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Discretion of ptesident of india
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Abstract AreadingofthetextofIndianConstitutionindicatesthatitdoesnot explicitlygrantanydiscretionarypowerstothePresidentofIndia, especiallyafterthe 42 nd ( 1976 )and4 4 thAmendments( 1978 ).Thepresident isexpresslyrequiredbyArticle 7 4oftheConstitutiontoalwayshavea councilofministerstoaidandadviseandtoalwaysactinaccordancewith itsadviceinexerciseofone’sfunctions.Thesubsequentconstitutional amendments( 42 ndand4 4 th)madeitamatterofawrittenconstitutional provision,leavingthepresidenttheonlyleewaythats/he‘mayrequirethe CouncilofMinisterstoreconsidersuchadvice,eithergenerallyor otherwise’,butaddedthat‘thePresidentshallactinaccordancewiththe advicetenderedaftersuchreconsideration’( 44 thAmendment) Methology Thedatarequiredforthispaperwasobtainedbytheinterpretationofthe judicialbodiesoftheconstitution,theamendmentsofthearticlesrelating tothepresident. limitations thereisalotofliteratureandwriterswhichhavetheirpersonalopinionon thediscretionofthepresidentandwhyitisso.thereisalotof complicationstofindthetruenatureandroleofthepresident The 42 nd amendment Priorto1 976 ,therewasnoexpressprovisionintheconstitutionthatthe presidentwasboundtoactinaccordancewiththeadvicetenderedbythe councilofministers,thoughitwasjudiciallypronouncedinShamsherSingh &AnrvsStateOfPunjab 1 thatthepresidentwasnotarealexecutive,buta constitutionalheadwhowasboundtoactaccordingtotheadviceof ministers.The 42 nd amendmentamendedarticle 74 ( 1 )toclarifythis (^1197) 5SCR( 1 ) 814
hastoactinaccordancewithsuchadvice.Byimplication,thePresident canactonhisownintheexerciseofhispowers. InRam JawayaKapur 2 andSamsherSingh 3 ,theSupremeCourtheldthat sinceIndiafollowsthe"cabinetsystem"asinEngland,itwouldbe legitimatetorefertoBritishconventionswheninterpretingArticles 7 4and 75 .TheCourtinU.N.R.Rao"ruledthatArticle 74 ( 1 )ismandatoryand therefore,thePresidentcannotexerciseexecutivepowerwithouttheaid andadviceoftheCouncilofMinisters.TheCourtwentontosaythatany exerciseofexecutivepowerwithoutsuchaidandadvicewouldbe unconstitutionalinviewofArticle 53 ( 1 ).Thisviewwasreiteratedin SamsherSingh. Thedistinctionbetweenpowersandfunctions,theycannotbeused interchangeably.Thetheoreticalposition,therefore,isthatthePresident cantaketheaidandadviceoftheCouncilofMinistersintheexerciseofhis functionsandinsuchcases,followingthe 197 6amendment,theadvice shallbebindinguponhim.However,theamendmenthasnotchangedthe factthatthePresidenthastotaldiscretionintheexerciseofhispowers.
ThePresidentisempoweredtograntpardon,reprieve,respiteorremission ofpunishmentortosuspend,remitorcommutethesentenceofany personconvictedofanyoffenceinallcaseswherepunishmentisbya courtmartial,wherethepunishmentisforanoffenceagainstalawrelating toamattertowhichtheexecutivepoweroftheUnionextends,orwherethe sentenceimposedisoneofdeath,byvirtueofArticle 72 .Itistobenoted thatArticle 7 2expresslyusestheterm power. Hence,theoretically,Article 7 4shouldnotapplytothisprovision.The President'spowerofpardonisadiscretionarypowertobeexercisedalone. Notsurprisingly,practiceindicatesotherwise.TheissueofwhetherArticle 7 2isadiscretionarypowerofthePresidentaroseinMaruRam v.Unionof India.Inthiscase,theCourtheldthatthepowerunderArticle 7 2wastobe exercisedontheaidandadviceofthe"CentralGovernment"andnotbythe (^2) AIR1 95 5SC5 49. (^3197) 5SCR( 1 ) 814
Presidentonhisownandthattheadviceofthe"government"wouldbe bindingonthePresident.JusticeKrishnaIyerwentontosaythatthe Presidentisbutafunctionaleuphemism,promptlyactingonandonlyon theadviceoftheCouncilofMinisters. TheissuearoseagaininKeharSinghv.UnionofIndia 4 .Inthiscase,the SupremeCourtreiterateditsdecisioninMaruRam andheldthatinusing hispowerunderArticle 72 ,thePresidenthastotaketheadviceofthe CouncilofMinistersandisboundbysuchadvice.Howeversubsequentlyin thejudgment,theCourtexpressedtheviewthatitisopentothePresident intheexerciseofthepowervestedinhim byArticle 72 ,toscrutinisethe evidenceonrecordofthecriminalcaseandcometoadifferentconclusion from thatreachedbytheCourtinregardtotheconvictionandsentenceof theaccused.Thecasecontainsaclearcontradictionbecauseifthe Presidentcantakeanindependentdecisiononthebasisoftheevidence placedbeforehim,itcannotbesaidthatheisboundbytheadviceofthe CouncilofMinisters.TheSupremeCourt'sverdictdidlittletodispelthe existingconfusiononwherethepowerofpardonreallylay.WhenKehar Singh'smercypetitionwassubmittedtoPresidentVenkataraman,he referredthemattertotheHomeMinistry.Hewasoftheopinionthathe wasboundtoaccepttheadviceoftheCouncilofMinisters.Indeed,he observesinhisbookthatdespitetheSupremeCourtgivinghim discretion inKeharSingh,hebelievedthatitwasfortheGovernmenttodecidethe matterandrenderadvicetohim.Itispreciselybecauseofsuchanattitude thatthepositionofthePresidenthasbeenreducedtothatofamere rubberstamp VetoPowerofthePresidentofIndia-Discretionofpresidenttoassentto bills UnderArticle 11 1oftheConstitution,allbillspassedbytheParliamentcan becomeanactonlyifitreceivestheconsentofthePresident.The Presidentcaneithergivehisassenttothebillorwithholdhisassentormay returnthebilltotheParliamentforreconsiderationexceptmoneybills. (^4198) 9Cri.L.J. 941.
PocketVeto–ThisisthepowerwherethePresidentneitherratifiesnor rejectsnorreturnsthebill,butsimplykeepsthebillpendingforan indefiniteperiod.ThePresidenttakesnoactioneitherpositiveornegative onthebill ThisispossiblebecausetheIndianConstitutiondoesnotprovideanytime- limitwithinwhichthePresidenthastotakeactiononabillpresentedto him forhisassent. The 24 th ConstitutionalAmendmentActof 197 1providedthatthe Presidenthastogivehisassenttoaconstitutionalamendmentbill.
ThePresidenthasthepowertopromulgateordinanceswhenbothHouses ofParliamentarenotinsession.Theseremaininforceuntil6weeksafter bothHouseshavebeenreconvened,unlessbothHousespassresolutions disapprovingofthem beforethattime.Thispowerpermitstheexecutiveto dealwithemergencysituationsarisingwhenParliamentisnotinsession. Article 12 3confersthepowertopromulgateordinancesonthePresident, subjecttotwoconditions.Firstly,bothHousesofParliamentshouldnotbe insessionandsecondly,thePresidentmustbe"satisfied"thatasituation existswhichwarrantstheissuingofanordinance.Aliteralinterpretationof Article 123 ( 1 )makesitclearthatthepromulgationofanordinanceisa discretionarypowerofthePresident.Thisisobviousbecauseoftheuseof theword"satisfied".Hence,intheory,thePresidentneednottaketheaid andadviceoftheCouncilofMinistersinthecourseofissuingordinances. Buttothecontrary,judicialinterpretationhasbeentothecontrary.InR.C Cooperv.UnionofIndia 5 ,theSupremeCourtruledthatthePresidenthasto actinallmatters,includingthepromulgationofanordinance,ontheadvice oftheCouncilofMinisters.TheCourtsaidthatalthoughinaconstitutional senseanordinanceispromulgatedonthesatisfactionofthePresident,in truth,itispromulgatedontheadviceoftheCouncilofMinistersandupon theirsatisfaction.TheCourtthereforeimpliedthatthepromulgationof (^5) AIR1 97 0SC5 64.
ordinanceswasafunctionofthePresident.Thispositionwasreiteratedin Venkatav.StateofAndhraPradesh 6 .However,inSardariLalv.Unionof India 7 ,theSupremeCourtheldthatinallplacesintheConstitutionwhere theterm satisfactionisused,itreferstothepersonalsatisfactionofthe Presidentonthebasisofthematerialplacedbeforehim.Thiswas overruledinthecaseofSamsherSing,wheretheCourtheldthat satisfactionofthePresidentwasnothispersonalsatisfaction,asalsoheld inJayantilalShodhanv.EN.Rana 8 ,butthesatisfactionoftheCouncilof Ministers.Hence,SamsherSingheffectivelyruledthatthePresidenthadno discretionintheexerciseofhispowersunderArticle 123.
Theemergencyprovisionsundoubtedlyrequirechecksandbalancesin theirexercise,sincerashusageoftheseprovisionscouldbeharmfultothe economyofthecountry.Itisthereforeimportanttoenquireintowhether thePresidenthasthepowertorefusetoinvoketheemergencyprovisions whenaskedtodosobytheCouncilofMinisters. Article 35 2oftheConstitutionprovidesthat " IfthePresidentissatisfiedthatagraveemergencyexistswherebythe securityofIndiaorofanypartoftheterritorythereofisthreatened,whether bywarorexternalaggressionorarmedrebellion,hemay,byproclamation, makeadeclarationtothateffect..." Theuseoftheword"satisfied"meansthatalltheargumentsadvancedin respectofArticle 12 3applytothisprovisionaswell.However,thispower ofthePresidentiscircumscribedbytherequirementunderArticle 352 ( 3 ), ofawrittencommunicationfrom theUnionCabinet,directingtheissuance ofaproclamationofemergency.ThePresidentcouldexercisehis discretionandrefusetoissuesuchaproclamation.Theonlyoptionthen availabletotheCouncilofMinisterswouldbetoinitiateimpeachment proceedingsagainsthim,iftheywereassuredofatwothirdsmajority.In theinterestsoftheConstitutionandthemandateofArticle 60 ,itis imperativethatthePresidentexercisehisdiscretion. (^6) AIR1 98 5SC7 24. (^7) AIR1 97 1SC1 547 (^8) AIR1 96 4SC6 48.
Thepresidentshouldpracticallyhaveallthepowerswhichtheconstitution bestowsuponhim.Toenhancethedegreeofpower,thepresidentshould haveacouncilofbureaucratswhom hecanseekadvicebutwillnotbe bindingonhim. Thisspecificcouncilwillbeelectedbyvirtueofanelectioninthe3tiers whichareexecutive,legislativeandjudiciary. Thiswillbeakindofcheckandbalanceoneachdecisionofthepresident andwillprovideexpertiseineachofthedecisionmaking.
Tomaintainallocationofpowers,theexecutiveissubjectedtochecksand controlsofthelegislature.IntheIndianConstitutionthisismanifestedin theform ofcollectiveresponsibilityofthePrimeMinisterandtheCouncil totheParliament.Thissystem isdesignedsothatthepolicy-makingofthe executiveisinconsonancewiththeactsofthelegislature. IfthePresidentofIndiaweretobeallowedtoexercisepower independently,thisverypurposewouldbedefeated.Therewouldbeno methodtochecktheactionsofthePresident,whichcouldleadthecountry intoaperiodoftyranny. Further,inIndia,thePresidentisnotdirectlyelected,asintheUnitedStates. ThisprovesthattheIndianPresidentisnotexpectedtohaveindependent powersinthewaytheAmericanPresidentis.