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The article examines the scope and effect of Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, particularly the proviso. It delves into the contentions around the 'democratic process', the interpretation of 'bill', and the creation of the new state of Bombay. The analysis explores the differences between the federal schemes of the US and India, the power of Parliament to create new states, and the limitations on such power. The document also touches upon the political question doctrine, Article 371-F, and the nature and scope of power under Articles 3 and 4.
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debated in the State Legislature upon introduction of the original Bill, and several members were in favour of one composite unit. It also cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was not relevant or pertinent to the subject matter of the original proposal. Thus, a new Bill and a fresh reference were not necessary.
The Court observed that the Indian Constitution is not a constitution that is true to any traditional pattern of federalism. The following were some of the reasons given:
As a result of its Award, certain areas of India became, after the partition, enclaves in East Pakistan. Similarly, certain East Pakistan enclaves were found in India. Dehagram and Angarpota were two such Pakistani enclaves in India. On or about the 16th May, 1974 an agreement was entered into between the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh. This agreement inter alia provided that India will retain half of Berubari Union No. 12, which under the 1958 agreement was to be transferred to Pakistan, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angarpota enclaves. The agreement further provided that India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh a small area near ‘Tin Bigha' for the purpose of connecting Dahagram and Angarpota with Bangladesh. The 1974 agreement, however remained unimplemented. Thereafter, in October 1982 an understanding was reached between the two governments in respect of 'lease in perpetuity' by India of the said area near 'Tin Bigha' to enable the Bangladesh government to exercise her sovereignty over Dahagram and Angarpota. It was further agreed that the1982 agreement would be an integral part of the earlier agreement of 1974. It was also agreed that the sovereignty over the leased area shall continue to vest in India. Clause 9 of the 1982 agreement provided that India would have no jurisdiction over Bangladesh nationals in respect of any offence committed in the area, and the same shall be dealt with by the Bangladesh law enforcing agency only. Issues: Whether implementation of Agreement relating to Berubari Union and exchange of Enclaves requires any legislative action either by way of a suitable law of Parliament relatable to Article 3 of Constitution or in accordance with provisions of Article 368 of Constitution or both? Held in SC: (1) The Division Bench came to the correct conclusion that inso far as the eastern border of India was concerned, the Ninth Constitutional amendment had not become part of the Constitution as no appointed day had been notified, and in that view of the matter, the decision to allow Bangladesh to retain Dahagram and Angarpota under the1974 and 1982 agreements did not amount to cession of Indian territory in favour of Bangladesh. (2) The Division Bench was pre-eminently right in arriving at the conclusion that there was no automatic transfer of Dahagram and Angarpota to India. (3) Dahagram and Angarpota remained and still remain part of the territory of East Pakistan and subsequently Bangladesh. This position has been recognised by both the Governments of India and Bangladesh in the two subsequent agreements of 1974 and 1982. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the decision to allow Bangladesh to retain Dahagram and Angarpota does not amount to cession of Indian territory in favour of Bangladesh. The Division Bench had held that the agreements of 1974 and 1982 did not amount to cession of territory or abandonment of sovereignty. If that is the position, no constitutional amendment was required for the arrangements entered into either by the agreement of 1974 or 1982. The Division Bench was therefore in error in expressing a contrary view. (4) In that view of the matter, the agreements of1974 and 1982 did not require to be suitably notified or included in the official gazette. Therefore, there was no cause to direct the legislature to amend or pass suitable laws. Held, directions of Division Bench of High Court be deleted in Clause (a) of ordering portion. So far as to take steps for acquisition and to acquire land owned by Indian citizens in said area in accordance with laws is concerned it was wholly unnecessary because there was no land owned by Indian citizens which was required to be acquired. Basically — there was no need to amend the Constitution of India so that the Berubari Union No. 12 is not transferred to Bangladesh along with other territories as contemplated by the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. Ninth Amendment to the Constitution has not come into effect. Therefore, the agreements of 1974 and 1982 did not require to be suitably notified or included in that official gazette. The Division Bench has held that there was no cession of territory. There was no abandonment of sovereignty and, therefore, no constitutional amendment was necessary in view of the facts mentioned hereinbefore.
Samsher Singh vs State of Punjab (1974) Article 77(3) [President] and Article 166 (3) [Governor] Facts:
DC Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar (1987) Validity of successive promulgations of the same ordinance
whether the satisfaction in a particular case constitutes a fraud on power or was actuated by an oblique motive. Judicial review in other words would enquire into whether there was no satisfaction at all. PRESIDENTIAL PARDON Kehar Singh vs. Union of India (1989) Presidential Pardon — Art 72. Facts
iii. that the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; iv. that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration; v. that the order suffers from the vices arbitrariness. PRIME MINISTER AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Ram Jawaya Kapoor vs. State of Punjab Scope of the executive power — 298, 162, 73 The recognised schools in Punjab used only such text books as were prescribed by the Education Department. In 1950, the Government embarked on the policy of nationalising text books and, thus, took over the work of printing and publishing them. The author of the book selected by the Government for the purpose by contract vested the copyright of the book in the Government in lieu of royalty. The scheme was challenged on the ground, inter alia, that the Executive could not engage in any trade or business activity without any law being passed for the purpose. The Supreme Court negatived the contention saying that the expenses necessary to carry on the business of publishing text books had been approved by the Legislature in the Appropriation Act. The Government required no additional power to carry on the business as whatever was necessary for that purpose, it could secure by entering into contracts with authors and other people. No private right was being infringed as the publishers were not being debarred from publishing books. In the circumstances, the carrying on of the business of publishing text books without a specific law sanctioning the same was not beyond the competence of the Executive. “It may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies. Ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislature and judicial functions are taken away.”
DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS (Article 245) State of Bombay vs. RMDC (1957) Facts: