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Natural Ontological Attitude - Philosophy of Science - Lecture Notes, Study notes of Philosophy

Natural Ontological Attitude, Arthur Fine, Philosopher of Science, Real Argument for Realism, Realism and Antirealism, Adding to the Core, Core Position, Realists and Antirealists, Result of Science, Success of Science are the important key points of lecture notes of Philosophy.

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Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA)
Arthur Fine
Philosopher of science
Agrees with Hacking and van Fraassen that traditional arguments for realism fail
Offers a view falling between Hacking’s relaxed realism and van Fraassen’s antirealism: the
Natural Ontological Attitude
The Real Argument for Realism
Realists do not really become realists on the basis of IBE arguments.
Rather they have a more pedestrian (common, ordinary) reason to accept realism.
“Well, on the whole, I trust the evidence of my senses with respect to garden-variety objects.
And on the whole I trust the checks and safeguards of working scientists, too. If they tell me that
there are atoms or quarks or the like, then I trust that there are such things. But I can accept the
confirmed results of science, in just the same way that I accept the evidence of my senses, only if
I am a realist about science. So I should be one.”
For Fine, to accept scientific results in the same way that we accept the evidence of our senses is
simply to accept them alike as true.
The Real Argument for Realism and Antirealism
But similarly, nothing about antirealism would incline him either to reject the result of science or
to give to the confirmed propositions of science a diminished status compared to the garden-
variety truths of everyday life.
Thus, both the realist and the antirealist accept the view that the confirmed results of science are
as good as familiar everyday truths.
- This is the core position.
Adding to the Core
If both realists and antirealists accept the core position, what will distinguish them is what they
add to this view.
Adding to the Core: Realism
According to Fine, realists add on to the core a desk-thumping, foot-stamping “Really!”
This is intended to reject any antirealist addition to the core, and to indicate a correspondence
theory of truth.
Adding to the Core: Antirealism
According to Fine, the various kinds of antirealist add on different things such as pragmatic,
instrumental, or conventional analysis of truth, or some broadly epistemological construal of
certain concepts.
Nothing but the Core: Nonrealism
But a third option is available: the core position itself.
According to Fine, this core position, or Natural Ontological Attitude, is the best view to have
toward science.
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Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA) Arthur Fine Philosopher of science Agrees with Hacking and van Fraassen that traditional arguments for realism fail Offers a view falling between Hacking’s relaxed realism and van Fraassen’s antirealism: the Natural Ontological Attitude

The Real Argument for Realism Realists do not really become realists on the basis of IBE arguments. Rather they have a more pedestrian (common, ordinary) reason to accept realism.

“Well, on the whole, I trust the evidence of my senses with respect to garden-variety objects. And on the whole I trust the checks and safeguards of working scientists, too. If they tell me that there are atoms or quarks or the like, then I trust that there are such things. But I can accept the confirmed results of science, in just the same way that I accept the evidence of my senses, only if I am a realist about science. So I should be one.”

For Fine, to accept scientific results in the same way that we accept the evidence of our senses is simply to accept them alike as true.

The Real Argument for Realism and Antirealism But similarly, nothing about antirealism would incline him either to reject the result of science or to give to the confirmed propositions of science a diminished status compared to the garden- variety truths of everyday life. Thus, both the realist and the antirealist accept the view that the confirmed results of science are as good as familiar everyday truths.

  • This is the core position.

Adding to the Core If both realists and antirealists accept the core position, what will distinguish them is what they add to this view.

Adding to the Core: Realism According to Fine, realists add on to the core a desk-thumping, foot-stamping “Really!” This is intended to reject any antirealist addition to the core, and to indicate a correspondence theory of truth.

Adding to the Core: Antirealism According to Fine, the various kinds of antirealist add on different things such as pragmatic, instrumental, or conventional analysis of truth, or some broadly epistemological construal of certain concepts.

Nothing but the Core: Nonrealism But a third option is available: the core position itself. According to Fine, this core position, or Natural Ontological Attitude, is the best view to have toward science.

The Natural Ontological Attitude NOA tells us to accept the result of science as true. Truth here is meant in the “normal referential way”.

  • Statements of science are true only if, according to some relevant scientific tradition, appropriate entities exist and stand in the operative referential relations.
  • E.g., “The snow is white” is true if only if the snow is white.

But, unlike realism, it does not tell us that science is making progress of any kind. The scientific tradition could change (e.g., paradigm shift) and the NOAer does not have to see this change as progressive. Thus, NOA allows belief in the entities postulated by our theories while not requiring stability of reference.

Also, NOA allows talk of reference without entailing belief in an objective external world. To talk about external world is to pretend to be outside the ‘game of reference and science’. But we are in the world, among the objects of science.

NOA Is Very Minimalist… It makes no pretense to being able to settle disagreements over what is true or even about what is the best explanation. But that’s okay because there are no such answers to be had, according to Fine.

…But Science Doesn’t Need More. We do not need the realist or antirealist perspectives, for we do not need:

  1. a sophisticated theory of truth,
  2. an explanation of the success of science, nor
  3. an explanation of the practice and goals of science. Science can be taken on its own terms. Nothing else is required or legitimate beyond the natural ontological attitude.

Musgrave’s Realist Reply to Fine Alan Musgrave Philosopher of science Argues that Fine’s NOA is essentially the realist position, and that an antirealist cannot accept it “NOA’s Ark – Fine for Realism”

NOA Is Not Fine for Antirealism The central dispute between realism and antirealism is about truth. On this, NOA seems much closer to realism, since it says that scientific theories are true – a position no antirealist would want to accept.

  • E.g., instrumentalists see theories as neither true nor false, van Fraassen thinks theories are only empirically adequate or not, etc.

NOA Is Fine for Realism?