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Problems with Falsificationism, Legitimate Parts of Science, Notion of Degree, Falsifiability is Problematic, Probabilistic Statements, Existential Statements, Unfalsifiable Scientific Principles, Natural Selection, Infinite Number of Falsifiers, Germ Theory are the important key points of lecture notes of Philosophy.
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Problems with falsificationism
1- Some legitimate parts of science seem not to be falsifiable 1.1 Probabilistic statements Often science does not predict a definite result, but only the probability that something will happen. In such a case, no individual instance is falsifiable, for basically anything could happen and it would still be consistent with the theory. E.g., a coin can land on the tail side without refuting the fact that it has ½ chance of landing head side up. This problem does not arise for probabilities defined over large population. E.g., with enough tosses (say, 1 million) the statement that a given coin has ½ chance of landing head side up will be considered refuted if it lands tail side up 90% of the time.
1.2 Existential statements Science not only produces universal statements (“All Xs are Ys”), but also existential statements (“There is an X”), that is, science says of some things that they exist. E.g., black holes, DNA, etc. Just because we have not found something yet, does not mean it does not exist. E.g., extra-terrestrials living beings. Thus, existential statements are not falsifiable. You could have inductive grounds to think that something does not exist, but falsificationism is supposed to allow science to do without induction. To completely reject induction means that we can never have any reason to believe in the unobservable entities postulated by science E.g., gravitational fields, quarks. Yet, these can help scientists devise otherwise highly falsifiable theories.
1.3 Unfalsifiable scientific principles It can be defended that some unfalsifiable principle are nevertheless proper parts of science. E.g., the principle of conservation of energy, the second law of thermodynamic (the entropy of any closed system always increases), and the principle of ‘no action at a distance’ are all principles that are firmly held by scientists. Any apparent falsification will be taken as showing that something else is wrong.
Some methodological principles also appear to be central to science yet unfalsifiable. E.g., the idea that simple and unifying theories are more likely to be true than messy and complex ones, all other things being equal. This methodological principle is what motivates many physicists today to try to unified general relativity and quantum mechanics, even though there are no new additional phenomenon to explain no covered by either one of these theories.
Special case: Natural selection Is the theory of natural selection falsifiable? A crude understanding of the theory of natural selection is that it simply states that the fittest species survive, where the fittest is defined as the one who survives. This is a tautology, and as such unfalsifiable. For this reason, Popper thought for a while that Natural selection was not science. However, a proper understanding of natural selection permits a testable evaluation of it, if not all by itself, at least by comparison to the others ‘evolution theory’ that existed in Darwin’s time (e.g., Lamark’s) and to creation theory.
2- Falsification is not itself falsifiable Popper admits this, but replies that it is not supposed to be falsifiable, because it is a philosophical or logical theory of the scientific method, so this objection misses its target.
3- The notion of degree of falsifiability is problematic 3.1 Infinite number of falsifiers The number of cases counting as falsification for a universal statement is always infinite, so there is no absolute measure of falsification. E.g., “All crows are black” implies a potentially infinite number of crows, and any one of them might turn out to be non-black. So there are an infinite number of falsifiers of “All crows are black”. We cannot compare theories by their number of potential falsifiers, for all theories with universal statements have the same number of falsifiers: i.e., an infinity. At best, we can have a relative measure of falsification, as some theories yield more sets of falsifiers. E.g., “All crows are black and weight less than 1Kg” is more falsifiable than just “All crows are black”, because a black crow of 1.2 Kg will count as a falsification for the former, but not for the latter.
3.2 Induction is implied by falsificationism The Duhem problem means that judgements about the degree of falsifiability of theories are relative to whole systems of hypotheses. This means that our basis for such judgement is past experience, and this lets induction in by the back door. E.g., testing the germ theory of disease vs. optical theory use by the microscope.
4- Popper cannot account for our expectations about the future By rejecting induction completely, Popper is committed to the idea that we never have any positive knowledge of anything. That is, we only know when something is false , never when it is true. However, it seems science does produce some positive knowledge as well, and we use this knowledge to guide our actions. Surely, it is more rational to believe that the safest way to go from the top floor of a building to the ground is by taking the elevator or the stairs, rather than jumping out of the window. Yet, it seems falsificationism is not able to justify this assessment.
Despite Hume’s problem with induction, it seems we still need induction, even if we adopt Popper’s general outlook on science.