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What do you mean by Statute? Statute signifies an act of the legislature; a law established by the act of the legislative power. It is a law or enactment of a legislative authority and set forth in a formal document. It is said that ‘statute’ ( statutum ) was first used on an act of 55 Henry III. This word is used to designate the written law in contradistinction to the unwritten law.^1 Words spoken or written are the means of communication. Where they are possible of giving one and only one meaning there is no problem. But where there is a possibility of two meanings, a problem arises and the real intention is to be sorted out. It two persons communicating with each other are sitting together; they can by subsequent conversation clear the confusion and make things clear. But what will happen if a provision in any statute is found to convey more than one meaning? The Judges and the Lawyers whose duty it is to interpret statutes have no opportunity to converse with the Legislature which had enacted a particular statute. The Legislature, after enacting statutes becomes functus officio so far as those statutes are concerned. It is not their function to interpret the statutes. Thus two functions are clearly demarcated. Legislature enacts and the Judges interpret. The difficulty with Judges is that they cannot say that they do not understand a particular provision of an enactment. They have to interpret in one way or another. They cannot remand or refer back the matter to the Legislature for interpretation. That situation led to the birth of principles of interpretation to find out the real intent of the Legislature. Consequently, the Superior Courts had to give us the rules of interpretation to ease ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions or lacunas. The rules of interpretation come into play only where clarity or precision in the provisions of the statute are found missing. There are two types of Ambiguities, namely;
- Latent Ambiguity – means introduced by explicit evidence whose vagueness is hidden and can be introduced at later stage.
- Patent Ambiguity – means an ambiguity that is not introduced by extrinsic evidence and is apparent of face of record so requires no introduction. Good enactments are those which have least ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions or lacunas. Bad enactments are gold mine for lawyers because for half of the litigation the legislative draftsmen are undoubtedly the cause. The purpose of the interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the Legislature. For such an unlocking, keys are to be found out. These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation and principles of interpretation. 2 (^1) The Major Law Lexicon – P Ramanatha Aiyar, 4th (^) Edn 2010 P. 6455/56. (^2) http://www.ijtr.nic.in/articles/art21.pdf
Definition of Interpretation & Construction Michael Zander^3 gives three reasons why statutory interpretation is necessary.
- Complexity of statutes in regards to the nature of the subject, numerous draftsmen and the blend of legal and technical language can result in incoherence, vague and ambiguous language.
- Anticipation of future events leads to the use of indeterminate terms. The impossible task of anticipating every possible scenario also leads to the use of indeterminate language. Judges therefore have to interpret statutes because of the gaps in law. E.g. use of the word ‘reasonable’.
- The multifaceted nature of language. Language, words and phrases are an imprecise form of communication. Words can have multiple definitions and meanings. Each party in court will utilize the definition and meaning of the language most advantageous to their particular need. It is up to the courts to decide the most correct use of the language employed. Interpretation is the process by which the Courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislation through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.^4 It is the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman, who has occasion to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from the words of a Statute Book a meaning which he either believes it to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to attribute to it.^5 Interpretation is the process by which the courts determine the meaning of a statutory provision for the purpose of applying it to the situation before them.^6 Construction , as applied to written law, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful either by reason of apparently conflicting provisions or directions, or by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.^7 Construction means construing, explaining or interpreting of a text, statement, action or words etc. in a statute. (^3) British Legal Scholar. (^4) Salmond: Jurisprudence, 11th (^) Edn, P. 152. (^5) Gray: The nature and the source of the law, 2nd (^) Edn. P.176. (^6) Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd (^) Edn. P.34. (^7) Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws 1 (1896).
6. Presumption that words used by Legislature bear ordinary meaning It is presumed that Legislature has used each word in its ordinary and natural sense unless otherwise is proved beyond doubt. Therefore, it is the duty of the court to first assign plain and ordinary meaning to the words. However, if the result draw is absurd, the court may look for other senses of the word like technical sense, legal sense etc. 7. Presumption that Legislature has knowledge of English grammar Legislature opens its mind in the form of a language and the intention of Legislature is therefore gathered from the language itself. English is the language used in enactments and is presumed that Legislature is well conversant with the rules of English grammar and as such the language used in an enactment is grammatically correct. Once the court is sure that there are no grammatical errors in the provision and the language properly represents the legislative intent, it may proceed to interpret the provision accordingly. 8. Presumption that Legislature knows law and judicial decisions Legislature is presumed to know the law and judicial decisions as to interpretation of words and language used in a statute. Therefore the court will proceed to construe a language with the assumption that the Legislature was aware of existing statutes, the rules of statutory construction and the judicial decisions. 9. Presumption as to re-enactment There is a presumption that when Legislature reproduces the material of an earlier enactment into a subsequent Act, then it intends that those repeated words shall mean the same what they meant in the previous Act as settled by judicial construction. The court therefore should be slow to overrule a previous decision on the interpretation of a statute. 10. Presumption that vested rights are preserved The presumption is that public or private vested rights are not taken away by the Legislature without compensation. The vested rights are deemed to be preserved. There is a strong presumption against the taking away of a vested right by any fresh legislation. Unless it is clearly shown that the Legislature has expressly intended to take away any vested right, the vested rights are presumed no to be abrogated. 11. Presumption that Legislature does not intend what is inconvenient It is presumed that the intention of Legislature is always fair and does not do anything which is unreasonable. Legislature never intends to create any kind of inconvenience. As such, no law should be so interpreted at to arrive at unreasonable results. A construction by which inconvenience is caused should be avoided.
12. Presumption that Legislature does not intend any alteration in existing law except what it expressly declares The presumption is that the intention of Legislature in enacting a statute is not to alter an existing common law. But if such is the intention, the Legislature would clearly reveal it in express words. Hence, unless it is specifically provided, a statute cannot be considered to have the effect of introducing a change in the general law. In view of this presumption, the ambiguous words of a statute are to be attributed such meaning which is in tune with the common law. 13. Presumption against retrospectivity Legislature is competent to legislate both prospectively and retrospectively. Retrospective law means the law which is intended to be applied to pending proceedings also. Where Legislature enacts a law having retrospective effect, it has to be so declared in unequivocal terms. In the absence of such declaration, the law is deemed to be prospective. There is a strong presumption against retrospectivity. 14. Presumption as to jurisdiction of courts There is a strong presumption against ouster of jurisdiction of a civil court. It is only the Legislature which can take away the jurisdiction of a court but unless such intention is clear, the court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction. However, ouster of jurisdiction of a court should not be readily accepted. The presumption is that the court has jurisdiction unless otherwise is proved beyond doubt. If a statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction of a civil court, it must do so by express terms.
alternative construction, if it is reasonably possible. Whenever the language of a provision is susceptible to two constructions, one leading to obvious injustice, the courts act upon the view that such a result could not have been intended and prefer that which ends in the furtherance of the object of the statute rather than the one that would frustrate it.
5. Consideration of Hardship An argument based on an inconvenience and hardship shall be admissible only when the meaning of the statute is obscure. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and explicit but any hardship or inconvenience is felt, courts cannot help it. The court cannot legislate under the garb of interpretation. 6. Consideration of Inconvenience When the language is explicit, its consequences are irrelevant. Even if the results flowing from unambiguous language are inconvenient, the court must enforce it. The argument of inconvenience is admissible only when there is ambiguity in the language. 7. Consideration of Anomaly When the text is clear and precise yet the anomalous results flow, the court cannot help it. But when on a construction of a statute, two views are possible, one of which results in an anomaly and the other does not, the court must adopt the latter. 8. Consideration of Consequences When the language employed is plain and unambiguous, the same must be given effect to irrespective of the consequences that may arise. If the language employed is reasonably capable of more meanings than one, then the court will consider the consequences that may flow from accepting one or the other of the interpretations.
The Process of Interpretation Salmond refers to 2 kinds of Interpretations:- A. Grammatical Interpretation / Literal Construction In case of grammatical interpretation, only the verbal expression of law is taken into consideration and the courts do not go beyond what is expressed by words. The dictate of words is known as literal legis. The grammatical or literal construction is totally confined to the words or expressions used in the language of the statute and the consequences are not in consideration. It remains firm on the letter of law even if injustice or hardship is caused. Limitations of Grammatical Interpretation The following defects could cause failure of grammatical interpretation: (i) Ambiguity If the words used in the provision are imprecise and can reasonably bear meanings more than one, then rule of literal or grammatical construction ceases to be sure guide to reach real legislative intent. In such a case, the courts may step out of strict grammatical interpretation and go behind the letter of the law to find the true intention of the Legislature and may call in aid other well recognized rules of construction such as legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, each portion throwing light on the rest, the purpose of legislation, the object sought to be achieved and the consequences that may follow from the adoption of one in preference to other possible interpretation. The court would then adopt the interpretation which advances the object of law. (ii) Inconsistency The different sections of the enactment may be inconsistent with each another. Due to this, either their meaning is nullified or one section loses its effect. In such a case, the courts are duty bound to find out the true intention of the Legislature but the same may not be possible through grammatical interpretation. (iii) Deficiency in the Act itself There may be some lacuna in the law itself which may not allow the whole meaning to be expressed. Such a defect can be remedies only by recourse to logical interpretation. However, the omission in the law must be such as to make it incomplete logically. B. Logical Interpretation Logical interpretation lays more emphasis on deriving the true spirit of law i.e. Sententia legis , even by travelling beyond what words reflect. If the words used in the language of a statute are unable to bring out the intention of the Legislature, the courts are at liberty to depart from the letter of the law in search of true intention.
are essential to the validity of the things which are done are called imperative or absolute, but those which are not essential and may be disregarded without invalidating the things to be done are called directory statutes. Imperative statutes must be strictly observed. Directory statute may be substantially complied with. The classification of statutes with reference to objective is as follows:
- Codifying statutes;
- Consolidating statutes;
- Declaratory statutes;
- Remedial statutes;
- Enabling statutes;
- Disabling statutes;
- Permissive statutes;
- Prohibitory statutes;
- Penal statutes;
- Taxing statutes;
- Explanatory statutes;
- Curative or validating statutes;
- Repealing statutes;
- Amending statutes. The codifying statutes are the ones which codifies the law, or in other words, which purports to state exhaustively the whole of the law upon a specific subject. The code contains the pre- existing provisions in different statutes on the subject as well as the common law on it. E.g. the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 The consolidating statutes are the ones which consolidate the law on a particular subject at one place; it collects all statutory enactments on a specific subject and gives them the shape of one statute with minor amendments, if necessary. E.g. The Law of Property Act, 1925 of England consolidated the Acts of 1922 and 1924. The declaratory statutes are the ones made to remove doubts either in the common law or in the statutory law. E.g. the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1985, added explanation 2 to S 40 of Income Tax Act, 1961. The remedial statutes are the one whereby a new favor or new remedy is conferred. The main object of passing such a statute is to make improvements in the enforcement of one’s rights or for redress of wrongs and remove defects or mistakes in the former law. Another synonymous expression is socio-economic legislation. E.g. Consumer Protection Act, Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 etc… The enabling statutes are which enlarges the common law where it is too strict or narrow and it makes a lawful to do something which would not otherwise be lawful. E.g. Advocates Act, 1961. The disabling statutes restrict or cut down rights existing at common law.
The permissive statutes allow certain acts to be done without commanding that they are performed whereas the prohibitory statute s forbid the doing of certain things. The penal statutes are the ones which punish certain acts or wrongs and may be in the form of a comprehensive criminal code or a larger number of sections providing punishments for different wrongs. E.g. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Arms Act, 1959 etc… The taxing statutes are the ones which impose taxes on income or certain other kinds of transaction. It may be in the form of income tax, wealth tax, sales tax, gifts tax etc. The curative statute is otherwise called as validating statute. It is passed to cure defects in the prior law and too validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts or public and private administrative powers which in the absence of such statute would be void for want of conformity with existing legal requirements but which would have been valid if the statute has so provided at the time of enacting. It is also called as explanatory statutes. A repealing statute either expressly or by necessary implication revokes or terminates another statute. The amending statute makes and operates to change the original law so as to effect an improvement or more effectively carry out the purpose for which the original law is passed. The classification of statutes with reference to extent of application is as follows:
- Public statutes;
- Private statutes. A public statute is the one which relates to a matter of public policy. Such a statute may be general, local or personal in nature. A private statute concerns with the matters which are individual in nature or is related to a body which has no public consequence.
Intention of the Legislature (( LITERA LEGIS & SENTENTIA LEGIS ) The Legislature enacts the law with a definite object in its mind which is called the ‘intention’ of the Legislature. The Legislature expects that the law enacted by it shall be understood by the courts in its true spirit and shall be administered in accordance with the intention with which the statute has been framed so as to advance the purpose of the statute. The Legislature opens its mind the form of certain language and it is presumed that precise words and clear language has been employed to express themselves. Therefore, the legislative intent must be primarily gathered from the language itself. The function of the court is only to expound and not to legislate. It is the duty of courts to discover and act upon the true intention of Legislature and essence of law lies in its spirit. Attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. In Sussex Peerage case^11 , it was observed that, if the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. In Nelson Motis v Union of India^12 , it was observed that when the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they bear only one meaning, the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, without looking into consequences thereof. In District Mining Officer v Tata Iron and Steel Co.^13 , it was observed that if a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation the court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the legislature. In Mithilesh Singh v Union of India^14 , it was held that there is a presumption that Legislature inserted every part of the statute for a definite purpose and as such, rejection of words as being inapposite surplus to be avoided. In State of Jharkhand v Govind Singh^15 , it was held that the elementary principle of interpreting a statute is to gather the sentential legis of the Legislature. However, abundant precaution has to be taken while striving for Sententia legis and the language should not be twisted or strained. The judges are not at liberty to add or take way from or modify the letter of law simply because they believe that the true meaning is not completely or correctly expressed by it. (^11) ( 1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 (HL). (^12) AIR 1992 SC 1981. (^13) AIR 2001 SC 3134. (^14) (2003) 3 SCC 309. (^15) (2005) 10 SCC 437.
In Thakkar Shipping Private Limited v Commissioner of Customs (General)^16 , S 129 D (1) of the Customs Act, 1962, provide that the Committee of Chief Commissioners of Customs may by order direct the Commissioner to apply to the Appellate Tribunal for determination of such points arising out of the decision or order of the Commissioner or the Adjudicating Authority, as may be specified by the Committee of Chief Commissioners of Customs in its Order. S 129 D (4) of the Act provides that where an application is made by the Commissioner to the Appellate Tribunal in pursuance of an order u/S 129 (D) (1), such application shall be heard by the Tribunal as if it were an appeal made against the decision or order of the Adjudicating Authority, and the provisions regarding appeals u/S 129 A to the tribunal, in so far as they are applicable, would be applicable to such application. The Supreme Court held that the provisions of S 129 A (5), empowering the Tribunal to condone the delay and admit an appeal filed beyond the prescribed period, would also apply, as the Court must give effect to the purpose and object of S 129 D (4). In Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v New Port Corporation^17 , the courts are waned that they are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. (^16) (2012) 12 SCC 189, p. 195. (^17) (1951) 2 All ER 839 (HL).
In Poppatlal Shah v State of Madras^21 , the Supreme Court interpreted the word ‘sale’ used in Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 and held that the word was laying stress on the element of transfer of property by way of sale and therefore if only a contract of sale has been entered into within the Province of Madras, then it does not constitute the sale within the meaning of this term under the Act because actual transfer of property has not taken place. In view of this, sales- tax cannot be levied. In arriving at such a conclusion, the Court referred to the title, preamble, definition and other provisions of the statute, as also subsequent amendments made in the statute. The Court observed that it is settled principle of construction that all constituent parts of the statute are taken together and each word, phrase or sentence is to be considered in the light of general purpose of the Act itself. In Rupak Kumar v State of Bihar^22 , the Supreme Court held that from a conjoint reading of sections, 7, 10 and 16 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, it will appear that the Act is intended to prohibit and penalize the sale of any adulterated article of food, and hence the term ‘store’ will take color from the context and the collocation in which it occurs in S7 and S16 of the Act. Therefore, ‘storage’ of an adulterated article other than fro sale would not fall within the purview of S16 of the Act. In Raheja Universal Limited v NRC Ltd. & Ors^23 , the Supreme Court held that all the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, have to be read conjointly. Every word and expression used by the Legislature has to be given its proper and effective meaning, as the Legislature uses no expression without purpose or meaning. Hence, the Supreme Court held that sections, 22, 22A, 26 and 32 have to be read and construed jointly and, so construed, the common thread of legislative intent appears to be to treat this law as a special law and to ensure its effective implementation with utmost expeditiousness. In Union of India v Sheo Shambhu Giri^24 , the Supreme Court held that the expression ‘transships’ occurring u/S 23 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, must necessarily be understood in the context of the scheme of the section, and the preceding expressions ‘imports into India’ and ‘exports from India’, to mean only transshipment for the purpose of either import into India or export out of India. (^21) AIR 1953 SC 274. (^22) (2014) 4 SCC 277 p.281. (^23) (2012) 4 SCC 48 pp 172 to 180. (^24) (2014) 12 SCC 692, p.694.
Statute to be construed to make it effective and workable than null ( UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT ) The courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to futility. A statute or any enacting provision therein must be so construed as to make it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ‘ UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT^25. It is an application of this principle that courts while pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a statute start with a presumption in favor of constitutionality and prefer a construction which keeps the statute within the competence of the Legislature. The importance of the principle can be judged from the fact that there is hardly any reported decision, where a statute may have been declared void for sheer vagueness, although theoretically it may be possible to reach such a conclusion in case of ‘ absolute intractability of the language used^26 ’, or when ‘ it is possible to resolve the ambiguity^27 ,’ i.e. when the language is absolutely meaningless^28. The courts will therefore reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the Legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation wherein a construction would reduce the legislation to futility, must be avoided. In K.B. Nagpur, M.D (Ayruvedic) v Union of India^29 , the context of S 7(1) of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, which provides that the President, Vice President or member of Central Council shall continue until his successor shall have been duly elected or nominated. The Supreme Court, while repelling a challenge to the provision made u/Arts. 14 & 16 of the Constitution, observed that the provision was made by the Parliament to take care of situations when election to the aforesaid posts is delayed for various reasons and upheld the provisions of S 7(1) of the Act applying that a statute is to be construed so as to make it effective and operative as expressed in the principle UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT. In Avtar Singh v State of Punjab^30 , S 39 of Electricity Act, 1910 provided that an accused found guilty u/this section must be punished u/S 379 of Indian Penal Code. S 50 of this Act provided the procedure. The appellant was convicted for theft of electricity u/S 39 and the respondent preceded against him u/S 379 of IPC. The appellant contended that he could not be convicted u/S 39 as the procedure for conviction as required by S 50 was not followed. The respondent contended that punishment u/S 379 of IPC has to be imposed in accordance with the provisions of S 39. The Supreme Court, applying this principle, held that the offence is against the Electricity Act and not against IPC; hence S 50 must have been followed. The Court held that the (^25) CIT v Teja Singh AIR 1959 SC 352, p.356. (^26) Salmon V Duncombe (1886) 11 AC 627, p.634, PC. (^27) K. A. Abbas v Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 481, p.496. (^28) Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123 p. 152. (^29) (2012), 4 SCC 483, p. 490. (^30) AIR 1965 SC 666.
recovery of tax assessed under the old Act. The Supreme Court reversed this judgment and observed that the effect of the High Court Judgment was to nullify s 297 (2) (j) and to declare it to be of no consequence and that an interpretation leading to such a startling result should be avoided as it is opposed to all sound canons of construction. The Court held that the procedure of the new Act for recovery of tax will apply mutatis mutandis for recovery of tax assessed under the repealed Act.
General Rules / Principles of Interpretation OR Kinds of Construction
- The Literal / Grammatical Rule
- The Mischief Rule
- The Golden Rule
- The Beneficial / Liberal Rule
- The Harmonious Rule
- Strict Rule Literal / Grammatical / Natural / Primary / Strict / Popular Rule This is the primary and principal rule to apply in interpretation of a statute. According to this rule, words, phrases and sentences are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Where the language used by the legislature is plain, unambiguous and admits one meaning only, it must be accepted and enforced however harsh, unjust and absurd the result may be. The rule of literal construction therefore demands strict adherence to ordinary and natural meaning of the words used in the language. This rule does not leave any avenue open for the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction simply to draw the supposed intention of Legislature. The basis of this rule is the presumption that the Legislature has used appropriate and specific words to open its mind. JUS DICERE, NON JUS DARE - To declare the law, not to make it; the duty of the court is to expound the law, not to make it. The duty of the court is to expound the law as it stands, giving due respect to the letter of the law and shall not construe words contrary to their ordinary and literal meaning. The interpretation of a statute shall be principally either made by applying the literal or grammatical rule ( litera scripta / litera legis ) or logically by deriving from the intent of the legislature ( sententia legis ). The court should give technical meaning to a technical word. In Crawford V Spooner^34 , the Privy Council reinstated that, “the words of the statute at first should be understood in their natural, ordinary, popular, plain sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. In Maqbool Hussain V State of Bombay^35 , the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did not declare that he had brought gold with him. Gold, found in his possession during search in violation of government notification, was confiscated u/s 167 (8), Sea Customs Act, 1878 and was charged u/s 8, FERA, 1947 as well. The appellant’s pleading that his trial u/ FERA (^34) (1846) 4 MLA 179, at p. 181 (PC). (^35) AIR 1953 SC 325.
