Docsity
Docsity

Prepare for your exams
Prepare for your exams

Study with the several resources on Docsity


Earn points to download
Earn points to download

Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan


Guidelines and tips
Guidelines and tips

The Role of State in Reorganization of States under Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, Cheat Sheet of Contract Law

The article examines the scope and effect of Article 3 of the Indian Constitution, particularly the proviso. It delves into the contentions around the 'democratic process', the interpretation of 'bill', and the creation of the new state of Bombay. The analysis explores the differences between the federal schemes of the US and India, the power of Parliament to create new states, and the limitations on such power. The document also touches upon the political question doctrine, Article 371-F, and the nature and scope of power under Articles 3 and 4.

Typology: Cheat Sheet

2021/2022

Uploaded on 04/07/2023

ritvik-singh-3
ritvik-singh-3 🇮🇳

5 documents

1 / 37

Toggle sidebar

This page cannot be seen from the preview

Don't miss anything!

bg1
NATURE OF THE UNION.
1) Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay (1960)!
Article 3 // Role of State in Re Org [Read with Berubari Union]
-Appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution, studies the true scope and effect of Article 3, particularly
the proviso. Dealing with a Bill being referred to the State Legislatures.
-The new State of Bombay was to come into existence from 1st November, 1956, but on 12th September,
1956, the appellant filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Indian Constitution in the Bombay High
Court challenging S. 8 and other consequential provisions of the State Reorganisation Act as contravening
Art. 3 of the Constitution
-Said Bill contained the proposal for the formation of 3 units — (1) Union Territory of Bombay; (2) State
of MH including Marathawada and Vidharbha; and (3) State of Gujarat including Saurashtra and Cutch.
-Section 8(1) of the Act was in question that constituted 3 separate units.
-Stated that the Bill contravened Article 3 of the Constitution as the Legislature of Bombay had no
opportunity to express its viewed on the formation of such a composite State.
-Substantive part of the article gives parliament the power to make laws under clauses (a) to (e). It is
followed by a proviso which lays down conditions for exercise of power.
-PROVISO: !
the proviso lays down two conditions : one is that no Bill shall be introduced except on the
recommendation of the President, and the second condition is that where the proposal contained in the Bill
affects the areas, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has to be referred by the President to the
Legislature of the State for expressing its views thereon.
-However the response of the State legislature isn’t binding — nor is it that the failure to respond
invalidates the bill.
-The words of the proviso are clear enough and bear their ordinary plain meaning
CONTENTIONS:
1) Whether Art. 3 of the Constitution incorporates a “democratic process” such that the people’s
representatives in the State Legislature should be given the opportunity of expressing their views not
merely on the original proposal of a Bill, but also on any substantial modification thereof?
2) Whether the word “Bill” in Art. 3 should be given an extended meaning so as to include any substantial
amendment of the proposal contained in it?
3) Whether the new State of Bombay established by the Act was so completely divorced from the proposal
contained in the Bill that it was effectively a new bill and a fresh reference was necessary?!
ANALYSIS:
All that is contemplated in Art. 3 is that the Parliament should have the views of the State Legislatures as
to the proposals contained in the Bill and then be free to deal with the Bill in any manner it thinks fit.
The proviso to Art. 3 does not say that a fresh reference to the State Legislature and a fresh bill are
required for every amendment to the original bill by Parliament. If it were so, it could result in an
interminable process.
On Issue 1, the plain, unambiguous language of Art. 3 does not incorporate any “democratic process” as
contended by the appellant. !
The process in Art. 3 should be distinguished from the process in the USA wherein the consent of a State
Legislature is required before altering its boundaries. This difference reflects the difference in the
federal schemes of the two countries: the American States were independent and sovereign before the
formation of the federal union, whereas in India, the Centre has been vested with the exclusive power
of organizing the territories of the constituent States, with the concerned State Legislatures having only
the right to an expression of views.
On Issue 2, the scope of the word “Bill” in Art. 3 can be determined by comparing it with Art. 117 which
uses the expression “A bill or amendments”. Thus, as Art. 3 only refers to “Bill” and not “amendments”,
the word “Bill” cannot be given an extended meaning as contended by the appellant. Secondly, Rule 80 of
the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha states that an amendment must be within
the scope of the Bill and relevant to the subject matter of the clause to which it relates. On top of this, Art.
122(1) says that the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground
of any alleged irregularity of procedure. In view of these provisions, Art. 3 cannot be interpreted so as to
nullify Art. 122.
On Issue 3, it cannot be said that the Bombay State Legislature had no opportunity to express views on the
idea of one composite unit as opposed to three units. Both these ideas, among others, were discussed and
pf3
pf4
pf5
pf8
pf9
pfa
pfd
pfe
pff
pf12
pf13
pf14
pf15
pf16
pf17
pf18
pf19
pf1a
pf1b
pf1c
pf1d
pf1e
pf1f
pf20
pf21
pf22
pf23
pf24
pf25

Partial preview of the text

Download The Role of State in Reorganization of States under Article 3 of the Indian Constitution and more Cheat Sheet Contract Law in PDF only on Docsity!

NATURE OF THE UNION.

  1. Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay (1960) Article 3 // Role of State in Re Org [Read with Berubari Union]
  • (^) Appeal under Article 132(1) of the Constitution, studies the true scope and effect of Article 3, particularly the proviso. Dealing with a Bill being referred to the State Legislatures.
  • (^) The new State of Bombay was to come into existence from 1st^ November, 1956, but on 12th^ September, 1956, the appellant filed a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Indian Constitution in the Bombay High Court challenging S. 8 and other consequential provisions of the State Reorganisation Act as contravening Art. 3 of the Constitution
  • (^) Said Bill contained the proposal for the formation of 3 units — (1) Union Territory of Bombay; (2) State of MH including Marathawada and Vidharbha; and (3) State of Gujarat including Saurashtra and Cutch.
  • (^) Section 8(1) of the Act was in question that constituted 3 separate units.
  • (^) Stated that the Bill contravened Article 3 of the Constitution as the Legislature of Bombay had no opportunity to express its viewed on the formation of such a composite State.
  • (^) Substantive part of the article gives parliament the power to make laws under clauses (a) to (e). It is followed by a proviso which lays down conditions for exercise of power.
  • (^) PROVISO: the proviso lays down two conditions : one is that no Bill shall be introduced except on the recommendation of the President, and the second condition is that where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the areas, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has to be referred by the President to the Legislature of the State for expressing its views thereon.
  • (^) However the response of the State legislature isn’t binding — nor is it that the failure to respond invalidates the bill.
  • (^) The words of the proviso are clear enough and bear their ordinary plain meaning CONTENTIONS:
  1. Whether Art. 3 of the Constitution incorporates a “democratic process” such that the people’s representatives in the State Legislature should be given the opportunity of expressing their views not merely on the original proposal of a Bill, but also on any substantial modification thereof?
  2. Whether the word “Bill” in Art. 3 should be given an extended meaning so as to include any substantial amendment of the proposal contained in it?
  3. Whether the new State of Bombay established by the Act was so completely divorced from the proposal contained in the Bill that it was effectively a new bill and a fresh reference was necessary? ANALYSIS:
  • All that is contemplated in Art. 3 is that the Parliament should have the views of the State Legislatures as to the proposals contained in the Bill and then be free to deal with the Bill in any manner it thinks fit. The proviso to Art. 3 does not say that a fresh reference to the State Legislature and a fresh bill are required for every amendment to the original bill by Parliament. If it were so, it could result in an interminable process.
  • On Issue 1, the plain, unambiguous language of Art. 3^ does not incorporate any “democratic process” as contended by the appellant. The process in Art. 3 should be distinguished from the process in the USA wherein the consent of a State Legislature is required before altering its boundaries. This difference reflects the difference in the federal schemes of the two countries: the American States were independent and sovereign before the formation of the federal union, whereas i n India, the Centre has been vested with the exclusive power of organizing the territories of the constituent States, with the concerned State Legislatures having only the right to an expression of views.
  • On Issue 2, the scope of the word “Bill” in Art. 3 can be determined by comparing it with Art. 117 which uses the expression “A bill or amendments”. Thus, as Art. 3 only refers to “Bill” and not “amendments”, the word “Bill” cannot be given an extended meaning as contended by the appellant. Secondly, Rule 80 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha states that an amendment must be within the scope of the Bill and relevant to the subject matter of the clause to which it relates. On top of this, Art. 122(1) says that the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. In view of these provisions, Art. 3 cannot be interpreted so as to nullify Art. 122.
  • On Issue 3, it^ cannot be said that the Bombay State Legislature had no opportunity to express views^ on the idea of one composite unit as opposed to three units. Both these ideas, among others, were discussed and

debated in the State Legislature upon introduction of the original Bill, and several members were in favour of one composite unit. It also cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was not relevant or pertinent to the subject matter of the original proposal. Thus, a new Bill and a fresh reference were not necessary.

  • CONCLUSION:^ None of the three arguments of the appellant were accepted.^ Appeal dismissed with costs.
  1. In Re : Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves (1960) Acquisition of Territory // Role of State in Re Org [Read with Babulal Parate]
  • Bengal and Punjab had to be partitioned. For the purpose of portioning Bengal, a boundary commission was appointed with Sir Cyril Radcliffe as its chairman. He fixed the boundary of India and Pakistan known as Radcliffe line.
  • The Radcliffe Award demarcating the boundaries of India and Pakistan was announced on August 12, 1947, as a result of which Berubari Union No. 12 fell within West Bengal, India.
  • There were several disputes that arose subsequent to the award, and were settled by the Bagge Award, made by the Indo-Pakistan Boundaries Disputes Tribunal, on January 26, 1950.
  • However, Pakistan only broached the issue of Berubari two years later, in 1952, alleging that it should fall within East Bengal (East Pakistan). Moreover, certain enclaves of Cooch-Behar district, merged with India on August 28,1949 also fell in Pakistan, while several Pakistani enclaves were part of Indian territory.
  • To address the tension arising from these disputes, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, Nehru and Noon, entered into an agreement, called the Indo-Pakistan Agreement, on September 10, 1958.
  • Article 3 of the agreement provided for equal division of Berubari Union No. 12 horizontally, between India and Pakistan. Article 10 stipulated for exchange of Cooch-Behar enclaves in Pakistan for Pakistani enclaves in India, without claim to compensation for extra area going to Pakistan.
  • Subsequent to this, doubts arose as to^ whether the Agreement required any legislative action under Article 3 or Article 368 of the Constitution, or both. The President then submitted these questions for the opinion of the Supreme Court.
  • The Attorney-General contended that the Agreement only purported to ascertain disputed boundary, and could be settled by executive action alone, rendering legislative action unnecessary. The opposing argument was that the Agreement is void and may not be effected, even by a legislative amendment. Issues: I. Whether legislative action is necessary for the implementation of the Agreement relating to Berubari Union and the exchange of other enclaves. II. If so, whether a law of Parliament as per Article 3 of the Constitution is sufficient for the purpose, or a constitutional amendment in accordance with Article 368 is necessary, in addition or in the alternative. III. Ancillary Issue: Whether Article 1(3)(c) confers authority on India to acquire territories. HOLDING Yes, legislative action is necessary for implementation of the Agreement relating to Berubari Union. No. 12 and exchange of other enclaves. As the Agreement has the effect of altering the territory of the Union, as defined under Article 1 of the Constitution, mere executive action would not be sufficient to implement the same. A law made under Article 3 would not, by itself, be effective in implementing the Agreement. A constitutional amendment in accordance with Article 368 is competent and necessary. A law of Parliament under both Article 368 and Article 3 would be necessary only if Parliament chooses to first pass a law amending Article 3 in accordance with Article 368, and then pass a law as per the amended Article 3 to implement the Agreement. No, the article does not endorse an expansionist regime. It makes a formal provision for absorption and integration of Indian territories, which at the date of the Constitution, continued to be under the control of foreign States, recognizing India’s rights as a sovereign State. RATIONALE

The Court observed that the Indian Constitution is not a constitution that is true to any traditional pattern of federalism. The following were some of the reasons given:

  1. A truly federal Constitution consists of independent and sovereign units to partially surrender their authority in the common interest and vest them in the Union. In the Indian context, however, that has not happened.
  2. Residuary power has been conferred on the Parliament instead of on states. Only those powers which are required to regulate local problems are held with the state, and all matters responsible for maintaining the economic, industrial and commercial unity of the Union are left with the Union.
  3. There is no constitutional guarantee against the modification of a state, or even, eventually, its destruction through the processes in Article 3.
  4. Even in true federations such as USA and Australia, the power of eminent domain is granted to the parliament to acquire state property. Thus, even if India were a true federation, there is no reason to assume that the states do not have a power to have their property acquired by the Central Government. As per the Constitution, property vested in the States cannot be acquired under a law made under Entry 42, List III, unless that law complies with the requirements of Art. 31 (repealed later in 1978). In interpreting a constitutional document, provisions conferring legislative power should be interpreted liberally. Hence, the word "property" in Entry 42 must be held to include property belonging to the States.
  5. RC Poudyal vs. UOI* (1993) Political Question Doctrine, Arts 2 and 371-F + Basic Structure
  • A tripartite agreement was executed amongst the Chogyal (Ruler) of Sikkim, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the leaders of the political parties representing the people of Sikkim which envisaged right of people of Sikkim to elections on the basis of adult suffrage, contemplated setting up of a Legislative Assembly in Sikkim to be reconstituted by election every four years and declared a commitment to free and fair elections to be overseen by a representative of the Election Commission of India.
  • Elections for the Sikkim Assembly were held in April 1974. The Sikkim Assembly so elected and constituted passed the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974. Later, the Sikkim Assembly passed a resolution abolishing the institution of Chogyal and declared that Sikkim would henceforth be a constituent unit of India enjoying a democratic and fully responsible Government.
  • Constitution was further amended by the Constitution (Thirty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 whereby Sikkim became a full-fledged State in the Union of India and Article 371-F was inserted — bearing certain special provisions.
  • Clause (f) of the said Article empowered Parliament to make provision for reservation of seats in the Sikkim Assembly for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of the different sections of the population of Sikkim. P’s filed petitions challenging reservation of 12 seats for Sikkimese of "Bhutia- Lepcha" origin. Issues: (a) Regarding the political question doctrine — where a law made under Article 2 containing the terms and conditions on which a new State is admitted in the Indian Union is, by its very nature, political involving matters of policy and, therefore, the terms and conditions contained in such a law are not justiciable on the political question doctrine; (b) Argued that the non-obstante clause of Article 371-F allowed Parliament to enact a law in derogation of other provisions and such a law cannot be challenged in grounds of violation of other Constitutional provisions. (c) The principal questions are whether there are any constitutional limitations on the power of Parliament in the matter of prescription of the terms and conditions for admission of a new State into the Union of India; and if so, what these limitations are. Held:
  • The power of Parliament under Article 2 is^ limited by the fundamentals of the Indian constitutionalism and those terms and conditions which the Parliament may deem fit to impose, cannot be inconsistent and irreconcilable with the foundational principles of the Constitution and cannot violate or subvert the Constitutional scheme.
  • This is not to say that the conditions subject to which a new State or territory is admitted into the Union ought to exactly be the same as those that govern all other States as at the time of the commencement of the Constitution.
  • Article 371-F cannot transgress the basic features of the Constitution. The non obstante clause of Article 371F cannot be construed as taking clause (f) of Article 371F outside the limitations on the amending power itself. Needs to be harmoniously construed with Art 2.
  • The power to admit new States into the Union under Article 2 is, no doubt, in the very nature of the power, very wide and its exercise necessarily guided by political issues of considerably complexity many of which may not be judicially manageable. But for that reason, it cannot be predicated that Article 2 confers on the Parliament an unreviewable and unfettered power immune from judicial scrutiny. The scope of the power conferred by Article 371-F, is therefore, subject to judicial review.
  • The inequalities in representation in the present case are an inheritance and compulsion from the past. Historical considerations have justified a differential treatment. Article 371F (f) cannot be said to violate any basic feature of the Constitution such as the democratic principle.
  1. In Re Mangal Singh* (1967) Arts 2, 3, 4 This case is to be read alongside RC Poudyal where the Supreme Court observed that the power conferred on Parliament under Art. 2 “is not power to override the constitutional scheme.”
  • The Punjab Reorganisation Act enacted with the object of reorganising the State of Punjab. The eastern hilly areas of the old State were transferred to the Union territory of Himachal Pradesh; the territory known as Chandigarh in Kharar tahsil was constituted into a Union territory; and the remaining territory was divided between the new State of Punjab and the Haryana State.
  • Validity of Act challenged on ground that out of 16 members who set out from list of members of Legislative Council (LC) of Punjab only 8 members who resides in Chandigarh allowed to sit in LC of new State of Punjab — which is denial of equality.
  • Also that the constitution of Legislative Assembly (LA) of Haryana under Section 13 (1) violates mandatory provisions of Article 170(1). Held
  • (^) Court observed that Section 13 (1) not invalid merely because it departed from minimum prescribed membership of Legislative Assembly for State.
  • (^) Article 170 fixes the minimum strength of a State Legislature Assembly at 60. When the Haryana State was established in 1966, the strength of the interim legislature was fixed at 54. The provision was challenged as being inconsistent with Art. 170, but the Supreme Court upheld it under Art. 4. Prima facie, the provision undoubtedly was an amendment of the Constitution but under Art. 4(2) it was not to be treated as such.
  • (^) Elucidating the scope of the power conferred upon Parliament by Arts. 2, 3 and 4, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the law referred to in Arts. 2 and 3 may alter or amend the First Schedule to the Constitution which sets out the names of the States and description of territories thereof, and the Fourth Schedule allotting seats to the States in the Rajya Sabha. Further —
  • (^) The law so made may also make supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions which would include provisions relating to the setting up of the legislative, executive and judicial organs of the State essential to the effective State administration under the Constitution.
  • (^) Power with which the Parliament is invested by Arts. 2 and 3, is power to admit, establish, or form new States which conform to the democratic pattern envisaged by the Constitution; and the power which the Parliament may exercise by law is supplemental, incidental or consequential to the admission, establishment or formation of a State as contemplated by the Constitution, and is not power to override the constitutional scheme.
  1. Mullaperiyar Env Protection Forum vs. UOI* (2006) A Arts 3 and 4

As a result of its Award, certain areas of India became, after the partition, enclaves in East Pakistan. Similarly, certain East Pakistan enclaves were found in India. Dehagram and Angarpota were two such Pakistani enclaves in India. On or about the 16th May, 1974 an agreement was entered into between the Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh. This agreement inter alia provided that India will retain half of Berubari Union No. 12, which under the 1958 agreement was to be transferred to Pakistan, and in exchange Bangladesh will retain the Dahagram and Angarpota enclaves. The agreement further provided that India will lease in perpetuity to Bangladesh a small area near ‘Tin Bigha' for the purpose of connecting Dahagram and Angarpota with Bangladesh. The 1974 agreement, however remained unimplemented. Thereafter, in October 1982 an understanding was reached between the two governments in respect of 'lease in perpetuity' by India of the said area near 'Tin Bigha' to enable the Bangladesh government to exercise her sovereignty over Dahagram and Angarpota. It was further agreed that the1982 agreement would be an integral part of the earlier agreement of 1974. It was also agreed that the sovereignty over the leased area shall continue to vest in India. Clause 9 of the 1982 agreement provided that India would have no jurisdiction over Bangladesh nationals in respect of any offence committed in the area, and the same shall be dealt with by the Bangladesh law enforcing agency only. Issues: Whether implementation of Agreement relating to Berubari Union and exchange of Enclaves requires any legislative action either by way of a suitable law of Parliament relatable to Article 3 of Constitution or in accordance with provisions of Article 368 of Constitution or both? Held in SC: (1) The Division Bench came to the correct conclusion that inso far as the eastern border of India was concerned, the Ninth Constitutional amendment had not become part of the Constitution as no appointed day had been notified, and in that view of the matter, the decision to allow Bangladesh to retain Dahagram and Angarpota under the1974 and 1982 agreements did not amount to cession of Indian territory in favour of Bangladesh. (2) The Division Bench was pre-eminently right in arriving at the conclusion that there was no automatic transfer of Dahagram and Angarpota to India. (3) Dahagram and Angarpota remained and still remain part of the territory of East Pakistan and subsequently Bangladesh. This position has been recognised by both the Governments of India and Bangladesh in the two subsequent agreements of 1974 and 1982. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the decision to allow Bangladesh to retain Dahagram and Angarpota does not amount to cession of Indian territory in favour of Bangladesh. The Division Bench had held that the agreements of 1974 and 1982 did not amount to cession of territory or abandonment of sovereignty. If that is the position, no constitutional amendment was required for the arrangements entered into either by the agreement of 1974 or 1982. The Division Bench was therefore in error in expressing a contrary view. (4) In that view of the matter, the agreements of1974 and 1982 did not require to be suitably notified or included in the official gazette. Therefore, there was no cause to direct the legislature to amend or pass suitable laws. Held, directions of Division Bench of High Court be deleted in Clause (a) of ordering portion. So far as to take steps for acquisition and to acquire land owned by Indian citizens in said area in accordance with laws is concerned it was wholly unnecessary because there was no land owned by Indian citizens which was required to be acquired. Basically — there was no need to amend the Constitution of India so that the Berubari Union No. 12 is not transferred to Bangladesh along with other territories as contemplated by the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. Ninth Amendment to the Constitution has not come into effect. Therefore, the agreements of 1974 and 1982 did not require to be suitably notified or included in that official gazette. The Division Bench has held that there was no cession of territory. There was no abandonment of sovereignty and, therefore, no constitutional amendment was necessary in view of the facts mentioned hereinbefore.

THE UNION AND STATE EXECUTIVE

AID AND ADVICE

Samsher Singh vs State of Punjab (1974) Article 77(3) [President] and Article 166 (3) [Governor] Facts:

  • The two appellants in this case had joined the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) and were on probation. The probation of both of them were terminated by orders [of concerned Ministers / Chief Minister] based on the recommendations of the High Court under different provisions of relevant rules. The orders of termination were issued in the name of the Governor of Punjab without seeking or obtaining his personal satisfaction.
  • The appellants contended that the Governor is the constitutional head of the state and can exercise the power of appointment and removal of Judicial Services personally. This power is conferred upon him by virtue of being the executive head of the State.
  • State contends that the Governor can appoint and remove members of the Subordinate Judicial Services on the aid and advise of the Council of Ministers and not in his personal capacity. Issue: Whether the President and the Governor have any discretion in the exercise of the executive power conferred upon them by the Constitution? Held:
  • Article 51(1) and Article154(1) respective talk about the President as the executive head of the Union and the Governor as the executive head of the State.
  • Neither the President nor the Governor may sue or be sued for any executive action of the State.
  • First, Article 300 States that the Government of India may sue or be sued in the name of the Union and the Governor may sue or be sued in the name of the State.
  • Second, Article 361 states that proceedings may be brought against the Government of India and the Government of the State but not against the President or the Governor.
  • Articles 300 and 361 indicate that neither the President nor the Governor can be sued for executive actions of the Government. The reason is that neither the president nor the Governor exercises the executive functions individually or personally.
  • Executive action taken in the name of the President is the action of the Union. Executive action taken in the name of the Governor is the executive action of the State. [Based on english principle the sovereign never acts on his own responsibility]. Satisfaction of the President and Governor
  • Whenever the State requires the satisfaction of the President or the Governor it is not the personal satisfaction of the office but the satisfaction of the Council of Ministers.
  • 77(3) and 166(3) provide for making of rules and allocation of business among Ministers. This means that the decision of the Ministers, upon the business that the Minister has been allocated, is the decision of the President or the Governor.
  • The decision of an official employee in the Ministry is the decision of the Minster. All these acts are done by the Government. Decision of the Court
  • Rule 9 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeals) Rules, 1952 stated that employment of a probationer would be over at the end of period of probation or before if any fault or unsatisfactory record was found. The employee would be told of the charges and given an opportunity to defend himself. The Court found that the charges leveled against Samsher Singh are unfounded and the order of termination was set aside.
  • Rule 7(3) in Part D of the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules 1951 states that upon the end of the probationary period the on the recommendation of the High Court the Governor may appoint him permanently if such a position if vacant, and if the work has been unsatisfactory dismiss him. The High Court appointed the Director of Vigilance to inquire into the activities of Ishwar Chand Agarwal, thereby dispensing its control over the investigation. The appellant was never made aware of the report submitted to the High Court. The Court finds the order of termination illegal and sets it aside.
  • Article 74(1) is mandatory and, therefore, the President cannot exercise the executive power without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. We must then harmonise the provisions of Article 75(3) with Article 74(1) and Article 75(2).
  • Article 75(3) brings into existence what is usually called “Responsible Government". In other words the Council of Ministers must enjoy the confidence of the House of People. While the House of People is not dissolved under Article 85(2)(b), Article 75(3) has full operation.
  • But when it is dissolved the^ Council of Ministers cannot naturally enjoy the confidence^ of the House of People. Nobody has said that the Council of Ministers does not enjoy the confidence of the House of People when it is prorogued.
  • In the context, therefore, this clause must be read as meaning that^ Article 75(3) only applies when the House of People does not stand dissolved or prorogued.
  • The Supreme Court has ruled that the principle of collective responsibility is in full operation so long as the Lok Sabha is not dissolved. “But when it is dissolved the Council of Ministers cannot naturally enjoy the confidence of the House of People.” MP Special Police Establishment vs. State of MP (2004) Article 163 - governor aid and advice Facts: Council of Ministers refusing to grant sanction for prosecution of Ministers on ground that no iota of evidence available against them. But Governor opined that evidence enough to show that prima facie case for prosecution made out and granted sanction for prosecution under Section 197, Cr. P.C. High Court reversed sanction so granted — whether High Court justified? — held, “no" Issue Whether a Governor can act in his discretion and against the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers in a matter of grant of sanction for prosecution of Ministers for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and/or under the IPC. Analysis
  • (^) The SC overrules the HC decision that granting sanction for prosecuting the Ministers was not a function that could be exercised by the Governor in his discretion.
  • (^) There are matters where the Governor can act in his discretion even though the Constitution has not expressly so provided. The concept of Governor acting in his discretion or exercising independent judgment is not alien to the Constitution.
  • (^) The exercise of administrative power will stand vitiated if there is a manifest error of record or the exercise of power is arbitrary. If power has been exercised on the non-consideration of mind to relevant factors the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. The advice of council of ministers in relation to the non-granting of sanction for prosecution of certain ministers was biased and vitiated due to non-consideration of relevant factors.
  • (^) Though in such matters the Governor is required to act on aid and advice of CoM but where bias is inherent and/or manifest in the advice of CoM or, where on facts the bias becomes apparent and/or the decision of CoM is shown to be irrational and based on non-consideration of relevant factors, the Governor would be right to act in his own discretion and grant sanction.
  • (^) If Governor is not given authority to act in his own discretion there would be complete breakdown of rule of law in as much as it would then be open for Govt. to refuse sanction inspite of overwhelming material showing that a prima facie case is made out.
  • (^) The phrase ‘at his discretion’ is significant. The Court examines Clause (2) of Article 163 to hold that the use of this term means that the discretion open to the Governor can exist even in situations when the Constitution does not expressly provide for such a situation. Otherwise, there would be no real need to have a provision like this when discretion is expressly granted, why would this be questioned in law?
  • (^) The Governor acting in his discretion and independently of the advice of the Chief Minister is not necessarily a problem, because there are situations where bias and a threat to democracy could result in situations not amenable to Ministerial advice.
  • (^) It is not abundantly clear that this judgement constitutes a complete departure from Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab (1974) because the court delivered the judgement in the peculiar circumstances of the case where the Lokayukta of the State of Madhya Pradesh (being a former judge of the Supreme Court) had applied its mind on the basis of materials available on record to direct the Madhya Pradesh Special Police Establishment (the investigating agency) to register and investigate the offences against the concerned ministers. The Court did not record a finding of bias, however held that given the report of the Lokayukta, the decision of the Council of Ministers that there was no prima facie case made out for an offence was irrational. Ratio: The Court in Para. 33 of the judgement makes it clear that in the case of apparent bias or a case where the decision of the Council of Ministers is shown to be irrational or based on non-consideration of the relevant factors, the Governor would be right in acting in his own discretion. Conclusion: While generally the Council of Ministers should usually act in a bona fide manner, in some situations, however, when there is prima facie evidence of bias, the Governor should be allowed to act in his own discretion and grant sanction for prosecution. ORDINANCE MAKING (Executive’s Legislative Power) AK Roy vs. UOI (1982) Judicial Review of Ordinance + Art. 123 Facts: A.K. Roy, a Marxist member of Parliament was detained under the National Security Ordinance, 1980. He was detained under preventive detention that he was indulging in activities that were prejudicial to pubic order. He thus filed a writ petition under Art. 32 questioning the validity of the Executive legislation of the ordinance which further became NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, 1980. Issue:
  1. Whether an ordinance passed under Art. 123, COI is to have equivalent powers as that of a law passed by legislature? 1.1 — Sub-issue: Thus, whether an ordinance so passed may be considered as ‘procedure established by law’ within the meaning of Art. 21?
  2. Whether an ordinance passed under Art. 123, COI is subject to judicial review? ANALYSIS
  • (^) Stated the necessity of ordinances in periods that necessarily require swift action, in periods of emergencies or stress. Additionally, it emphasized the fluidity of the separation of powers conceptualization in constitutional framework.
  • (^) Thus, it opined that the President’s power under Art. 123 was quintessential for a peaceful and good governance of the country, as imperative as a law passed by legislature. This gave further impetus to Art. 123(2). Thus, it was to have the same effect as any law of that passed by legislature differentiated only by their life-span and process of continuance.
  • (^) Consequently, it was to be considered within the ambit of “law” inter alia Art. 13(3).
  • (^) Court held that legislation could not function on virgin land and executive laws were to be considered same and thus held that an ordinance is to be considered within the meaning of a “procedure established by law” under Art. 21.
  • On the issue of whether the ordinance passed under Art. 123 as justiciable, the court left the question open whether the satisfaction of the President under Art. 123(1) is justiciable or not. The Court did say however that it was arguable that “judicial review is not totally excluded in regard to the question relating to the President’s satisfaction.”
  • As to whether the preconditions to the exercise of power under Art. 123 have been satisfied or not^ cannot be regarded as a purely political question and kept beyond judicial review. In the instant case, since the Ordinance in question had been replaced by an Act of Parliament, the Court felt no need to go into the question of the President’s satisfaction to issue the Ordinance in question.

DC Wadhwa vs. State of Bihar (1987) Validity of successive promulgations of the same ordinance

  • (^) The Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Ordinance was kept in force for more than 13 years through the process of re-promulgation instead of seven and a half months as envisaged by the constitutional provision. Many other ordinances were continued for years without ever being brought before the Legislature for approval.
  • (^) During the period 1967-81, the State Governor promulgated 256 ordinances; all these ordinances were kept alive for periods ranging between 1 to 14 years by repromulgation from time to time.
  • (^) A writ petition was filed in the Supreme Court as a matter of public interest litigation on January 16, 1984, challenging such a practice as unconstitutional. The Supreme Court delivered its opinion in the matter in December, 1986
  • (^) The Court emphasized that under the Constitution, the primary law-making authority is the legislature and not the executive and the ordinance making power is “in the nature of an emergency power.”
  • (^) This reprehensible practice posed a threat to the system of parliamentary democracy. It could also be characterised as a fraud on the constitution as Art. 213 was never designed to be used in such a manner.
  • (^) The Court insisted that the government cannot by-pass the legislature and keep ordinances alive indefinitely without enacting their provisions into Acts of legislature. Wadhwa’s case has been taken note of in the discussion on the ordinance-making power of the State Governments [Art. 213] which is on all fours with the ordinance-making power of the Centre. HELD: The power to promulgate an ordinance is essentially a power to be used to meet an extraordinary situation and it cannot be allowed to be perverted to serve political ends The Court did concede, however, that “there may be a situation where it may not be possible for the Government to introduce and push through in the Legislature a Bill containing the same provisions as in the ordinance, because the Legislature may have too much legislative business in a particular session, or the time at the disposal of the Legislature in a particular session may be short, and in that event, the Governor may legitimately find that it is necessary to repromulgate the ordinance. Where such is the case, repromultation of the ordinance may not be open to attack. But, otherwise, it would be a colourable exercise of power on the part of the Executive Krishna Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar (2017) On 16-12-1989, the Bihar Government promulgated an ordinance to take over private recognised Sanskrit schools which were receiving government grants. The ordinance of 89 was successively replaced several times during 90 to 92. These ordinances were substantially in similar terms. Each ordinance contained a “repeal and savings’ clause repealing the previous ordinance. As a result thereof, all actions taken under the previous ordinance were deemed to be taken under the fresh ordinance. Held: All these ordinances except the original one of 1989, as unconstitutional and invalid. The Court ruled that in the absence of any explanation by the Government for promulgating these ordinances and in the absence of any compensation for taking over properties of the schools, all the ordinances which took colour from one another and formed a chain , were held to be fraud on Art. 213, arbitrary and invalid violating Art. 14 of the Constitution. The satisfaction of the President Under Article 123 and of the Governor. Article 213 is not immune from judicial review particularly after the amendment brought about by the forty-fourth amendment to the Constitution by the deletion of Clause 4 in both the articles. The test is whether the satisfaction is based on some relevant material. The court in the exercise of its power of judicial review will not determine the sufficiency or adequacy of the material. The court will scrutinise

whether the satisfaction in a particular case constitutes a fraud on power or was actuated by an oblique motive. Judicial review in other words would enquire into whether there was no satisfaction at all. PRESIDENTIAL PARDON Kehar Singh vs. Union of India (1989) Presidential Pardon — Art 72. Facts

  • The petitioner was convicted under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the IPC. He was sentenced to death for the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of India on 31st^ October, 1984.
  • After the confirmation of his sentence by the Supreme Court and the dismissal of his review petition, a mercy petition was submitted. This petition was filed by the petitioner’s son on his behalf to the President of India on the ground that he had been wrongly convicted.
  • It was urged that it was a case for the exercise of^ clemency^ and therefore, petitioner should be pardoned under Article 72 of the Constitution.
  • The petition included a request that the representative of the petitioner may be allowed to see the President in person in order to explain the case concerning him.
  • However, the petition was rejected on 24th^ November, 1988, on the ground that the^ President is precluded from entering into the merits of the case finally decided by the Supreme Court. The date of execution was fixed as 2nd^ December, 1988.
  • On 1st^ December, the present writ petition was filed before the Supreme Court. Issues
  1. Whether the President could examine the merits of a case which had been finally heard and decided by the Supreme Court while exercising his power to grant pardon under Article 72 of the Indian Constitution
  2. Whether judicial review extends to an examination of the order passed by the President under Article 72 of the Constitution?
  3. Whether there is a right to an oral hearing before the President in matters concerning Article 72? Analysis Regarding Pardon
  • (^) The Court held that the power to grant pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme. It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State.
  • (^) It is done to provide relief from mistake in the operation or the enforcement of the criminal law. Further the Court confirmed that the President’s decision under Article 72 would be bound by the advice given by the Councils of Ministers under Article 74(1).
  • (^) The Court concluded that the President is entitled to examine the evidence on record and arrive at a conclusion opposite to the court’s decision regarding conviction or sentence imposed. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record.
  • (^) The Court further clarified that the nature of power exercised by the President is different from the judicial decision-making and does not result in abrogating the judicial record.
  • (^) Therefore, the power of pardon is an executive function meant to rectify ‘fallibility of human judgement’. Judicial Review
  • (^) With regard to the second issue, the Court held that the President’s decision could not be subject to judicial review on its merits except within the strict limitation defined in Maru Ram.
  • (^) It could examine the area and scope of the pardoning power of the President under Article 72 because it is a matter for the Court to decide whether an authority under the Constitution has acted within the limits of its power or exceeded it. On the third issue, the Court held that the petitioner has no right to insist on presenting an oral argument. This is so because the proceedings before the president is of an executive character, and when the petitioner files his petition it is for him to submit with all the requisite information necessary for the disposal of the petition. Then the President considers whether the material furnished before him is sufficient in disposal of

iii. that the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; iv. that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration; v. that the order suffers from the vices arbitrariness. PRIME MINISTER AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS Ram Jawaya Kapoor vs. State of Punjab Scope of the executive power — 298, 162, 73 The recognised schools in Punjab used only such text books as were prescribed by the Education Department. In 1950, the Government embarked on the policy of nationalising text books and, thus, took over the work of printing and publishing them. The author of the book selected by the Government for the purpose by contract vested the copyright of the book in the Government in lieu of royalty. The scheme was challenged on the ground, inter alia, that the Executive could not engage in any trade or business activity without any law being passed for the purpose. The Supreme Court negatived the contention saying that the expenses necessary to carry on the business of publishing text books had been approved by the Legislature in the Appropriation Act. The Government required no additional power to carry on the business as whatever was necessary for that purpose, it could secure by entering into contracts with authors and other people. No private right was being infringed as the publishers were not being debarred from publishing books. In the circumstances, the carrying on of the business of publishing text books without a specific law sanctioning the same was not beyond the competence of the Executive. “It may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies. Ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislature and judicial functions are taken away.”

  • The language of Article 162 clearly indicates that the powers of the State executive do extend to matters upon which the state Legislature is competent to legislate and are not confined to matters over which legislation has been passed already. The same principle underlies article 73 of the Constitution.
  • In a written Constitution like ours the^ executive power may be such as is given to the executive or is implied, ancillary or inherent. It must include all powers that may be needed to carry into effect the aims and objects of the Constitution. It must mean more than merely executing the laws. The State has a right to hold and manage its own property and carry on such trade or business as a citizen has the right to carry on, so long as such activity does not encroach upon the rights of others or is not contrary to law.
  • Our Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the^ British Parliamentary system.^ The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution. This evidently includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, the promotion of social and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State.
  • Hence, for the purpose of carrying on the business the Government does not require any additional powers. This power of contract is expressly vested in the Government under article 298 of the Constitution.
  • The Cabinet enjoying, as it does, a majority in the legislature concentrates in itself the virtual control of both legislative and executive functions; and as the Ministers constituting the Cabinet are presumably agreed on fundamentals and act on the principle of collective responsibility , the most important questions of policy are all formulated by them. B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu Jayalalithaa case — disqualifications u/102. Appointment u/75. Jayalalithaa, was convicted in two criminal cases by the trial court. On appeal, High Court suspended her sentences but her application for stay of judgment was rejected. She then contested elections and her nomination was rejected due to criminal convictions. Her party came into the majority and she became the Chief Minister. This was challenged in appeal. HELD : Supreme Court read a significant restriction in Art. 75(5).
  • (^) The Supreme Court ruled that under Art. 75(5), a person who is not a member of a House of Parliament can be appointed as the Prime Minister or a Minister only if he has the qualifications for membership of Parliament as prescribed by Art. 84
  • (^) And should not be disqualified from the membership thereof by reason of the disqualifications set out in Art. 102.
  • (^) Further, they are to be elected within 6 months SP Anand vs. Devegowda (1997) Can a non elected member be appointed as PM? Deve Gowda, who was not a member of either House of Parliament was appointed as the Prime Minister of India. His appointment was put in issue — The Supreme Court upheld the appointment. The Court also repelled the argument that if a non-member is appointed as the Prime Minister, it would be against national interest. Once appointed as the Prime Minister, he becomes responsible and answerable to the House. The Court observed: “Even if a person is not a member of the House, if he has support and confidence of the House, he can be chosen to head the Council of Ministers without violating the norms of democracy and the requirement of being accountable to the House would ensure the smooth functioning of the democratic process.”
  • (^) Principle of collective responsibility governs the democratic process.
  • (^) On no other condition can a Council of Ministers work as a team and carry on the government of the country.
  • (^) It is the Prime Minister who enforces collective responsibility amongst the Ministers through his ultimate power to dismiss a Minister. Parity of reasoning if a person who is not a member of the State Legislature can be appointed a Chief Minister of a State under Article 164(4) for six months, a person who is not a member of either House of Parliament can be appointed Prime Minister for the same duration. S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab (2001) Art 75(5) The question which arose in the instant case was as follows : a person who is not a member of a House of Parliament is appointed as a minister. He resigns after six months, as required by Art. 75(5), as he fails to become a member of a House of Parliament in the meantime. Issues : Can he be re-appointed as a minister for another term of six months? Can a person be appointed repeatedly as a minister for a period of six months at a time even though he is not a member of a House of Parliament? Held :
  • Although Art. 75(5) does not specifically bar such a practice, if a literal view is adopted thereof, the Supreme Court has banned it in Chaudhuri characterising it as “undemocratic”; it would be “subverting the Constitution” to allow such a practice.
  • The Court has observed further : “The practice would be clearly derogatory to the constitutional scheme, improper, undemocratic and invalid.” Art. 75(5) is in the nature of an exception to the normal rule that only members of Parliament can be appointed as ministers. “This exception is essentially required to be used to meet very extraordinary situation and must be strictly construed and sparingly used.”
  • This means that within the life time of Parliament for five years, a person who is not a member of a House of Parliament, can be appointed as a minister only once and that too for a short period of six months. The Chaudhuri case arose the State of Punjab under Art. 164(4) which applies to the appointment of ministers in a State and is in pari materia with Art. 75(5). Therefore, whatever is said in relation to Art. 164(4) applies to Art. 75(5) as well and vice versa. **

PARLIAMENT AND STATE LEGISLATURES

DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS (Article 245) State of Bombay vs. RMDC (1957) Facts:

  • The respondent in the instant case procured a license from the then Collector of Bombay under the provisions of the Bombay Prize Competitions Tax Act, 1939 (now repealed) to conduct a prize competition. The competition tax was also paid to the provincial government.
  • The respondent subsequently applied for renewal of his license but was denied one. Due to that reason the respondent in 1948 decided to shift his base of operations from Bombay to Mysore wherein he had established a company in 1949 under the name of R.M.D.C. (Mysore) Limited.
  • This^ company owned a weekly newspaper known as ‘Sporting Star’^ and also took care of the printing and publishing of the same. Through this newspaper that a prize competition known as the R.M.D.C Crosswords was. This newspaper had enjoyed wide circulation in various parts of India including the State of Bombay, this competition received entries from the places where it was circulated through agents situated in the areas and localities of the State where the newspaper was in circulation.
  • The 1939 Act under which the respondent had previously obtained a license was replaced by^ Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competition Control and Tax Act, 1948. However this Act was subjected to amendments by the corresponding Amendment Act passed in 1952. By virtue of the amendment made to the Act it no longer excluded prize competitions circulated and communicated by newspapers in its definitions and included the same as subject to taxes under a newly inserted Section.
  • The facts that the^ respondent was not a resident of the State of Bombay, and held his prize competitions through a newspaper printed and published in Bangalore but in wide circulation in various States of India including the State of Bombay (the petitioner), that the necessary steps to be taken so as to take part in the competition were all taken in Bombay and that the State Government, with regard to the same, intended to tax such activity are facts which are significant and apropos to the concept and the Principle of the Constitution covered and necessary to be considered so as to compendiously analyse the concept so covered with respect to the facts of this case. Issues relevant:
  • Whether the Legislature of Bombay transgressed its limits by enacting the Act so as to cover businessmen residing and carrying out their activities outside the State of Bombay thereby imparting the act an extra-territorial operation.
  • Whether there is s ufficient territorial nexus/connection to justify the extra-territorial operation^ of the Act. Held: The court observed that in order to ascertain the sufficiency of the territorial nexus/connection between the person to be taxed and the state so taxing, it is imperative to consider the following two elements, a) the nexus/connection must be real and not illusory and, b) the liability sought to be imposed must be relevant to that nexus /connection.
  • The court also held that the^ extent or the sufficiency^ of the nexus has an effect on the policy of the legislation not the validity of the same.
  • The court with respect to the issue of sufficiency of the nexus highlighted the facts that the newspaper ‘Sporting Star’, which is printed and published in Bangalore, enjoyed wide circulation in the State of Bombay; that various collection depots have been set up in various areas within Bombay, all of them staffed with respective local collectors, in order to receive entry forms and fees from the participants; that there is an abundance of extra coupons which were circulated by the local collectors; that the advertisements of the competition were available throughout Bombay for its perusal by the residents of Bombay; and most importantly that all the essential formalities associated with the competition such as filling up of the forms and the payment of the fees were undertaken in Bombay so as to participate.
  • With regard to this the court held that the State, through its legislation sought to tax the money received by the respondents by the way of payments made by Bombay residents in order to participate in the gambling venture.
  • The court, in congruence with the ruling of the Court of Appeal with respect to this issue, held that^ a sufficient territorial nexus exists, as all the activities related to the participation in the completion were undertaken in Bombay, and by virtue of that nexus the Bombay legislation cannot be invalidated on the ground of extra-territorial operation and therefore should be upheld. This case provides conditions by which the application of this principle can be called for and they are as follows, i. Whether the State Legislation has an extra-territorial operation. ii. Whether there is a territorial connection between the subject matter of the legislation and the State making that legislation. This case also serves to signify that the subject matter, object or the person to which a State Legislation applies need not be situated physically within the boundaries however there must be a sufficient territorial nexus i.e. connection present between the subject matter of the Law and the State making that Law so as to ensure the application of that legislation. This case is an exemplary of the principle that imposition of tax can take place not only when the object/ person so taxed are present within the territory of the state but also when there is a sufficient connection between the object/person charged with tax and the legislation of the State imposing the tax. State of Bihar v. Charusila Dasi (1959) Article 245
  • Charusila Dasi, the respondent, created a trust deed of her properties, which includes several houses and lands in Bihar and Calcutta. The trust was situated in Bihar. In the trust deed, it was recited that the trust would establish two temples and a hospital in the name of her deceased husband.
  • The Bihar legislature enacted the Bihar Hindu Religion Trust Act, 1950 for the protection and preservation of properties pertaining to the Hindu religious trusts.
  • On October 1952, the Superintendent, Bihar Board of Religious Trusts Patna sent a notice to CharusilaDasi under Section 59 of the Act asking her to furnish the return in respect of the trust in question.
  • The^ respondent refused to pay and said that the Trust is a private endowment^ created for the worship of the family idol and therefore, the act did not apply to it.
  • The second contention was that the property in Calcutta was situated outside the state of Bihar so the Act could not apply on that property. Issue-
    1. Whether the Trust in question is of a private nature or public has interest in the Trust activities? Negative.
    2. Whether the provisions of the Act would apply to trust properties which are situated outside the state of Bihar? Affirmative. Analysis- The court looked at the preamble and the provisions of the Act Preamble- “Whereas it is expedient to provide for the better administration of Hindu religious trusts in the State of Bihar and for the protection and preservation of properties appertaining to such trusts” Section 1 (2)-“the Act extends to the whole of the State of Bihar” Section 3- “This Act shall apply to all religious trusts, whether created before or after the commencement of this Act, any part of the property of which is situated in the State of Bihar” After that the court said,“If these two provisions are read in the context of the preamble, they can only mean that the Act applies in cases in which (a) the religious trust or institution is in Bihar and (b) any part of the property of which institution is situated in the State of Bihar. In other words, the aforesaid two conditions must be fulfilled for the application of the Act. It is now well settled that there is a general presumption that the legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction , and it is a sound principle of construction