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THE STEPHEN LAWRENCE
INQUIRY
REPORT OF AN INQUIRY
BY SIR WILLIAM MACPHERSON OF CLUNY
ADVISED BY
TOM COOK, THE RIGHT REVEREND DR JOHN SENTAMU, DR
RICHARD STONE
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty.
February 1999
Cm 4262-I
Volume I
CONTENTS
Paragraph
Prelim
CHAPTER ONE
The Murder of Stephen Lawrence
CHAPTER TWO
Since the Murder
CHAPTER THREE
The Inquiry
Terms of Reference 3. Limited immunity (^) 3. The Commissioner's intervention 20.4.98 3. The Advisers 3. Counsel and Solicitors 3. The Secretariat 3.
CHAPTER FOUR
Mr & Mrs Lawrence and Stephen
CHAPTER FIVE
Duwayne Brooks
His evidence 5. At the scene (^) 5. Stereotyped 5. At the hospital 5. At Plumstead Police Station 5. Liaison 5. His prosecution (^) 5. Conclusion 5.
CHAPTER SIX
Racism
Kent Report 6. Racism (^) 6. Institutional racism 6. Unwitting racism 6. Failure of first investigation 6. The Commissioner's view 6. The MPS Black Police Association's view (^) 6. 1990 Trust 6. Commission for Racial Equality 6. Dr Robin Oakley 6. Dr Benjamin Bowling 6.
CHAPTER ELEVEN
CHAPTER TWELVE
I Arrival at the Scene of Senior Officers
II The Hospital
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Conclusion (^) 15.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
The Incident Room
Detective Sergeant Peter Flook
DS Flook 16. Ignorance of job description (^) 16. Multiple roles 16. HOLMES inadequately serviced 16. Delay 16. Red Astra car 16. Cross-examination as to the family (^) 16. Mr Imran Khan 16. Lack of control 16. Conclusion 16.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
House to House Inquiries
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
Surveillance
No plan or record 18. Priority 18. Black binliners, 26.4.93 (^) 18. Black binliners, 27.4.93 18. Conclusion 18.
CHAPTER NINETEEN
Detective Sergeant John Davidson, and
Handling of Certain Witnesses
James Grant 19. Detective Sergeant John Davidson 19. Lack of documents 19. James Grant, 27.4.93 19. James Grant, 6.5.93 (^) 19. Registration of James Grant 19. Witness B 19. Arrest and interview of Gary Dobson 19. Detective Sergeant Davidson's views as to motive 19. Unwitting racism (^) 19. Conclusions 19.
CHAPTER TWENTY
The Elimination of the Suspects and the red Astra car
Red Astra at scene 20. 30.4.93, red Astra car stopped (^) 20.
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
Details as to 3 June 1993 and
CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT
CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE
CHAPTER THIRTY
CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE
CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO
CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE
CHAPTER THIRTY-SIX
CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN
CHAPTER THIRTY-EIGHT
CHAPTER THIRTY-NINE CHAPTER FORTY CHAPTER FORTY-ONE
- The Inquiry's "definition" 6.
- Professor Simon Holdaway 6.
- Institutional racism present 6.
- ACPO view 6.
- Mr Paul Pugh 6.
- The Home Secretary 6.
- Research 7. The Five Suspects
- Other offences 7.
- Witness K 7.
- Witness B 7.
- 1994 Surveillance 7.
- Evidence at the Inquiry 7.
- Divisional Court ruling 7.
- Perjury 7.
- 'Autrefois acquit' 7.
- The allegation 8. Corruption and Collusion
- Standard of proof 8.
- The "Norris factor" 8.
- Sergeant XX 8.
- Conclusion 8.
- The allegation 9. The Stacey Benefield Case
- Identification 9.
- The alleged bribe 9.
- Raymond Dewar's trial 9.
- David Norris' trial 9.
- Acquittal of David Norris 9.
- Conclusion 9.
- Mr & Mrs Taaffe 10. First Aid
- Duwayne Brooks 10.
- Doctors' opinion 10.
- PC James Geddis & Mrs Geddis 10.
- PCs Linda Bethel & Anthony Gleason 10.
- Training inadequate 10.
- Senior officers present 10.
- PC Gleason's actions 10.
- ABC of First Aid 10.
- PC Joanne Smith 10.
- Treatment of Duwayne Brooks at scene and hospital 10.
- Paramedics 10.
- The Avery sisters 10.
- Inspector Steven Groves 10.
- The experts: Mr Graham Cook 10.
- Mr David Sadler 10.
- PC Stephen Hughes 10.
- Conclusions 10.
- Lack of command and organisation 11. Initial Response
- Lack of documents 11.
- Inspector Groves' notes 11.
- TSG carriers 11.
- Mr Groves goes to Welcome Inn 11.
- Mobile search 11.
- Disarray 11.
- Other TSG vehicles 11.
- Cordons 11.
- Other senior officers present 11.
- Absence of logs 11.
- Control non-existent 11.
- Duwayne Brooks 11.
- The red Astra car 11.
- Lack of information 11.
- Lack of direction and control 11.
- Summary 11.
- Disagreement with Kent 11.
- Chief Inspector Jonathan McIvor 12. III Arrival of the CID
- Chief Superintendent Christopher Benn 12.
- Inspector Ian Little 12.
- Mr Little arrives 12. THE HOSPITAL
- Words used by Mr Little 12.
- of Stephen Lawrence 12. Visit to resuscitation room for identification
- Further conversation with Mr Lawrence 12.
- Lack of sensitivity of Mr Little 12.
- Lack of arrangements for Mr & Mrs Lawrence 12.
- Unwitting racism 12.
- Miss Mandy Lavin 12.
- DC Steven Pye 12. The CID
- Detective Inspector Philip Jeynes 12.
- Chief Superintendent John Philpott 12.
- Conclusion 12.
- Appointment as SIO 13. The First Senior Investigating Officer
- Main complaint of Mr & Mrs Lawrence 13.
- Fundamental error 13.
- Mr Crampton at the scene 13.
- Appointment of family liaison officers 13.
- Briefings 13.
- Start of vital information - 23.4.93 13.
- Arrival of 'James Grant' - 23.4.93 13.
- Second visit of 'James Grant' - 24.4.93 13.
- Anonymous letters (Witness FF) 13.
- Decision not to arrest 13.
- No record of decision 13.
- 7 May arrests. Words used 13.
- Search upon arrest for other offence 13.
- No policy file entry, or apparent examination by senior officers 13.
- Handover to Mr Weeden 13.
- Fundamental misjudgment 13.
- Clifford Norris 13.
- Lack of connection 13.
- Sergeant XX 13.
- Mr Crampton's reference 13.
- Conclusion re Sergeant XX 13.
- No corruption or collusion 13.
- Duwayne Brooks 13.
- Resources 13.
- Conclusion 13.
- Post-script as to grounds for arrest 13.
- Conclusion 13.
- Handover 14. Detective Superintendent Brian Weeden
- DIO not HOLMES trained 14.
- Continuation of strategy 14.
- Arrest on reasonable grounds for suspicion 14.
- Failure to arrest fundamental 14.
- Witness K 14.
- Source of James Grant's information 14.
- Witness B 14.
- Registration of James Grant 14.
- Mr Weeden's honesty not impugned 14.
- No racism as to investigation duties 14.
- Norris connection 14.
- No conspiracy 14.
- Criticism of surveillance 14.
- Red Astra car 14.
- Outside pressures as to arrest on 7 May 14.
- Opinion as to discontinuance 14.
- Detective Sergeant Christopher Crowley 14.
- Family Liaison 14.
- Mr Weeden's briefing notes 14.
- "Bombardment" by letter 14.
- Failure to deal appropriately with family 14.
- Unwitting racism 14.
- Responsibility for failure of liaison 14.
- Duwayne Brooks 14.
- Conclusion 14.
- Service 15. Detective Inspector Benjamin Bullock
- Ignorance of AMIP guidelines 15.
- HOLMES 15.
- James Grant 15.
- Clifford Norris 15.
- Norris connection 15.
- Family liaison 15.
- Delay 20.
- Detective Constable Michael Tomlin 20.
- Conclusions as to Red Astra 20.
- Examples of other failures 20.
- Blue Stewart 20.
- Michael Bunn 20.
- Bradley & Scott Lamb 20.
- Conclusion 20.
- Dates of parades 21. Identification Parades and Fair Haired Attacker
- 7.5.93 21.
- 13.5.93 21.
- Neil Acourt 21.
- 24.5.93 21.
- 3.6.93 Luke Knight identified 21.
- Improper control 21.
- The fair haired attacker 21.
- The allegation 22. Mr Brooks' contact with Detective Sergeant Christopher Crowley
- Escort duty. 3.6.93 22.
- Date of DS Crowley's statement 22.
- Mr Brooks' "conversation" 22.
- Return to Plumstead 2 2.
- Central Criminal Court 22.
- Conclusion 22.
- Norris connection 22.
- Rolan Adams case 22.
- The allegation 22.
- Mr Cattini 22.
- Alleged robbery 22.
- Statements taken by DS Crowley 22.
- Mr Macdonald's concession 22.5
- Conclusion 22.
- Mr Ilsley 27.
- Changeover of SIO 27.
- Pressures in 3 Area 27.
- Press conference 27.
- Mr Ilsley's role in family liaison 27.
- 6.5.93 Mr Ilsley takes over 27.
- The folded note 27.
- Mr Ilsley's views on Mr Khan 27.
- Decision as to arrest 27.
- Barker Review 27.
- James Grant 27.
- No corruption 27.
- The Norrises 27.
- Sergeant XX 27.
- No intrusive surveillance 27.
- Barker Review 27.
- Conclusion 27.
- Review launched 28. The Barker Review
- Change of Commander (Ops) 28.
- Setting up Terms of Reference 28.
- Mr Blenkin signs Terms of Reference 28.
- Guidelines 28.
- Terms of Reference (see Appendix) 28.
- Kent and the Review 28.
- Inquiry's reaction 28.
- Inhibiting fetters 28.
- Notes lost 28.
- Two versions of Review 28.
- Failure to deal with information 28.
- Mr Barker pulled his punches 28.
- The family. Institutional racism 28.
- Doubtful sources. 28.
- The Commissioner's personal involvement 28. Reception and response to the Review
- Circulation of Review 28.
- Discussion with Commander and Commissioner 28.
- Correspondence with Commissioner - and meetings 20.4.94 28.
- Commissioner's answer to Chairman 28.
- Commissioner's comments 28.
- Conclusion 28.
- Mr Osland 29. Deputy Assistant Commissioner David Osland
- The chain of command 29.
- Staffing 29.
- Grounds for arrest 29.
- Note to the Commissioner 2 9.
- Family Liaison myths 29.
- Decision to arrest 29.
- The Barker Review 29.
- Instructions to Mr Barker 29.
- Acceptance of the Review 29.
- Public criticism of Mr & Mrs Lawrence 29.
- Mr Osland and Greenwich Council 29.
- Conclusion 29.
- Mr Johnston 30. Assistant Commissioner Ian Johnston
- The apology on his own behalf and for the Commissioner 30.
- Racism 30.
- The second investigation 30.
- Statement after the Inquest 30.
- The Barker Review 30.
- Treatment of Duwayne Brooks 30.
- Conclusion 30.
- Mr Adams 31. Commander Raymond Adams
- Notices 31.
- Allegation 31.
- Policy file entry 31.
- Notice 31.
- Correspondence with and from Mr Khan 31.
- Mr Adams' letter 30.4.93 31.
- The Norrises 31.
- Mr Adams' health 31.
- No suggestion made of corrupt connections 31.
- Conclusion 31.
- Mr Burdis and his team 32.
- His experience 32.
- HOLMES system 32.
- Category B 32.
- Staffing derisory 32.
- Staffing over Bank Holiday 32.
- No research staff 32.
- Lack of rigour in tracing 32.
- Handling of Witness B 32.
- Indexing to high standard 32.
- Conclusion as to staffing 32.
- Commander James Gibson's role and duty 32.
- Mr Osland's power to add to resources 32.
- Comparative figures for staff 32.
- Conclusion 32.
- Mr Weeden delays retirement 33. The Second Investigation
- Mr Perry Nove head of new SE Area 33.
- Second investigation fresh start 33.
- Mr Mellish to be SIO 33.
- Decision to arrest in first investigation 33.
- Radical and innovative strategy 33.
- Decision to arrest Clifford Norris 33.
- Arrest of Clifford Norris 33.
- Instrusive Surveillance 33.
- Transcript 33.
- "Schooling" of suspects 33.
- Gary Dobson interviewed 33.
- The private prosecution 33.
- Duwayne Brooks 33.
- Police escort for Mr Brooks 33.
- Escorted by Sergeant XX 33.
- Mr Mansfield thanks Mr Mellish 33.
- Clifford Norris 33.
- James Grant 33.
- Witnesses K & B 33.
- Questions on behalf of SIOs 33.
- Mr Weeden's views on Mr Khan 33.
- Mr Nove 34.
- Liaison with Mr & Mrs Lawrence and Mr Khan 34.
- Commander Gibson 34.
- Barker Review 34.
- Intrusive surveillance 34.
- Selwood report 34.
- DS Crowley and Selwood report 34.
- Prosecution of Duwayne Brooks 34.
- Conclusion 34.
- Racial Incident Unit 35. Chief Superintendent John Philpott and the Racial Incident Unit
- Staffing of Unit 35.
- Card Index of Unit 3 5.
- GACARA 35.
- CRE Chairman praised Unit 35.
- Police Sergeant Peter Solley 35.
- The five suspects 35.
- Racism awareness training 35.
- Mr Philpott at the scene 35.
- Family Liaison 35.
- Barker Review 35.
- Duwayne Brooks 3 5.
- Liaison with Mr & Mrs Adams 35.
- Questions from CRE 35.
- Questions for SIOs 35.
- Uniformed ground control - Mr McIvor 35.
- Conclusion 35.
- Mr Harcourt Alleyne 36. Mr Harcourt Alleyne and "GACARA"
- Racial Incident Unit 36.
- Multi-racial forum 36.
- GACARA 36.
- Conclusion 36.
- Mr Dev Barrah 36.
- Criticism of Racial Incident Unit 36.
- Mr Barrah and Mr Khan 36.
- Disagreement with Greenwich Council 36.
- PSgt Solley 37.
- Told of the murder 37.
- Meeting with Mrs Lawrence 37.
- PSgt Solley's "document" 37.
- Conclusion 37.
- "Canteen culture" 37.
- PC Alan Fisher 38. Police Constable Alan Fisher
- Co-operation with Greenwich Council 38.
- The red Astra car 38.
- PC Fisher with AMIP team 38.
- PC Fisher attends mortuary 38.
- Sainsbury's car park incident, 30.4.93 38.
- Lack of training of PC Fisher 38.
- Conclusion 38.
- Mr Philip Medwynter 39. Crown Prosecution Service
- Decision to discontinue 39.
- Code for Crown Prosecutors. The critieria 39.
- R v Turnbull 39.
- Witham prosecution 39.
- Mr Howard Youngerwood 39.
- Conclusion 39.
- Prosecution of Mr Brooks 39.
- Transmission of news as to discontinuance 39.
- Witness B 40. The Main Committal Hearing
- Mr Brooks' evidence 40.
- Failure of identification by Witness B 40.
- Jamie Acourt not to be committed 40.
- Committal of Neil Acourt, Luke Knight, Gary Dobson 40.
- The Judge 41. The Central Criminal Court Trial
CHAPTER FORTY-SEVEN
Recommendations
he managed to get 130 yards with all the injuries he had, but also the fact that the deep penetrating wound of the right side caused the upper lobe to partially collapse his lung. It is therefore a testimony to Stephen's physical fitness that he was able to run the distance he did before collapsing".
1.8 No great quantities of blood marked the scene of the attack or the track taken by Stephen, because he wore five layers of clothing. But when he fell he was bleeding freely, and nearly all of the witnesses who saw him lying there speak of a substantial quantity of blood. There are variations in their description of the amount and location of the blood. The probability is that the blood came out in front of his body as he lay by chance in the position described, which appeared to many witnesses to be the "recovery" position. His head looked to the left into the roadway and his left arm was up.
1.9 The medical evidence indicates that Stephen was dead before he was removed by the ambulance men some time later. The amount of blood which had been lost would have made it probable that Stephen died where he fell on the pavement, and probably within a short time of his fall.
1.10 What followed has ultimately led to this public Inquiry. Little did those around Stephen, or the police officers, or indeed the public, expect that five years on this Inquiry would deal with every detail of what occurred from the moment of Stephen's death until the hearings at Hannibal House, where this Inquiry has taken place.
1.11 Stephen Lawrence's murder was simply and solely and unequivocally motivated by racism. It was the deepest tragedy for his family. It was an affront to society, and especially to the local black community in Greenwich.
1.12 Nobody has been convicted of this awful crime. That also is an affront both to the Lawrence family and the community at large.
CHAPTER TWO
SINCE THE MURDER
2.1 Those violent seconds in 1993 have been followed by extraordinary activity, without satisfactory result. From the Lawrence family's point of view there has been a sequence of disasters and disappointments.
2.2 Prolonged police investigations, in two distinct phases, produced no witnesses other than Mr Brooks who could properly purport to identify any of the attackers. Other sound evidence against the prime suspects, or against anybody else, is conspicuous by its absence. Even now after the unprecedented publicity of this Inquiry nobody has come forward to advance the case.
2.3 Three of the prime suspects were taken to trial in 1996 in a private prosecution which failed because of the absence of any firm and sustainable evidence. The trial resulted in the acquittal of all three accused. They can never be tried again in any circumstances in the present state of the law.
2.4 Two other suspects were discharged at the committal stage of the prosecution in
- Upon the existing evidence there is no prospect of them being prosecuted again. General publicity and comment over the last five years which assumed their guilt would in the absence of most compelling fresh evidence mean that no Court would countenance such a trial.
2.5 The Inquest jury returned a unanimous verdict after a full hearing in 1997, that "Stephen Lawrence was unlawfully killed in a completely unprovoked racist attack by five white youths"****.
2.6 The Police Complaints Authority (PCA) engaged the Kent Police (Kent) to investigate Mr & Mrs Lawrence's complaint that the first Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) investigation had been bungled. The Kent Investigating Officer's report runs to 459 pages. 19 officers spent a year investigating the complaint. The PCA Report roundly criticised many aspects of the MPS investigation.
2.7 At the request of Mr & Mrs Lawrence this Inquiry was established by the Rt Hon Jack Straw MP, the Home Secretary, in July 1997.
2.8 We sat for 59 days in Hannibal House hearing the evidence and submissions on Part 1 of our Inquiry, the investigation into "the matters arising from the death of Stephen Lawrence". We sat for 10 days to hear and to consider recommendations suggested to us by about 100 people and organisations in connection with Part 2 of our Inquiry, "to identify the lessons to be learned for the investigation and prosecution of racially motivated crimes". More than 12,000 pages of transcript were produced. The submissions of Counsel for represented parties alone ran to around 1,000 pages. Our aim has been to inquire into each and every issue raised by all represented parties. 88 witnesses gave evidence.
2.9 The attendant documentation is literally vast. It is estimated that there are more than 100,000 pages of reports, statements, and other written or printed documents
