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U.C. Berkeley Economic History Exam: January 2008, Exams of Economics

Questions from an economic history field exam held at u.c. Berkeley in january 2008. The questions cover various topics such as the economic histories of china, europe, india, and the great depression. Students are asked to analyze historical gdp estimates, qualitative accounts, and economic theories to explain surprising historical results.

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ECONOMIC HISTORY FIELD EXAM
U.C. BERKELEY
JANUARY 2008
DO THREE OF 12:
1. According to Angus Maddison's historical GDP estimates, China had higher per capita
incomes than Europe prior to 1500--as did India. Qualitative accounts similarly suggest that the
Chinese economy was more technologically advanced than the European economy. Yet the first
industrial revolution took place in Europe, not in China or India (or the Middle East). How do
historians explain this surprising result? Which of their explanations do you find most
convincing?
2. In his presidential address to the American Economic Association, Robert Mundell blames the
Great Depression of the 1930s on a global gold shortage. Prices had risen between 1913 and
1925, but global gold supplies had not, which placed deflationary pressure on the world
economy. Does Mundell's explanation for the Depression hold water? Are there reasons to
doubt it? Are there alternative explanations which are more compelling?
3. Both economists (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson) and economic historians (Engerman and
Sokoloff) have sought to rehabilitate the classic argument that colonialism shaped the
development possibilities of different parts of the world. Do their arguments capture the
principal channels through which colonialism shaped development prospects? Are they
convincing? What do they leave out?
4. It is now 40 years since Peter Temin wrote his classic article on the debate over labor scarcity
and the "American system." Many subsequent studies have addressed this topic. How much of
the labor-scarcity paradigm survives this reassessment? If you were to teach the labor-scarcity
debate to first-year graduate students, how would you characterize it?
5. Friedman and Schwartz, Romer and Romer, and Richardson and Troost all emphasize the
usefulness of natural experiments in identifying the real effects of monetary policy shocks. What
dangers or pitfalls do you see in relying on such an approach? Can you suggest solutions or
partial remedies to some of these dangers?
6. There is much discussion of the dollar as an international currency: will it lose its dominant
role as a reserve, vehicle and international investment currency to the euro, the yen or the yuan?
What does the history of international currencies tell us about the prospects?
7. In the fifteenth century the high civilization of Islam was richer, militarily stronger, and
politically better organized than the lands to its west (witness Mehmed II's conquest of
Constantinople) and the lands to its east (witness Babur's conquest of the Indo-Gangetic plain).
The story since, however, has been one of nearly unbroken relative economic decline. What can
economic historians say that is of any use in understanding this nearly unbroken relative
economic decline?
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ECONOMIC HISTORY FIELD EXAM

U.C. BERKELEY

JANUARY 2008

DO THREE OF 12:

  1. According to Angus Maddison's historical GDP estimates, China had higher per capita incomes than Europe prior to 1500--as did India. Qualitative accounts similarly suggest that the Chinese economy was more technologically advanced than the European economy. Yet the first industrial revolution took place in Europe, not in China or India (or the Middle East). How do historians explain this surprising result? Which of their explanations do you find most convincing?
  2. In his presidential address to the American Economic Association, Robert Mundell blames the Great Depression of the 1930s on a global gold shortage. Prices had risen between 1913 and 1925, but global gold supplies had not, which placed deflationary pressure on the world economy. Does Mundell's explanation for the Depression hold water? Are there reasons to doubt it? Are there alternative explanations which are more compelling?
  3. Both economists (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson) and economic historians (Engerman and Sokoloff) have sought to rehabilitate the classic argument that colonialism shaped the development possibilities of different parts of the world. Do their arguments capture the principal channels through which colonialism shaped development prospects? Are they convincing? What do they leave out?
  4. It is now 40 years since Peter Temin wrote his classic article on the debate over labor scarcity and the "American system." Many subsequent studies have addressed this topic. How much of the labor-scarcity paradigm survives this reassessment? If you were to teach the labor-scarcity debate to first-year graduate students, how would you characterize it?
  5. Friedman and Schwartz, Romer and Romer, and Richardson and Troost all emphasize the usefulness of natural experiments in identifying the real effects of monetary policy shocks. What dangers or pitfalls do you see in relying on such an approach? Can you suggest solutions or partial remedies to some of these dangers?
  6. There is much discussion of the dollar as an international currency: will it lose its dominant role as a reserve, vehicle and international investment currency to the euro, the yen or the yuan? What does the history of international currencies tell us about the prospects?
  7. In the fifteenth century the high civilization of Islam was richer, militarily stronger, and politically better organized than the lands to its west (witness Mehmed II's conquest of Constantinople) and the lands to its east (witness Babur's conquest of the Indo-Gangetic plain). The story since, however, has been one of nearly unbroken relative economic decline. What can economic historians say that is of any use in understanding this nearly unbroken relative economic decline?
  1. To what extent can you tell the story of the nineteenth-century development of political economy as a reflection of the structure and transformation of the economies in which various political economists lived? To what extent must the story be not an "external" but an "internal" one—in which doctrines and their development are shaped much less by economic transformations and much more by the logic of intellectual disciplinary argument?
  2. To what countries and regions has industrialization spread most rapidly in the twentieth century? What factors have tended to make a country or region likely to industrialize? Conversely, what factors have tended to make a country or region less likely to industrialize?
  3. Women and children played a prominent role in industrialization in Great Britain, the United States, and other places. How does recognition of this fact force us to re-think the processes of economic development and growth in early the 19th century?
  4. Some economists argue that deflation both is particularly devastating to the economy and renders monetary policy ineffectual. In your opinion, does the evidence support these claims? Be sure to include a critical evaluation of the relevant literature and a discussion of particular historical episodes in your answer.
  5. Why have the economic histories of North America, Central America, and South America diverged?