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The Roots of “Penal Populism”:
the Role of Media and Politics^1
M A R G A R I T A D o B R y n I n A
InTRoDUcTIon
Penal populism is often labeled as a process whereby politicians devise pu- nitive penal policies, which are adjudged to be “popular” within the general public, and are designed to mobilize votes rather than improve the crime and justice situation. A “tough on crime” policy stance is usually most manifest during election campaigns. This definitional assessment, however, is overly simplified, and does not reflect the complexity of the actual issue which, in true fact, is “[…] represent- ing a major shift in the configuration of penal power in modern society, rather than something within the purview of politicians to tinker with as they please” (Pratt 2007, p. 8). Pratt notes that instead of designating political manipula- tions in order to increase votes, penal populism denotes major social and cul- tural changes of the 1970s, which are reflected and continue to take place in the modern society. From a sociological perspective, Shils (1956) and canovan (1981) observed that populism represents not the general public opinion, but the feelings, voic- es, and moods of those societal segments that were neglected and left out by the authorities, i. e., by those in power in favor of the “less worthy others.” In this sense, populism reflects the dissatisfaction and alienation of underrepre-
(^1) This article is based on the study first reported in the framework of the research project FIDUcIA (new European crimes and Trust-based Policy), funded primarily by the European commission under the 7th Framework programme for Research.
DoI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/crimLithuan.201??????
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sented segments of society. At the same time, populism functionally criticizes those sectors of society which allowed the mistreatment and social oversight to occur by “[…] engineering this marginalization of disenfranchisement of ‘ordinary people’” (Pratt 2007, p. 9). The sectors responsible for this usually include governmental institutions/bureaucracies, a self-serving parliamentary process and different elite groups, which advise or influence government ac- tors (i.e., academics, judiciary, media). All together, these forces represent “the establishment,” which claims to speak “on behalf of the people” concerning all matters, including the devel- opment of penal policy. It should be noted that punishment and its provi- sion resides in the discourse of the “power field” as well as in politics directly. Thus, the demand of certain interest groups to make punishments more severe might designate a public claim for power or might be used in order to create an impression of holding power. In this case, the role of the mass media is crucial. It not only shapes, consolidates and directs public attitudes, but also mediates itself as the “true voice” of the ordinary people.
METHoDoLoGy
In order to better understand the manifestation of penal populism in the media and its interrelation with politics, this article relied upon qualitative discourse analysis, mostly looking at mass media from P. Bourdieu’s perspec- tive of a “social field.” This approach best enables an examination of ideologies and power relations involved in discourse. The critical distinguisher from this view is the role of language, as a form of social practice, which focuses on the ways social and political dominance are reproduced in texts and talks. This approach determines the interpretative nature of the analysis. The empirical research of this study was based on the Lithuanian media coverage of a crime story – a pedophile scandal. The research begins with the very first article, which appeared on this issue in the media in August 2009. The research also focuses upon media reporting impact on criminal justice institutions and the changes in public attitudes toward them as a result of a media-constructed “moral panic.” This particular case was chosen because it was the only case in the history of Lithuanian media to be reported with such intensity and for such an extensive period of time (2009-2012). It also perfectly
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considering the restrictions of accessing television program records, the scope of the analysis included 19 television shows on the coverage of this par- ticular crime story during the research period: october 1, 2009 to December 31, 2010. The analysis was used to illustrate that media is an arena where power can be concentrated and exercised. In this instance, it reflected the mo- nopolization of the crime problem by certain interest groups – “claim-makers.” However, it should equivalently be noted that the specific nature of these tel- evision programs as “info-shows” had an important impact on determining the participating actors. Television program records were analyzed according to the following categories: name, date, duration, number of comments, dura- tion of comments, number and duration of comments according to their type (public/professional/political), and role/profession of the commentator. It should be restated that the media discourse analysis was enriched with Bourdieu’s approach, particularly with the notion of a social field where penal populism can be exercised and penal attitudes can be reinforced and mediated to the society. The chosen research approach enabled a better assessment of which social actors were “empowered” to comment on the pedophilia scandal, and to assess the ideological motives of the selection of program participants.
“PEnAL PoPULISM”: THE InTERRELATIon
oF MASS MEDIA AnD PoLITIcAL FIELDS
Bourdieu argues that mass media is gaining more and more power in so- ciety, and becoming a major factor in the political struggle, precisely at the time that it is falling under the ever-growing influence and control of politics (politicians) and economics. In this case, the more invisible and anonymous economic pressure of market forces often has a more harmful effect than open
and inequality issues. Thus, the advocated means of solving the problem usually are connected to fighting unemployment, poverty, community development etc. The “social breakdown” frame sees the causes of crime in a family and community breakdown. The solution is seen in strengthening family values, communities, citizen involvement. The “racist system” argues that the problem lies in the discriminatory operation of the crimi- nal justice system, which need to become more sensitive to the racial justice issues, and calls for empowerment of discriminated groups. The “violent media” frame argues that violent crime in particular stems from the violence portrayed in the mass media, and calls for more governmental control of produced violent media content.
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political censorship, which journalists can consciously resist (бурдье 2002, p. 12). Bourdieu emphasizes that “symbolic power,” which was previously iso- lated from political and economic power, is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few. By symbolic power, Bourdieu means the power to define, clas- sify, create and impose specific social concepts and desirable system models of state and society; the power to define and classify. In other words, large corpora- tions, who simultaneously own mass media and the means for the production and dissemination of cultural goods, offer similar market logic to everyone via television channels, publishing groups, internet companies etc. Thus, cultural goods, including information about crime and criminal justice – are treated like any other commodity. As a result, information on crime is made to conform to common economic indicators, the most important of which is profit. In the case of the pedophilia scandal in Lithuania, mass media, using a “market logic-oriented” news production practice, created a brand, the “logo” of which the main story “hero” was D. Kedys. The positioning of this brand in the public consciousness was ensured not only by an intense mass media escalation of the pedophilia story, but also through its penetration into other forms of discourse:
- Some virtual D. Kedys support communities were created in the social media;
- Commercial television produced TV series dedicated to this story;
- Online news portals launched separate columns: “The Story of D. Kedys” and “The case of D. Kedys”;
- D. Kedys’ character also appeared in children’s comics. Quite often, mass media portrayed D. Kedys in a purple shirt, which turned this color into a symbol for “pedophile fighters.” coincidentally, this coincided with this color’s rise in 2009 fashion trends. certain “style fans” of D. Kedys’ image had also emerged. The proponents of D. Kedys started initiatives to cre- ate a political party. Finally, a “D. Kedys brand” was used in food menus and slogans. Direct market competition is an inevitable and integral characteristic of the mass media business model. Since, as a result, the commercial success and continuity of a television program depends on ratings, any effort to build truly rational and enlightened public opinion is a secondary consideration to pack- aging a salable story. This, of course, is contrary to what some media dema- gogues try to convince the public (бурдье 2002, p. 88).
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trary, given the influences under which journalists consciously and, perhaps, unconsciously function (бурдье 2002, p. 16). From this starting place, the sys- tem continues to turn on itself. Influenced media reporting strongly influences politicians, law enforcement representatives, public figures and the interface between them and the public, which itself responds to media controlled con- tent (бурдье 2002, p. 17). Since market pressure is rarely directly correlated with media content in this or other spheres, instead of becoming a support for informed democracy, mass media becomes a mechanism of democratic subversion. The analysis of TV programs clearly shows how participant content is con- trolled via time constraints, program format and script, message oversight (to ensure it is not sophisticated beyond the presumed reach of the general public) etc. This practice simultaneously narrows the scope of discussion and those capable of presenting it. Television producers and directors, by prioritizing the sensational, define information and how to interpret it. As the market-engendered spiral contin- ues, competing television media groups increasingly rely on “tabloid” media tactics, devoted principally to chronicle events and sports news (бурдье 2002, 69). Within this format, criminal news, disasters and the genre of similar in- formation do not require any special competence – certainly not a political one – to deliver. Bourdieu emphasizes that this form of chronicling of events creates a political emptiness, depoliticizes and downgrades political life to the level of jokes or gossip. Without a political barometer to interpret evens, pub- lic attention is easily switched to focus on matters of limited political conse- quences; these consequences, however, are dramatized so that the public can “learn” from them or that they are conversely presented as “social problems” (бурдье 2002, p. 70). For this purpose, “media philosophers” or other persons of status in the public sphere often are paraded to give a special meaning to the “coinciden- tal crime occurrence,” which is artificially embedded into the media’s agenda priorities to give it the status of a “significant event.” For example, journalists invite academics, important public figures and politicians to their programs or ask for interviews in order to create an image of intellectualism and profes- sionalism, which, in turn, legitimizes the overall program as objective, unbi- ased and focused on getting to the truth on a matter predetermined by the
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media to be of importance, given its capacity to pull public attention, thus revenue as well. In short, this format commoditizes the news, but does so in a way that it carries a flavor of both legitimacy, unbiasedness and importance and, in the process, drives ratings and revenue upward. In the case of the Lithuania pedophilia story researched herein, internet media articles and TV programs took this exact approach in transforming an “accidental event” into a “social problem.” They accomplished this by using claim-makers and “media philosophers” to comment on the particular case in a manner that validated it and legitimized it as an actual social problem. They accomplished this by highlighting and reconstructing certain facts, which can lead to tremendous interest, gratifying the most primitive human impulses and desires (бурдье 2002, p. 70). For example, stories of child sexual exploitation and abuse tend to stimulate national rage. Thus, contemporary means of mass communication, which stir and exploit the lowest lusts (violence, carnal instincts), can augment the out- breaks of hatred toward certain social groups (pedophiles, homosexuals etc.) and lead to popular requests for increasing punishment and control (“limits of pain”) over them. Simultaneously, according to Bourdieu, the mass media coverage of such type of events like the pedophilia scandal might induce vari- ous types of emotionally-driven, popular responses and actions. Responses in such an instance will range from exceptionally sentimental and compassionate toward the victims and aggressive, to the point of symbolic lynching, toward those considered responsible. The pedophilia scandal is a case in point as it is particularly common that such stories and events describe the cruel treatment of children by stigmatized groups (for instance, pedophiles). of course, the responsibility for societal response partly falls on the journalists for their form and style of presenting the pedophilia scandal. clearly, however, their actions are simply opportunis- tic responses to events as they occur. Their culpability relates to the manner in which they choose to interpret events and the implications thereof. This culpability is more systemic than individual, as the journalists work within the socioeconomic construct of the media industry and its interface with society and the state. That is precisely why, if we are to understand the construction of punitive attitudes in public discourse (which are based on the knowledge that one possesses about crime reality), it is critical to be well versed in the logic of
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cial to society. Bourdieu points out that in today’s cynical world, a lot of focus is on talking about conscience. However, conscience is only “effective” when it is based on the structures and mechanisms that lead people to willingly com- ply with the moral norms. In this case, and in counter distinction, the de- pendence of the journalistic field on market pressure predetermines certain criteria of professional activity and predisposes the standards of “professional conscience.” In order for the conscience “to get concerned” and be correctly oriented, it requires a better-educated audience, aware of media manipula- tions. However, popular confidence rates in mass media and indicators show- ing mass media (especially television) as the main source of information about criminal problems indicates that public resistance to the economic game rules of mass media is very low. Journalists, due to the internal ideological factors of information produc- tion, are not enabled to keep a rational distance, which is necessary for rea- soning to occur. This, of course, amplifies the problem. In a sense, and in this context, the public witnessed the overriding cynicism of the mass media as an industry by the escalation of the pedophilia story, via the following actions:
- Intensively educating the public about the core “social vices”;
- Loudly disclosing “villains”;
- Passing strict sentences on certain “offenders” and then shifting sides. Through these means, mass media falsely presented itself as a protector of humanist values whilst simultaneously carrying out market-based mass ma- nipulation. Such media maneuvering is possible, in part, because the intense quantity and flow of information in the “knowledge society” exacerbates a chronic social illness – “memory amnesia.” At the same time, this situation shows that by channeling and mobiliz- ing information, mass media contributes to the consolidation of a “perverse direct democracy,” principally by failing to maintain essential distance from what is defined as “news of the day” and public pressure, which is not neces- sarily democratic in nature (бурдье 2002, p. 84). The information provided in the public discourse about the pedophilia scandal – “bad news” – could be compared to nails that were hammered daily into the people’s conscious and subconscious; the more of those nails were delivered – the angrier the person would get. This occurrence sets the scope for a resulting decline in public toler- ance and humanity.
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It should be noted that during the coverage of the pedophilia scandal, there was a simultaneous increase in public dissatisfaction with public au- thorities, and an intensification of homophobic sentiment (fear of otherness) etc. These events were also covered by various mass media sources: Politicians Choose Public Figure Masks (www.delfi.com, 2010 09 15), Public Incitement to Beat Gays Received the Attention of Prosecutors (www.delfi.lt, 2010 03 17), In Vilnius – Drastic Incitement to Protest Against the Gay Parade (www.delfi.lt, 2010 05 05) etc. It is important to note that, under normal conditions, “maintenance of the necessary distance” should be guaranteed by the relatively independent politi- cal field logic. However, the pedophilia scandal in public discourse incited the opposite. Here, representatives of the political field became participants in the mass media-created narrative, thus legitimating both their own and the me- dia’s right to professional legal discourse. Therefore, in this context, we could discuss the mediatization of the political and legal fields, which points to the limited actual autonomy of those fields. In short, such interaction by journal- ists with politicians and law enforcement representatives weakens the bounda- ries between these groups. Arguably, it also modifies the functional and dis- tinguishable role of politicians and law enforcement officers, which become enmeshed by the logic of the journalistic field market. The analysis of internet news media and television revealed which social agents were given the right to comment on the pedophilia scandal and simul- taneously which had the right to provide their definitions of the situation. To “fight” with the prevailing revenge logic in the pedophilia scandal narrative was relegated to legal and political logic. The logic of the political field not only did not help to maintain the necessary distance, but integrated into, according to S. cohen’s terminology, the deviance amplification spiral, partly legitimat- ing society’s “rage” (cohen 2002). According to the analysis of selected TV programs, the pedophilia scandal was mostly politicized on the commercial channel TV3’s show Confrontation. on four out of the nine programs (2010 09 22, 2010 10 13, 2010 10 27, 2010 11 24) the participants were politicians (members of the Seimas). on one of the shows (2010 10 27), three out of ten participants were the representatives of the political field (i.e, two members of the Seimas and a presidential spokes- person).
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- I Am Expecting Stricter Decisions Concerning the Prosecutors (2009 10 26), I Degutienė [chairman of the Lithuanian Seimas] Questions the Court Decision on D Kedys’ Case and the Bailiff ’s Conduct (www.delfi. lt, 2010 05 19). It is interesting to note that during the period of moral panic, public dis- trust and anger, the trust ratings of the two mentioned main governmental authorities were quite high. At the same time, the Prime Minister took a low profile on the pedophilia scandal, appearing only four times. Interestingly, and contrary to the President and the chairman of the Lithuanian Seimas, who were extensively quoted, the Prime Minister, from the perspective of politi- cal marketing, chose an unpopular attitude. His comments focused on other things, among them the following:
- How to protect the “faulty system”;
- The “prosecution service has problems; however, everything shouldn’t be assessed by one case”; “noncompliance with a court decision is a crime”;
- “The government will not intervene in the story of D. Kedys’ daughter.” of course, politicians’ ratings are influenced by many factors, but it is clear that such comments by the Prime Minister during the times of public distrust in government and especially law enforcement institutions did not promote the populist mobilization of the electorate. Related or not, during the research period, the Prime Minister remained one of the most unpopular politicians in the country. While, according to R. Koženiauskienė’s political language typology, the speech of the Head of the State, who was one of the social actors (politicians) most actively commenting on the pedophilia scandal in the political field, could be attributed to military rhetoric (Koženiauskienė 2001). This type of rhetoric is characterized by the brevity of speech, being laconic, a usage of “active” verbs and quite imperative first-person forms. This includes various comments, some of which are given below:
- “The President House promises”;
- “The President is unhappy”;
- “Lately deciding to fire not one judge”;
- “Will take bigger responsibility”;
- “Called on the carpet”;
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- “Expect tougher decisions”;
- “See shifts”;
- “The decision to leave on the post”;
- “Why were the searches conducted wherever?”;
- “The most important are the child’s interests”;
- “Will offer candidacy”;
- “The decisions must be made immediately”;
- “Is looking for a General Prosecutor”;
- “It is necessary to keep peace and to act in a civilized way” [Adviser to the President], “The Kaunas events are a painful lesson for the State” [Adviser to the President]. This parlance, which has consistently accompanied the Head of State since her inauguration and which is reflected in such phrases as “I will be an active president” and “will fight,” also shifts to the public crime and criminal justice discourse. Such rhetoric aims to strengthen authority and power. However, at the same time, such language is both impressive and manipulative, since it only provides the public with a certain contour, allowing the audience to fill in the emerged space with their expectations. In this way, a public political claim for crime knowledge becomes one of the ways to mobilize public sup- port, through the vote for their power, leadership and represented ideology. Within this context, the pedophilia scandal became a public relations instru- ment of the representatives of the political field, a reinforcement tool for their symbolic capital. Having an opinion on the pedophilia case became an integral part of the political agenda, whilst having a harsh opinion became essential for increasing one’s ratings. In other words, the language of the economic field and all the mechanisms related to it are penetrating the functioning of the political field, which in turn clearly impacts on public crime discourse. Thus, in this case, one could ob- serve not only the example of mass media’s influence on shaping political and public agendas and in excluding other more important topics out of public discourse (i.e., budget cuts, rising electricity costs, amendments to the Labor Law etc.), but also their synoptical functioning (especially in the case of televi- sion) – when the audience’s eyes are focused not only on selective events, but also on those few who are given the right to comment on these events, which, in the process, directs viewer focus in predetermined ideological directions.
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the political, legal and civil fields. The content of the vision is a product of the journalistic field and its manufactured interests. Bourdieu argues that in the modern world, the need for constant and engaging entertainment drives mass media to use “animators” rather than serious commentators and reporters; also, it drives the media to deliver information that provides entertainment (i.e., meaningless talk show formats) instead of serious, analytical information and its discussion (бурдье 2002, pp. 152-153). To defend this simplified, demagogic form of presenting criminal stories (such as was the investigation of pedophilia case trials in the analyzed pro- grams), journalists often claim they are meeting the expectations of their au- diences. In fact, it is they who also assign their own preferences and attitudes in covering crime problems to the public, which is a direct reflection of the functioning of the journalistic field and its dependence upon market logic. In this case, commercial television, in applying this logic for crime infor- mation/news production, prioritizes confrontations over rational debates and highlights the confrontation between individuals rather than the differences in their arguments. The title of one Lithuanian show, Confrontation, both sym- bolically and metaphorically represents this point. In short, journalists are more interested in the game, its players, the tactics they use, and the effect which is caused by certain rhetoric in the relevant field, rather than actual informative content and the essence of what the characters represent (бурдье 2002, p. 154). Bourdieu notes that the media’s natural commercial orientation towards entertainment involuntarily directs the viewer’s attention towards a certain spectacle or scandal each time when an important, however, seemingly boring political issue emerges. So, for example, as in the case of the pedophilia scan- dal, information which is called “news” is reduced to the chronicling of “inter- esting events” – and the story is produced in a borderline form between factual events and a show, and which is chaotically presented through a set of diverse events, occurring one after another only due to chronological coincidence – a scandalous criminal procedure, a civil war in Africa, the banking crisis, the loss of a basketball team, an aviation disaster, a bad weather forecast etc. Due to the already mentioned particularities of media information production, the presentation of events is usually restricted to the “here and now” context, thus separating criminal problems from their causes and long-term consequences.
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Such fragmentation and superficial portrayal of crime reality is supported by the “thinking this day” logic and constant competition over defining and sell- ing what is important and new (sensations), which in turn condemns journal- ists to the constant daily search for news and the construction of incoherent, scattered impressions and images of crime reality (бурдье 2002, p. 157). Due to journalists’ lack of interest and information, their mediated criminal knowl- edge and attitudes lack appropriate social context; thus, events are separated from the system of relations that actually determine them. This result was ob- served in the coverage of the pedophilia scandal. For instance, the structure of the criminal justice system depends on criminal justice policy. criminal jus- tice policy is in turn related to other political strategies, which are influenced by general state policy, which is in turn related to culture, as well as other social interests, which are determined by power relations and so on. Thus, during the coverage of the pedophilia story, the focus was generally given to the events happening “here and now” or actions with an observable outcome and not to this critical, broader, systemic context. So, the logic of the journalistic field – due to the form that competitive struggle accordingly influences the production routine of crime news – con- structs crime news as a series of absurd, unrelated events, which are impos- sible to understand and prevent. Thus, to media consumers, there emerges an incomprehensible world, full of violence, aggression, crime, threats, a world from which one should hide and be aware of. In this case, the presentation of false information about crime reality, including constantly growing occur- rences of violence and crime and an “epidemic” of sexual crimes, for example, feeds a feeling of anxiety in society and the notion that applied security meas- ures are insufficient. In this context, public dissatisfaction surfaces leading to demands to harden existing security measures and to establish stiffer punish- ments for the violation of public interest. Representatives of the political field who seek to mobilize potential voter support usually advocate such changes. In general, there is an impression that the worldview, which emerges for view- ers from television or other means of mass media, is very difficult to change. In the case of criminal problems (such as pedophilia), this vision of reality is further enhanced by the sense that crime is an object of a legal and political game – a matter for professionals. Bourdieu notes that such a portrayal of real- ity promotes a so-called public, fatalistic disinvolvement, particularly among
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“theft.” Individuals are taught from a young age that conflicts can hurt others and bring harm to the social system, and that governmental officials, officers, and institutions are necessary to restrain society from personal revenge and vendetta. Mass media in this context becomes one of the social institutions affirming and preserving this status quo. In the case of the coverage of the pedophilia scandal in Lithuanian media, one could observe how the solution of the conflict, which emerged in the community (a family conflict) became the undisputed property of both the legal and political fields. crime reality and criminal knowledge in public discourse are thus established as the discourse of professionals and adopted by legal, political, scientific and journalistic fields. Thus, mass media, being one of the most important cultural mediators constructing crime knowledge and attitudes, reproduces social powers and their distribution in society’s social structure. At the same time, it should be noted that a distorted presentation of crime and criminal justice is inherent in politically organized societies, where, ac- cording to R. Quinney (2004), the state is the core of criminal knowledge. In such societies, the social construction of a crime reality is a political act, which implies social and mind control, legitimating the “regimes of truth” and re- moving the unwanted discourses. All these political processes find their place and are reflected in the structure of public discourse. An analysis of the representatives of the social fields that are given the right to define, comment upon and suggest solutions to the problem of crime showed that the public discourse of crime and criminal justice, primarily, is a profession- al discourse (criminal justice officials, policy makers, less often – academics). In turn, the ordinary members of society more often play the role of passive observ- ers. In other words, society’s social hierarchy in media discourse is reproduced through the so-called “rhetoric credibility hierarchy” (i.e., the “credible experts” who are provided with the ground to speak in media discourse) and, thereby, confirms the legitimacy of the social structure (van Dijk, 2009). It should be emphasized that crime knowledge is embodied. In the pub- lic discourse, it is mediated by so-called “claim-makers” who are representing certain social segments and competing with each other for the recognition of their proposed constructions of social reality. To land their constructions and to establish their power, they not only sometimes employ populistic argu- ments, which are quite often based on stereotypes, but invoke certain concep-
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tual frames, which are based on factual and interpretative claims and advocate corresponding ways to define and solve problems (Surette 2011, pp. 38-40). In this case, the social construct that wins gives power to the group representing it. For instance, the most popular frames used by claim-makers in the pedo- philia scandal narrative were the “faulty criminal justice system” and “social breakdown” frames. They then recommended the strategies of harsher social control and stronger community engagement, thus a fostering of stronger pe- nal attitudes, intolerance towards “non-traditional” forms of the family and conservative attitudes toward problem solving, respectively. In the case of the “social breakdown” frame, its conservative version, which denoted liberal atti- tudes towards moral issues as the cause of social breakdown (i.e., cohabitation, non-marital childbearing etc.), corresponded not only to the simultaneously occurring polemic on family concept in the public discourse, but also to a broader political discourse, i.e., the prevailing conservative ideology. In other words, the public discourse on crime and criminal justice is also an arena for the struggle and competition for symbolic resources between interest groups. Here one could also observe the power of the media that is exercised while filtering certain constructions, usually favoring those positions that are dramatic, sponsored by powerful groups and are related to pre-established cul- tural themes (Surette 2011). It should also be noted that mass media, by defining the form and content of thinking and talking about the crime reality for the representatives of political and legal field and society at large, itself becomes a producer of crime knowledge and reinforces certain attitudes. This shows the mediatization of these profes- sional fields and highlights their vulnerability to the market field logic emanat- ing from media production output. At the same time, it reflects Bourdieu’s claim of the “perverse principles of direct democracy” in the reception of crime and criminal justice. While the journalistic field, in order to provide the illusion of truthfulness and authority for its constructed public discourse, makes use of the structural elements of legal, political and academic fields. Thus, mass media’s constructed structure of knowledge and its proposed attitudes toward crime and criminal justice reflect the one‘s of the society, where the discourse is given meaning. While, on the other hand, mass media‘s manufactured knowledge and produced attitudes reflect the functioning of its inner ideology, conveying the ways in which information is selected, processed and disseminated.
