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Series IV, Volume 3, No. 2, October 2013
Problematizing the Religious Basis of
Maududi’s Political Theory
Shahbaz Ahmad Cheema
University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.
Introduction This paper problematizes the divinity of establishing an Islamic state by analysing the religious basis of Maulana Abul Ala Maududi’s (hereafter referred to as Maududi) political theory. His political theory revolves around the idea that religion and politics are an inseparable entity and the fulfilment of religious dictates is impossible unless and until we organize a political system as per criteria set by the religion. This idea of Maududi has led many to believe that it is our religious duty to struggle for an Islamic state like many other religious obligations, e.g. offering prayers and keeping fasts. Though neither Maududi himselfnor his political party has been involved systematically in political violence for political ends,it is difficult to argue that his ideology has not undermined the establishment of a sound political system by entangling its developmentwith religion. The selection of Maududi’s political theory for analysis in this paper is informed by the fact that his ideology still has a widespread following in the world. According to Nasr, Maududi is “the most influential of contemporary revivalist thinkers”^1. This opinion is echoed by Jackson.^2 To materialize his idea of establishing an Islamic
(^1) Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revolution (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 3.
(^2) Roy Jackson, Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam: Authority and the Islamic State (New York: Routledge, 2011).
Studies on Asia state, he organized a political party named the Jamaat-i-Islami (hereafter referred to as JI) which is one of the most organized religio-political parties of Pakistan. 3 It was organized by him in 1941 before partition of the Indian Subcontinent. 4 Maududi anchored and supervised the JI for more than three decades till his death in 1979. Maududi’s contribution to laying down the ideology of the JI is momentous as whatever had been written by him is regarded as its standard discourse. At present, Maududi’s brainchild, the JI, is organized and works under the same name “Jamaat-i-Islami” in five geographical locations in the Indian Subcontinent. 5 The JI’s influence has extended far beyond its place of birth, i.e. the Indian Subcontinent. It maintains links and has organized sister organisations in the USA, UK, and other parts of the world, largely related to the diaspora communities. 6 Maududi’s ideological influence may also be observed in Central Asia, North Africa and Southeast Asia. 7 There is another reason for analyzing Maududi’s political theory: debates on constitutionalism in Muslim majority countries often bring up issues highlighted by Maududi in his writings. These issues include sovereignty of human beings versus sovereignty of
(^3) Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1994); Pooja Joshi, Jamaat-i-Islami: The Catalyst of Islamisation in Pakistan (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2003).
(^4) Nasr, Mawdudi , 41; Irfan Ahmad, Islamism and Democracy in India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
(^5) Frederic Grare, Political Islam in Indian Sub-continent: The Jamaat-i-Islami (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2005), 11.
(^6) Ibid., 102.
(^7) Nasr, Mawdudi , 4.
Studies on Asia Contemporary revivalism is not a homogenous phenomenon; it has different shades of thoughts and resorts to multiple kinds of strategies for materializing its goals. But this is not to suggest that there is no common ground among the contemporary revivalists. They agree on a few fundamental premises and Maududi’s role in shaping these premises is far reaching. Inseparability of politics and religion, and establishment of an Islamic state emerge conspicuously in these premises. From the outset, contemporary revivalism seems to be a mixture of paradoxical derives; it aims, on the one hand, to revive the tradition in the modern and on the other, it is deeply connected to modernage. Esposito says that contemporary revivalism does not intend to reproduce the past in a stereotypical manner; its purpose israther “to reconstruct society through aprocess of Islamic reform in which the principles of Islam applied to contemporary need.” 9 According to the same scholar, it differentiates between westernisation and modernisation; it has no problem with the latter, but it does not find itself at home with the former.^10 The revivalists accept, even welcome modern tools and technologies, but reject any thing that is based on what they perceive to be a Western value system. This approach of taking science and technology as tools of modernisation and separating them from value-addition of westernisation is severely criticized by Tibi.^11 Tibi does not regard scientific tools as value free
the masses. The paper does not refer to that section of contemporary revivalists who employ violent means for their political ends.
(^9) John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 209.
(^10) Ibid., 134.
(^11) Bassam Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
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and asserts that “modern science is based on rationality and is not simply a source for instrumental tool.”^12 A question is often raised as to the relationship of 20th century revivalismwith the general notion of revivalism in Islamic history. There are two opposing views on this issue. There are those who regard it as a “recurring theme in Islamic history” and at the same time it is also characterized as “a historically unique new development”.^13 Voll opines that revivalist movements periodically come forward in Islamic history owingto the introduction of unwarranted flexibilities and compromises which have a potential to threaten the very existence of the community.^14 Kirmanj while comparing revivalism in the past and the present concludes that the contemporary movement is “a new wave in an old continuum.”^15 With reference to the uniqueness of contemporary revivalism, Jawed points out that it is “at once a consequence of modernity and the antithesis of modernism.” 16 The uniqueness thesis implies that had therenot been modernity, there would not be such a revivalism. Maududi has written quite a lot about the revivalist instinct and the history of Muslim ummah , and in principle, he has submitted
(^12) Ibid., 12.
(^13) Nasim Ahmad Jawed, Islam’s Political Culture: Religion and Politics in Pre-divided Pakistan (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 161.
(^14) John O Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in Modern World (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1994), 387.
(^15) Sherko Kirmanj, “The Relationship between Traditional and Contemporary Islamist Political Thought,” The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.12, No.1 (March, 2008), accessed May 19, 2009, http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2008/issue1/pdf/6.pdf
(^16) Jawed, Islam’s Political Culture , 162.
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external aspects as compared to the spiritual/internal dimension of religion.^21 While referring to renowned revivalists of the past Mujadid Alaf Sani and Shah Wali Ullah, Maududi states that it was those revivalists’ overindulgence in Sufism (asceticism) that became one of the major impediments to their success.^22 Taking this into account, he was not willing to embrace the same fate by indulging in asceticism despite the fact that he has Sufi ancestors himself.^23 Maududi states of Imam Mehdi, future and final revivalist as regarded by Muslims, that he will be a thoroughly modern figure; he will not emerge from any hujrah 24 of mosque and will not only be equipped with traditional knowledge rather he will be well conversant with the modern knowledge of his age.^25 Maududi’s reading of past andfuture revivalism emphasizes a number ofaspects which have a bearing on his political theory. Firstly, there is a strong hope of change and this change will only be materialized by human initiatives. Secondly, reliance on human initiative shows his conviction in human capacity and capability to bring change. Thirdly, there is no possibility of change if we keep on relying upon traditional methodologies; hence, one has to resort to modern technologiesto bring about change. Finally, his analysis is also a severe rebuke of Muslims who are generally inclined to adopt a fatalist approach regarding change. It is worth observing that similar
(^21) Nasr, Mawdudi.
(^22) Maududi, Tajdeed-o-Ahyaa-e-Deen , 119.
(^23) Syed Asad Gilani, Maududi: Thoughts and Movement (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1984), 21; Naeem Siddique, Al-Maududi (Lahore: Al-Faisal, 2006).
(^24) Literally means room.
(^25) Maududi, Tajdeed-o-Ahyaa-e-Deen , 52-54.
Studies on Asia emphasis on change/reform coupled with faith in human capabilities can also be observed in the origin of modernity. Leonard Binder, while discussing the JI, has underscored its “desire for reform” which is comparable to the similar desire for modernity.^26 Maududi’s movement has made use of all available resources of modernity from communication to propaganda and from organisation to mobilisation. On the other hand, it has advocated a more entrenched relationship with the past. In addition to the organisational structure, the JI has taken the lead to break away from dominant traditional attitude of ulama of not contesting themselves for government’s posts. Thanks to the rich history of Islam and the modern party system in the world, the JI has taken this task onto itself. Maududi has endeavoured to connect his theory to the tradition, but what is more apparent is that its branches are caught up in the modern and these have been shaped by it. Maududi’s connectivity with the modern can also be observed from another perspective. According to Foucault,^27 there are multiple discontinuities and ruptures in a course of history, and it is not a continuous discourse. 28 Every discontinuity or rupture is
(^26) Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California, 1963), 73.
(^27) Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge , trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith, (London: Routledge, 1972).
(^28) One of the very instructive engagements with Foucault’s conception of discontinuity is by C. B. Dilger. He writes “Foucault’s goal is not the violent and permanent removal of all continuities, nor the erasure of all humanism and anthropology, nor the denial of the use of these concepts and their ready-mades in certain contexts. Rather, he seeks a more balanced form of analysis in which continuities are controlled and prevented from dominating and distorting history” (C. B. Dilger, “The Discontinuities of Foucault: Reading the Archaeology of Knowledge” accessed April 29, 2009, http://www.thefoucauldian.co.uk/discontinuity.pdf ). This is the sense in which I have employed the concept of discontinuity here.
Studies on Asia much Maududi depends on his socio-political context even for the purposes of elaboration of those themes which he regards as Islamic. Again referring back to Foucault’s^32 notion of discontinuity, the colonization of the Muslim world is a kind of historical discontinuity which snatched from the Muslims whatever insignificant power they had been exercising in their domains. This deprivation of power has also influenced the shaping of contemporary revivalist movements. In the pre-colonial period, the Muslim world witnessed a relatively soft revivalist phenomenon; soft in the sense that most of the revivalists in that period did not attempt to dislodge the Muslim monarchs but endeavoured to bring about change through them. Mujadid Alaf Sani and Shah Wali Ullah confirm this aspect. 33 The historical discontinuity of colonization provided the contemporary revivalists with a window of hope to return to the purest form of Islam as was supposed by them to have been exercised during the period of the Khulafaey Rashedin (the Rightly Guided Caliphate).They started to think of it as a better alternative to bring change on their own initiativerather than giving it effect through Muslim governments and monarchs as had been done in previous revivalist movements. That’s what led to the more politically enthusiastic revivalist movements in the aftermath of the colonial period. 34
(^32) Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge.
(^33) Maududi, Tajdeed-o-Ahyaa-e-Deen.
(^34) Mahmood Mamdani observes that “contemporary, modern, political Islam developed as a response to colonialism. Colonialism posed a double challenge, external and internal, the challenge of foreign domination and of the need of internal reform to address weaknesses exposed by external aggression” (Mahmood Mamdani, (2004) “Contemporary Political Terror: Its Origins in the Late Cold War,” (2004) accessed April 30, 2009, http://www.library.cornell.edu/africana/lecture/mamdani.pdf).
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Revivalist movements are supposed to have gained prominence either after thesix day Arab-Israel war in 1967^35 or on the eve of the Iranian revolution in 1979. 36 But the fact of the matter is that revivalist ideologues including Maududi were born and their academic upbringing took place in the colonial period. Whenever they were reading the Quran and particularly verses dealing with the dominance of Islam as understood by the contemporary revivalists in terms of political dominance, 37 they were struck by the apparent contradiction in the Quranic references of Islam’s dominance and their own reality of subjugation. It would have been a persistent query: whether the Quran was not telling the truth or it was the prevailing attitude of Muslims that had led to the failure of Islam’s promised dominance. Acceptance of the former would have been destructive of faith, so the latter option was accepted. This acceptance was not the end of the debate; instead it encouraged them to strive for the promised dominance through revivalism. It is noteworthy that the above referred dogmatic issue was not there in the pre-colonial period as Muslim monarchs were in governments of their respective domains. This was the reason thatthe effort to control governments by revivalists was not the defining characteristic of revivalism in that period. It is a marker of the difference between revivalist movements in the pre-and post-colonial periods. In the former period revivalists were more inclined to bring
(^35) Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics , 14.
(^36) L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 1.
(^37) This theme is recurrent in Maududi’s following writings: Syed Abul Ala Maududi, Deenyaat (Lahore: Idara Tarjumanul Quran, 2002); Syed Abul Ala Maududi, Khilafat wa Malookeyat (Lahore: Idara Tarjumanal Quran, 2000); Syed Abul Ala Maududi, The Meanings of the Quran Vol.1-6. (Lahore: Idara Tarjumanul Quran).
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There is no doubt that all the above factors contribute. But it needs to be queried whether all these factors are bound to contribute in one particular way. Similar factors may produce different reactions including nationalist, secularist, and modernist. This is similar to any particular precept of the divine which could be read in a traditionalist, modernist or revivalist manner. The multiplicity of views does not relegate the influence of any particular factor. Equally true is the importance of the socio-political context which acted as a contributory factor, but not as the sole factor in this regard.
Hukumat-i-Illahiya 41 and the Religious Basis of Maududi’s
Political Theory: Jawed outlines the reasons for the necessity of an Islamic state and government in different strands of political Islam. 42 Firstly, “conception of the moral role and power of government” provides justification to strive for establishing an Islamic state and this idea is particularly associated with revivalists. Secondly, there are certain goals which could not be achieved without a state, e.g., implementation of the complete Shariah code. This view is primarily held by traditional ulama and is also another justification extended by revivalists. Thirdly, there are certain social goals, e.g., Islamic social order, which necessitate establishing a state. 43 All the abovementioned views have one point of convergence, that they regard the state as a tool for the accomplishment of some other purpose. That purpose has been variously articulated due to differences of perspective among these groups.
(^41) Literally means a government which rules according to the laws laid down by God.
(^42) Jawed, Islam’s Political Culture.
(^43) Ibid., 60-61.
Studies on Asia According to Maududi, this purpose is the establishment of hukumat-i-illahiya and he has coined terminologies to distinguish his conception from other forms of government. The most important of these terminologies are “sovereignty of God” in contradistinction to “popular sovereignty” and “theo-democracy” in contradistinction to “theocracy” on the one hand and “secular Western democracy” on the other.^44 He opines that all problems in different systems of the world are due to the fact that human beings rule human beings and if popular sovereignty is replaced with the sovereignty of God, these problems are bound to be resolved. 45 That the popular sovereignty would be substituted by the sovereignty of God in a system proposed by Maududi appears to be an attractive idea at first look. But, is there any other way to materialize that sovereignty except through the people? If the people do not observe limits as enshrined in his notion of God’s sovereignty, the situation would not be different from that under the popular sovereignty. We could not imagine any system which can work without the involvement of human agency. It is this human agency which is likely to “promote illiberal, authoritarian politics that leaves little room for civil liberties, cultural pluralism, the rights of women and minorities and democracy.” 46 It is unfortunate that issues similar to the above are eschewed in utopian discourses. The distinctive nature of the terminologies employed by Maududi is worth analyzing. He has not coined these terminologies in a vacuum. Their foundation is well established in contemporary
(^44) Syed Abul Ala Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution , trans. and ed. Khurshid Ahmad, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), 136-141.
(^45) Syed Abul Ala Maududi, Tahreek-e-Azadi-e-Hind Musalman Vol. 2 (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1996), 193.
(^46) Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of Muslim Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol.16, No.2, April (2005).
Studies on Asia those who lack such attitudes and sensibilities through the instrumentalities of the colonial state. From this perspective, Maududi’s project involves remaking others, i.e. citizens of the Islamic state, which could not be accomplished without an Islamic state. This perspective has involved Islamists like Maududi in power politics and struggle for government, which is bound to generate reactions from other competitors. Maududi considers this type of confrontational consequences of his movement as not different from the resistance extended to the Prophets during their lives. One of the vocal critics of Maududi’s thought, Khan^49 has severely objected to his confrontational vision and viewing everything through the prism of hukumat-i-illahiya. 50 Khan asserts that this attitude kept the ulama in conflict with the colonizers during the colonial period and in the post-colonial period they were reduced to perpetual opposition. 51 This confrontational attitude is itself a hurdle in paving the way for a society embedded in an Islamic value system. Moreover, demands for establishing Islamic rule are made without the preparation of the Muslim masses for this purpose. 52 Khan even
(^49) Wahid-ud-Din Khan is a prolific writer based in India who has written about Islam extensively. He joined the JI and remained an active worker for about fifteen years. He served as an editor of the Jamaat-i-Islami India’s periodical “Zindaghi” for some time. His books and journals can be accessed at www.alrisala.org.
(^50) Wahid-ud-Din Khan, Deen ki Siyassi Tabeer (New Delhi: Al-Risala Books, 1990); Wahid-ud-Din Khan, Tabeer ki Ghaalti (New Delhi: Al-Risala Books, 1995).
(^51) Wahid-ud-Din Khan, Ulama aur Daur-e-Jadid (New Delhi: Al-Risala Books, 1992), 25-26.
(^52) Ibid., 25-26.
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goes on to term such movements as “counter-productive” in the Muslim world. 53 Khan attributes this interpretation of responsibility for establishing hukumat-i-illahiya as a product of the defective understanding of Western dominance in the world considering it as if it is political in nature.^54 The political dimension is only one aspect of dominance of Western civilisation; the other aspect comprises invention and circulation of knowledge. The latter dimension is more instrumental in creating and perpetuating the dominance of the West. 55 For the purposes of substantiating his contention, Khan notes that there were only a few Prophets (including Yousaf, Dawood and Muhammad) who actually succeeded in establishing a political entity. 56 If we insist that establishing an Islamic state was a responsibility of the Prophets then we have to admit that the overwhelming majority of them were unsuccessful in their prophetic missions. Maududi does not subscribe to this view. He argues that it was rather the failure of people who did not believe and support the Prophets to carry out the prescribed task of hukumat-i-illahiya.^57
(^53) Ibid., 28.
(^54) Ibid., 31.
(^55) See Khan (Wahid-ud-Din Khan, The Call of the Quran (New Delhi: Goodword Books, 2000), 84) to appreciate his opinion of the responsibility of ulama in the contemporary world and more particularly his description of Jamal-ud-Din Afghani and Sultan Abdul Hamid Sani of the Ottoman Empire.
(^56) Khan, Tabeer ki Ghaalti.
(^57) Syed Abul Ala Maududi, Muslaman aur Majooda Siyasi Kashmikash Hisa Soum Par Tanqiedi Jiyaza , Months 9-10-11 (1941): 130.
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Al-Ashmawy and Maududi rely on the same sources to reach different conclusions. There may be many reasons for this difference of opinion, but to my understanding the main reason is their variation in understanding the relationship between politics andreligion. If one, like Maududi, is of the opinion that there is no difference between politics and religion, then he would reach a conclusion which is premised on responsibility to establish a government of God. But if someone views politics and religion as pertaining to different domains, then it would be less likely that he would concludethat establishing an Islamic state is a responsibility of Muslims. The fact of the matter is this that the divine and historical sources relied and referred to by Muslims are so loaded and diverse that they always need human agency to make them speak or give them a particular construction. There appears little need to emphasize the point that Maududi has taken the idea of the fusion between politics and religion to its zenith. What is more important in this respect is to analyze the question of how he evolvesa/the religious foundation for his thesis? We will observe how similar words are construed to portray entirely different picturesby different Muslim scholars. Inseparability of religion and politics has been theoreticallya concern of more or less all schools of thoughts within the Islamic tradition, it was not maintained practically.^64 Maududi does not find this difference in theory and practice as a precedent worthy to be relied upon. One of the most influential books by him which discusses the basis for his view on the inseparability of religion and politics is “ Four Basic Quranic Terms .” 65 I will deal with this book to explain how he makes the divine speak. Thereafter, Maududi’s
(^64) Nasr, Mawdudi , 60; Brown, Religion and State , 80.
(^65) Maududi, Four Basic Quranic Terms.
Studies on Asia version will be juxtaposed by Khan’s contentions. The point meant to be substantiated in this debate is not that anyone’s version is more authenticthan the other rather it is that Maududi’s primary thesis of inseparability of religion and politics cannot be unquestionably and indisputably derived from divine sources. Maududi’s contention of the inseparability of religion and politics is founded on his primary thesis presented in his book Four Basic Quranic Terms , according to which the sovereignty of God over the entire universe is an indivisible entity and not amenable to sharing out in any manner whatsoever. Maududi has selected four terms in the above book to substantiate his thesis. They are Ilah , Rabb , ibadah and deen. 66 According to him, Ilah is comparable to the contemporary understanding of sovereignty in political science, which emphasizes willing submission to God’s sovereignty in those spheres where He has left choice/option for human beings. “Godhood and authority are inextricably interconnected and are, in essence and substance, one and the same thing.”^67 Moreover, this sovereignty is indivisible.^68 This indivisibility implies that it is polytheism to consider somebody as worthy of obedience without the clear sanction of God.^69 With reference to Rabb , Maududi states that there are five literal meanings of this word and all of them are employed for God in the Quran, sometimes independently and sometimes conjointly to highlight the inseparability of metaphysical sovereignty from political sovereignty. 70 Most of the debates between the Prophets and their
(^66) Ibid.
(^67) Ibid., 24.
(^68) Ibid., 26.
(^69) Ibid., 28.
(^70) Ibid., 31.
