw materials and industry" as existed and developed. In the meantime, such access was sought "to modify existing arrangements." As part of that general effort, American officials planned to demand unrestricted movement for American newspapermen so that "the spotlight [can be] trained on these areas."^9
In reality, this "clear and firm" policy Williams con- structed himself by mixing together portions of three sepa- rate position papers, only one of which had anything at all
' Ibid., 245.
WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS
ably expect the sources to be brimming with references
to the drive to obtain an Open Door in Eastern Europe.
Not so, Williams argued in an earlier passage. "American
leaders had internalized, and had come to believe, the
theory, the necessity, and the morality of open-door ex-
pansion," he wrote. "Hence they seldom thought it neces-
sary to explain or defend the approach."^13
Whatever the validity of this "proof by lack of evi-
dence" thesis, Williams himself contradicted it in his own
pages. Referring to American goals in Manchuria, he
showed through copious quotations that American offi-
cials, most notably Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson
and W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to Russia, were
very much concerned to maintain the Open Door in that
area. "Stimson," Williams wrote, "seems to have set him-
self the role of special tutor to Truman and [Secretary of
State] Byrnes on the importance of the Open Door Policy
in the Far East."^14 Why American policymakers had no
need to mention the Open Door in Eastern Europe be-
cause the pohcy had become "internalized," yet referred
to it frequently and by name in discussions over Man-
churia (the site of its original application), Williams
failed to make clear. Equally mysterious is why Stimson
should feel the need to appoint himself "special tutor" to
a man whom Williams described as the "classic personifi-
cation" of the Open Door Pohcy. It is difficult to escape
the conclusion that where Williams had the facts he used
them, and where he could find none he claimed their very
absence corroborated his interpretation.
(^13) Tragedy, 206 (Williams's emphasis). " Ibid., 245-
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Williams devoted a good deal of attention to the Pots- dam Conference (July 16-August 2, 1945), using it to show how American officials pursued their strategies. Stalin, according to Williams, came to Potsdam in quest of humble goals: "He was still concerned about Russia's frontiers in Europe, about preventing Germany from try- ing it all over in another 25 years, and about a major economic transfusion for the Soviet Union's battered economy."^15 Convinced that the United States possessed effective economic leverage, emboldened by reports of the successful atomic tests (which arrived as the confer- ence got under way), American negotiators sought to force Russian acquiescence in Eastern Europe by deny- ing her even these minimum demands. Wilhams's version of the discussions at Potsdam supported his theme, but scarcely resembles what actually took place. One of the techniques Williams used most often in Tragedy was to construct imaginary speeches and dia- logues by splicing together phrases uttered at different times and on diverse subjects. His presentation of Stalin's opening statements at the first plenary meeting is typical:
"This council," Stalin remarked in explaining the So- viet view of the conference at its first general session, "will deal with reparations and will give an indication of the day when the Peace Conference should meet." The primary political issue, he continued, was that of dealing with Germany and its former allies. That was "high policy. The purpose of such a policy was to sepa- rate these countries from Germany as a great force." Recurring often to the "many difficulties and sacrifices" (^15) Ibid., 246.
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
arations settlements on the other. The Americans believed
they could "bargain from a position of formidable pow-
er," in Williams's view, because "Byrnes knew, when he
told Molotov on July 20 that reparations were not 'an
immediate problem,' that the atom bomb was a success."^20
But what Williams neglected to mention was that Byrnes's
statement did not pertain to reparations from Germany,
which was the crux of the matter; he was telling Molotov
that since the United States at the time was pouring
money into Italy to keep her from going under, repara-
tions from Italy were not "an immediate problem."^21
Byrnes's remark, when read in its proper context, is ir-
relevant to Williams's thesis.
The United States altered its position on reparations
(though not its ultimate goals) a few days later, one learns
in Tragedy, when it became clear that Russia would not
back off from her demands regardless of American eco-
nomic power or possession of the bomb. On July 23, there-
fore, Byrnes proposed that each nation take reparations
from its own zone of occupation. This suggestion, to Wil-
liams, meant "that the Russians would have a free hand in
their zone of Germany and throughout eastern Europe"
because "the freedom to control economics implied—de-
manded—political control." Yet, "the fascinating thing
is that the Russians fought that proposal for one whole
week — from July 23 to July 31 — before Stalin finally
(^20) Ibid., 248 (Williams's emphasis). (^21) Potsdam Papers n, 148. The entire statement reads: "Mr. Byrnes pointed out that the United States Government has al- ready advanced $200,000,000 to Italy and would probably have to advance $400,000,000 or $500,000,000 more. Therefore rep- arations do not seem to the United States to be an immediate problem."
WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS
agreed to it. Even then, he remarked very sharply that it was 'the opposite of liberal.' "^22 Why did the Russians oppose such an offer, and why did the United States make it? The answer to both ques- tions, according to Williams, is that the American pro- posal would have denied Russia badly needed industrial equipment from the Ruhr Valley (which lay within the Western zone) and excluded her from participating in the control of German industry. By refusing to tie the ques- tion of German war potential to that of reparations, Wil- liams wrote, the United States could afford to make con- cessions on the latter issue because it still possessed as tools the bomb and Russian fear of a resurgent Germany. "American leaders were certain that the bomb, and Rus- sia's great recovery needs," as he put it, "provided them with the leverage to re-establish the Open Door, and pro- Western governments, in eastern Europe."^23 The evidence Williams cited to prove this "new" strat- egy is as spurious as that he used to substantiate the old one. In order to show that American officials understood that the "meaning" of the arrangement that each power would take reparations from its own zone was that it would in effect "give Russia a free hand," Williams cited a "memorandum" written by Assistant Secretary of State Will Clayton after the Conference adjourned: Although he was formally denying the point he was raising, the tone of his remarks needs no comment. "There appears to be," he noted ruefully, "an unfortu- nate tendency to interpret the reparations operating agreement as an indication of complete abandonment (^22) Tragedy, 250 (Williams's emphasis). (^23) Ibid., 253.
WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS
This "exchange" also misrepresented what the docu ments contain. First, Molotov's remarks were not made in a single conversation, as Williams presented them; they were taken from notes on two separate meetings. Far more important, Williams's use of ellipses distorted the sense of Byrnes's replies. In response to Molotov's query about each country's having a "free hand," for instance, Byrnes said "that was true in substance but he had in mind working out arrangements for the exchange of needed products between the zones, for example, from the Ruhr if the British agreed, machinery and equipment could be removed and exchanged with the Soviet authori ties for goods—food and coal—in the Soviet zone." Wil liams also failed to mention that Byrnes assured Molotov "that under his scheme nothing was changed in regard to overall treatment of German finance, transport, foreign trade, etc."^27 By culling out phrases and isolated sentences from the sources, Williams badly garbled what Byrnes's proposal was all about and how the Russians reacted to it. As a final example of his contention that both the Americans and Russians understood that Byrnes's pro posal meant giving over political control to each nation in its own zone, Williams alluded to a conversation among the heads-of-state during which, he said, Stalin "extended" Byrnes's proposal "in a way that clearly fore shadowed the division of Europe. The specific issue in volved the assignment of German assets in other Euro pean countries, but the discussion immediately picked up overtones of a far broader nature." 2 7 Potsdam Papers π, 439-440, 450, 474.
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
PREMIER STALIN:... with regard to shares and for eign investments, perhaps the demarcation lines between the Soviet and Western zones of occupation should be taken as the dividing lines and everything west of that line would go to the Allies and everything east of that line to the Russians. THE PRESIDENT [TRUMAN] inquired if he meant a line running from the Baltic to the Adriatic. PREMIER STALIN replied in the affirmative.... [BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY] BEViN said he agreed and asked if Greece would belong to Britain.... PREMIER STALIN suggested that the Allies take Yugo slavia and Austria would be divided into zones.... MR. BYRNES said he thought it was important to have a meeting of minds. Mr. Bevin's question was whether the Russians' claim was limited to the zone occupied by the Russian Army. To that he understood Mr. Stalin to say "yes." If that were so he was prepared to agree. PREMIER STALIN replied in the affirmative.... THE PRESIDENT [TRUMAN] said that he agreed with the Soviet proposal.^28 Once again, Williams's use of hiatuses abused the histor ical record. A look at the entire exchange reveals that the discussions never deviated from the subject of Ger man investments and assets, nor did they at any time "pick up overtones of a far broader nature."2 9 Williams himself produced this effect by selecting appropriate comments scattered throughout the talks and placing 2 8 Tragedy, 252. 2 9 (^) Potsdam Papers π, 566-569.
THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
phrase "involving the future strength of German indus try." The statement about the Soviets wanting "clear re plies to the questions," taken from a different page in the source, in context referred to a report submitted by the Reparations Commission (upon which a Russian mem ber sat).3 3^ Placing these elements together as though they represented an exchange over the question of Germany's war potential showed remarkable ingenuity but rather small concern for fealty to the sources. Throughout his account of the negotiations at Pots dam, Williams repeatedly asserted that American officials acted as they did out of their determination to achieve an Open Door in Eastern Europe. He did not, however, produce any evidence that this was true. In the source he used for his analysis, the Potsdam Papers, the sole refer ence to an Open Door made at the Conference appeared as the last sentence in an American proposal headed USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELLITE REPARATIONS OR "WAR TROPHIES." This proposal was circulated on July 25, accepted by the Conference "on principle," and the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through normal diplomatic channels.^34 The 3 3 Ibid., 428. "MR. MOLOTOV said that the Soviet delegation re garded the work done by the Commission on Reparations as un satisfactory. He said that they should have clear replies to the questions under discussion or should direct them to other chan nels in case they were unable to solve them themselves." (Empha sis added.) 3 4 Potsdam Papers π, 545-546, 744-745, 1498. Since the completion of this manuscript a new revisionist work has appeared, Bruce Kuklick's American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972). Like Williams, Kuklick argues that the United States at Potsdam departed from the Yalta agree-
WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS
issue of an Open Door was discussed neither at the heads- of-state level nor in the conferences of the foreign minis ters. Perhaps, as Williams claimed, American officials had so "internalized" the Open Door Policy that they felt no need to discuss it among themselves. It is very odd, how ever, that they failed to call Stalin's attention to it. How could they expect the various strategies Williams assigned to them to work if Stalin himself did not know what it
ments on reparations as a means of forcing Russia to grant the American demand for "multilateralism" (a variation of Wil liams's Open Door) in Eastern Europe. Although somewhat more accurate in his handling of sources than most revisionists, Kuklick has written a grievously flawed book. In contending that Roosevelt at Yalta committed the United States to a reparations figure of approximately 20 billion dollars (half to go to Russia) when he consented to use this amount as the "basis" for future discussions, for instance, Kuklick unaccountably fails to mention the "considerations" upon which this sum was based. Among these were estimates of Germany's national wealth, the amount of destruction likely to be caused by the war, and what would be necessary to provide Germany with "living standards compa rable to those prevailing in Central Europe." Presumably the ac tual reparations figure would be adjusted on the basis of how widely the situation at war's end differed from Russian estimates. By the time of the Postdam Conference, however, these estimates were irrelevant. The Soviet Union had turned over to Poland almost one-fifth of prewar Germany, the remaining four-fifths would have to sustain the population (8½ million) of the ceded area, Russia had stripped away whatever she could under the name of "war booty" (not to be counted as reparations), and no systematic evaluation of actual war damage had been carried out. Thus, as one American official put it, the "situation was radically altered" by the time of the Potsdam Conference. Kuklick men tions some of these facts but, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary (see Potsdam Papers π, 830ff.), asserts that they did not figure importantly in American thinking. He also converts
WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS
there "with two approaches to the postwar world. One was based on receiving a large loan from the United States. His overtures in this direction were answered with vague and unrewarding replies."^35 Actually, Stalin made no mention of this matter at Yalta. The only reference to it occurred during the following exchange:
MR. MOLOTOV indicated that the Soviet Government expected to receive reparations from Germany in kind and hoped that the United States would furnish the So viet Union with long-term credits. [Secretary of State] MR. STETTINIUS stated that his Government had studied this question and that he per sonally was ready to discuss it at any time with Mr. Molotov. This could be done here as well as later either in Moscow or in Washington.^38
The subject was not raised again through the entire con ference. Stalin's "overtures" and the United States' "vague and unrewarding replies" existed only in Williams's imag ination. Again on the subject of a loan, which bulks large in Tragedy, Williams contended that Secretary Byrnes "had neither time nor interest for the idea of working out some agreement with the Russians... ." Byrnes, according to Williams, "even sidetracked the basic memorandum deal ing with the issue. Ί had it placed in the "Forgotten File," ' he later revealed, 'as I felt sure that Fred Vinson, the new Secretary of the Treasury, would not press it.' "3 7 8 5 Tragedy, 223. 3 6 Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 610. Hereafter cited as Yalta Papers. 37 Tragedy, 239.
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But the "it" Byrnes placed in the "Forgotten File" was not, as Williams claimed, the "basic memorandum" on the issue. It was a memorandum written by the former Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., which suggested a larger loan at a lower interest rate than the Russians themselves had asked for.^38 Whatever Byrnes's culpability in the failure of negotiations for a loan, the evidence Williams cited was irrelevant to the issue. Concerning the atomic bomb, Williams stated une- quivocally that "the United States dropped the bomb to end the war against Japan and thereby stop the Russians in Asia, and to give them sober pause in eastern Europe." Part of his evidence for this interpretation is contained in the following paragraph: The decision to bomb Japan as quickly as possible was made during the Potsdam Conference, and at the very time of the toughest discussions about eastern Europe. In a very candid meeting on July 23, 1945, Truman, General George C. Marshall, Stimson and others gen- erally agreed that the Russians were no longer needed in the war against Japan. They also talked very directly of using the bomb before the Russians could enter that conflict. Actually, however, that was not a new ap- proach. Stimson had recommended as early as July 2, 1945, that the bomb should be dropped at a time when "the Russian attack, if actual, must not have progressed too far." And once it had proved out in the test, Truman was "intensely pleased" with the chance of using it be- fore the Russians even entered the war.^39 (^38) James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 310. (^39) Tragedy, 253-254 (Williams's emphasis).
