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SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
Team Code: 1
SURANA & SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY
MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2018
IN THE HON’BLE COURT OF SESSIONS JUDGE, PUNNAI
C.C. NO. 100 of 2018
STATE OF SARDAM
(PROSECUTION)
V.
DEVEN & JEYANT
(DEFENCE)
FOR OFFENCES CHARGED UNDER:
SECTIONS 307, 325, 354(D), 355, 504, 509 & 358
OF THE BARAT PENAL CODE, 1860
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SESSION JUDGE
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION
Table of Contents
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
& And
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
AIR All India Report
Anr. Another
Bom CR Bombay Criminal Reporter
BPC Barat Penal Code
Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal Procedure
Cri LJ / Cr. LJ Criminal Law Journal
Del Delhi
Hon’ble Honorable
IPC Indian Penal Code
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
No. Number
Ori. Odisha
Ors. Others
r/w Read with
Retd. Retired
S./Sec. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
St. State
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
u/s Under Section
v. Versus
IN
DEX OF AUTHORITIES
TABLE OF CASES:
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
1. Abhiram Mukhi v. St. of Orissa, 1996 Cri LJ 2341
2. Aman Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 1497
3. Aniyan Kunju & Ors v. St. of Kerela, 2008
4. Anuradha R Kshirsagar v. St. of Maharashtra, 1991 Cri LJ 411
5. Apparel Export Promotion Council v A.K. Chopra AIR 1999 SC 625
6. Arjun Thakur v. State of Orissa, 1994 Cr LJ 3526 (Ori)
7. Bellana Kannam Naidu v. St. of AP, 1994 Cr. Lj 1146 (AP)
8. Bhaskar Pandit Kadam v. St. of Maharashtra, (1984) (2) Bom CR 769
9. Chimbanbhai Jagabhai Patel v State of Gujarat, AIR 2009 SC 3223
10. Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598
11. Hari lal & Anr. v. St. of UP, 1970 SCR (2) 237
12. Inder Mohan Goswamy v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors, 2007 (4) JCC 2843
13. Jagga Singh v. St. of Punjab, (2001) 3 SCC 137
14. Jage Ram v. St. Of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366
15. Jodh Singh v. State of UP 1991 Cr LJ 3226 (All)
16. Jodha v. St. of Rajasthan, (1994) SCC Online Raj 161
17. Keshab Padhan v. St. of Orisaa, 1976 Cutt. LR (Cri) 236
18. Kuldip Singh v. St. (1988) 3 Crimes 628 (1) Del (SN)
19. Liyakat Mian v. State of Bihar, AIR 1973 SC 807
20. Lugga Singh v State of Punjab, (2008) Cr LJ 90 (P&H)
21. Manik Bandu Gawali v State of Mharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 2246 (Bom)
22. Namdeo Dnyanaba Agarkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2013 Cr Lj 3946 (BOM)
23. Narayana v. State of Karnartaka, 1998 Cr LJ 1549 (Kant)
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
BOOKS:
1. Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code , 33rd^ Ed. (2011)
2. P.S.A. Pillai (13th^ Ed. 2017)
3. Gaur, KD, Criminal Law: Cases and Materials, (6th^ Ed. 2009)
4. Gupta and Dighe, Criminal Manual, (7th^ Ed. 2007)
5. Kelkar, R.V. Criminal Procedure , (5th^ Ed. 2011)
WEBSITES:
1. http://www.scconline.com
2. http://www.manupatrafast.com
3. http://www.findlaw.com
4. http://www.judis.nic.in
5. http://www.indiankanoon.com
STATUTES:
1. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act 2 of 1973)
2. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 18 of 1872)
3. The Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860)
ST
ATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
The Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to try the instant matter under Sec. 177 r/w Sec. 209 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973^1.
Section 177:
‘177.Ordinary place of inquiry and trial-
Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction it was committed.’
r/w Section 209:
‘209.Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it -
When, in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought
before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by
the Court of Session, he shall-
(a) Commit the case to the Court of Session;
(b) Subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during,
and until the conclusion of, the trial;
(c) Send to that Court the record of the case and the documents and articles, if any, which are to
be produced in evidence;
(d) Notify the Public Prosecutor of the commitment of the case to the Court of Session.’
The Counsels for the Prosecution most respectfully submit to this jurisdiction of the
Hon’ble Sessions Court.
Statement of Jurisdiction
(^1) The Code of Criminal Procedure, No. 2 of 1974
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
Statement of Charges
Charge-
Deven – has been charged under The Barat Penal Code, 1860 - Section 307 for attempt to
murder, Section 354D for stalking and Section 509 for Word, gesture or act intended to insult the
modesty of a woman.
Charge-
Jeyant – has been charged under The Barat Penal Code, 1860 - Section 325 for voluntarily
causing grievous hurt, Section 355 for Assault or criminal force with intent to dishonor person,
otherwise than on grave provocation & Section 504 for Intentional insult with intent to provoke
breach of peace.
Charge-
The unknown persons who attacked Deven were also charged under Section 358 of The Barat
Penal Code, 1860.
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
Summary of Arguments 11-
ISSUE 1: Whether Deven is guilty of outraging the modesty and stalking Pooja under
section 509 and 354D of BPC respectively?
It is submitted before the Hon’ble court that the accused, Mr. Deven, had committed the offense
of Stalking and outraging the modesty of the victim and is guilty for the same. The accused had
an intention to outrage the modesty of woman and he did so, by abusing her and calling her
characterless. Similarly, he also committed the offense of stalking even after sensing the victim’s
disinterest in him. He tried contacting her from unknown numbers and waited for her outside her
workplace. The essential ingredients of both the sections of BPC are fulfilled.
ISSUE II: Whether Deven is guilty under section 307 BPC for attempting murder of
Pooja?
It is submitted before the Hon’ble court that the accused, Mr. Deven had committed the offense
of attempting to murder the victim. He slashed the victim’s neck with a sharp-edged knife,
already proves actus rea. The mens rea can be seen by the type of weapon and wound along with
part of the body attacked. The essential ingredients of Section 307 are therefore fulfilled.
ISSUE III Whether Jeyant is an offender under section 325 of BPC?
It is submitted before the Hon’ble court that Accused no. 2, Mr Jeyant is guilty of causing
grievous hurt voluntarily to Accused no 2 with the intention to vent out his personal enmity. He
threw stones on him, that hit him on his head and thereafter rained fresh blows on him. The act
of Jeyant was without any provocation which proves that the essential ingredients of Section 325
of BPC are fulfilled.
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
ISSUE 1: Whether Deven is guilty of outraging the modesty and stalking Pooja under
Section 509 and 354D?
1.1: It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the acts committed by Deven
(hereinafter referred to as Accused No. 1) in pursuance of his feelings for Pooja had clearly
outraged her modesty as per the provisions of Section 509 of the Barat Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred as ‘BPC’).
It will be believed that a person outraged a woman’s modesty if he assaults or uses criminal force
against any woman, even after knowing that such act will outrage her modesty^2. It is to be noted
that the essential ingredients of Section 509 are as follows –
● Intention to insult the modesty of a woman
● The insult must be caused by uttering some word, or making some sound, or gesture, or
exhibiting any object so as to be heard or seen by such a woman.
A. The intention to insult the modesty of Pooja: The test of outrage of modesty is whether a
reasonable man will think that the act of the offender was intended to or was known to be likely
to outrage the modesty of a woman.^3 Ergo, even mere knowledge that a woman’s modesty will
be outraged will prove a person guilty san any deliberate intention.^4 The existence of such
knowledge can be determined from various incidents in which and upon whom the offense is
committed.^5 The Supreme Court, in a case, observed that the offence under this section is
concerned with the intention to outrage the modesty of women. It held, “The culpable intention
of the accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant, but its
(^2) Subs by Criminal law (Amendment) Act 2013 (13 of 2013) (^3) Keshab Padhan v. State of Orissa, 1976 Cutt. LR (Cri) 236 (^4) Aman Kumar v State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 1497 (^5) Namdeo Dnyanaba Agarkar v State of Maharashtra, 2013 Cr Lj 3946 (BOM); Vidyadharan v State of Kerala, AIR 2004 SC 536 : (2004) 1 SCC 215; State of Punjab v Major Singh, AIR 1967 SC 63
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
absence is not always decisive. Modesty is an attribute associated with female human beings as a
class.”^6
On 9th^ June 2017, Pooja (hereinafter referred to as the Victim) decided to meet Deven for making
clear her intentions of severing all ties with him. She pulled off a casual black dress. Initially, the
accused complemented her saying that she looked “smart”. However, when the victim revealed
her future plans of being an air hostess, he tried to dissuade her. On failing to do so, he abused
her and told her that her dressing sense and behavior shows that she has lost her character.
Complimenting a woman for her clothes initially and thereafter abusing and passing derogatory
comments on her for the same shows that intention to insult her was present. And intention to
insult the modesty of a woman is an important ingredient of the offence under this section.^7 The
accused, in a case, was convicted for words uttered by him which were outrageous and attacked
the woman’s decency^8.
B. The insult must be caused by uttering some word: Any sort of assault on a woman’s
modesty, be it by words, deed, touch or look needs stricture. The court, in a case, made the
respondent liable under Sec. 509 for calling the petitioner a characterless lady.^9 It was held that
abusive language in reference to women would constitute an offence.^10 The counsel would
request the bench to refer to Annexure 2(9) wherein the waiter witnessed harsh words hurdled
upon the victim and her character to outrage her modesty. The court observed that the offense
relating to modesty under the section cannot be treated as trivial. Mere idea about the fact that
the action would outrage the modesty is sufficient to constitute an offense here. It may be
(^6) Tarkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar, 2006 (8) SCC 560 (^7) Phiaz Mahamad (1903) 5 BOM LR 502 (^8) State v. Chottu@ Javed Khan Case no 321/2a/04 of 2013, Delhi District Court (^9) Skipper Beverage Pvt. Ltd. V. State, 92 (2001) DLT 2017; Inder Mohan Goswamy v. state of Uttaranchal and others, 2007 (4) JCC 2843 (^10) Anuradha R Kshirsagar v State of Maharashtra 1991 CR LJ 411
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
It was held that seldom a woman files complaint and often the wrongdoers are left unpunished
even if the complaint is filed since there is no effective mechanism to monitor and follow up
such acts.^12 The horrifying aftermaths of stalking are not hidden from anyone. A law student of
Delhi University filed a case against her stalker one year before she was raped and murdered by
him.^13 The case clearly indicates that stalking is a step before sexual harassment. The court also
held the accused guilty for the offence of stalking and outraging the modesty of a married
woman which led to the failure of her marriage.^14 In one such case, a 12-year-old girl was being
stalked by the rickshaw puller on her way to school and back home. The accused rickshaw
puller, who not only stalked her but also abused her, was held guilty in court under Section
354D.^15
With reference to the instant case, it is requested that the bench refers to Annexure 2(5) which
would prove that in spite of severing all the ties and asking Deven to refrain from pestering her
by calling and texting, the victim received calls and texts from him which were tormenting. The
witness’ statement clearly mentions that Pooja wanted to be left alone but he would not give up
contacting her. Further, Deven’s desperation also led him to irritate the victim’s flat mate Divya
by texting and calling her continuously (Exhibit H). It is therefore established that the accused
was an insane stalker akin to roadside Romeo who would percolate along some incredible scales
to foster personal interaction with the victim and intrude in her personal space.
ISSUE 2: Whether Deven is guilty of attempt to murder under Section 307 of BPC?
(^12) Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram, (2013) 1 SCC 598 (^13) State v. Santosh Kumar Singh, (2010) 9 SCC 747 (^14) State v. Ashok Singh, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/60489353/ (^15) State v. Ashok Kumar, https://indiankanoon.org/doc/32288367/
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
It is humbly submitted before this court that Deven is guilty of an unlawful offence under
Section 307 of BPC. Any act or omission will be taken into this section if the offender, while
committing such act thought that it would lead to death.^16 It is to be noted that the essential
elements of Sec. 307 are as follows:
the act must be capable of causing death^17 ,
the existence of the intention of the offender to cause death^18
If the accused intended that the natural consequence of his act should result in death but he was
frustrated only by the extraneous circumstances, he would be guilty of attempt to commit the
offence of murder.^19 The ingredients of Sec 300 when fulfilled, brings the case into the ambit of
Sec 307.^20
For a conviction under this section it is not necessary that the accused should complete every
stage in the actual offence, except the final action. It is enough if in the attempt he did an act
towards the commission of the offence.^21 The Supreme Court reiterated its earlier view and held
that the offence under 307, IPC is committed, when with the intention to commit murder, the
offender does any act or series of acts towards the commission of murder. It is not necessary that
the act done must be last for committing murder.^22
(^16) Lugga Singh v State of Punjab, (2008) Cr LJ 90 (P&H) (^17) State of Maharastra v. Kashirao, (2003) 10 SCC 434 (^18) Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 (^19) T. Munirathnam Reddi, 1995 Cr LJ 917 (^20) Arjun Thakur v. State of Orissa, 1994 Cr LJ 3526 (Ori) (^21) Raghunath alias Ram Singh, (1940) 16 Luck 194 (^22) Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1782
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
intent of the accused; there have been some tests to determine the murderous intent of the
accused^30. The intent coupled with act in executing that intention would suffice.^31 The court
said, “as far as the part of proving his intention the nature of the wound, type of weapon
used, part of the body attacked can be taken into account.”^32 The Hon’ble High Court of
Bombay observed that an attempt to murder itself is enough to prove intention.^33 Referring to
our case, the counsel humbly submits that all the aforementioned conditions are satisfied as:
Nature of the Wound: The Wound caused by the accused was deep enough to cause
death, as it resulted in causing a grave injury to the victim and she was admitted to ICU.
Type of Weapon Used: The Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka has observed that the use
of lethal weapon itself brings in provision of section 307.^34 The Weapon used was a
sharp-edged knife which, if used in any vital part of the body, will lead to causing of
death.
Part of the Body Attacked: The accused have slashed the victim on her neck with a sharp
knife which is considered to be a vital part of the body.
In case of Kuldip Singh v. State^35 , the accused tried to hit the victim with a naked sword but
somehow the victim got saved and the blow only caused simple injury, but the court
convicted the accused under section 307 IPC because of the dangerous weapon used, which
gave away the intention of the accused, which was to murder the victim. “ So basically, if the
intention or necessary knowledge to cause death as envisaged by section 300 IPC which
(^30) R. v. Cassidy, (1867) 4 BHC (Cr C) 17 (^31) State of MP v. Kedar Yadav, 2001 (1) SCC (Cri) 1008 (^32) Pran Dutt v. UP and Hari Kishan v. Sukhbir Singh (1983) 1 Crimes 286 (^33) Manik Bandu Gawali v State of Mharashtra, 1998 Cr LJ 2246 (Bom) (^34) Narayana v. State of Karnartaka, 1998 Cr LJ 1549 (Kant) (^35) (1988) 3 Crimes 628(1) Del (SN)
SURANA AND SURANA NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2018
defines murder is there, then it is immaterial to whether or not any hurt was caused to the
victim by the accused^36 ”.
After meeting Pooja and fuming with anger, Deven came back home. While reacting to the
song that was playing in the television, he says to his friend that girls who play with feelings
of boys should be treated awfully (Annexure 2(8)). Right after this feeling of revenge came
into his mind, he called her, around 11.45 pm and apologized to her on his behaviour and
said he wanted to meet her and ask her pardon in person. At this point in time, it can be
concluded that he wanted to take revenge on Pooja. Asking her for pardon in person was an
excuse to meet her and fulfil his evil intentions. It is clear that Deven intended to murder
Pooja. And thus, the element of mens rea was present. Therefore, it is established that he is
guilty of attempting murder.
ISSUE-3: Whether Jeyant Is an offender under Section 325 of BPC?
The counsel humbly submits that Jeyant (A2) is guilty of causing grievous hurt to Deven in order
to give a free rein to his enmity, thereby being an offender under Section 325 of BPC. The
essential ingredients of the section are as follows:
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt
Such grievous hurt being caused without any provocation
A. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt: There is no such thing as a regular weapon for
committing murder or for that matter a hurt. Whether a particular article can per se cause any
serious wound or grievous hurt or injury has to be determined factually.^37 In a case, the
(^36) Ratanlal and Dheerajlal, The India Penal Code (32nd (^) ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2010) 1753- (^37) St. of UP v. Indirajeet Alias Sukhatha 2000 (7) SCC 249
