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INFALLIBLE? AN INQUIRY CONSIDERED
JOHN JAY HUGHES
St, Louis University, School of Divinity
T
HEOLOGICAL BLOCKBUSTER, best seller, brilliantly written polemic, popular sensation, ecclesiastical bombshell—Hans Kong's new book, Infallible? An Inquiry, is all of these things, and more. From its publica- tion on July 18, 1970 (one hundred years to the day after the definition of papal infallibility in the Constitution Pastor aeternus at the First Vat- ican Council) to year end, the book has sold over sixteen thousand copies in the German original alone and gone through two printings. The Italian translation, published even before the original for motives too obvious to require statement here, predictably caused the editor of Osservatore romano to explode like a rocket streaking across the Roman heavens: two lengthy articles in the semiofficial Vatican organ de- nounced the Swiss theologian and all his works, while failing to convey to readers even the barest summary of the book's contents. Demon- strating anew one of publishing's oldest laws, that a scathing review will sell a book quite as well as a laudatory one, Italian readers bought up within a few weeks all the four thousand copies originally printed. At this point an attempt was made at the highest ecclesiastical level to prevent further dissemination of a work which, it was felt in the Vatican, de- served if ever a book did the label piis auribus offensivus. Archbishop Carlo Colombo, a close associate of Pope Paul VI and head of a Vatican commission on Catholic publications, wrote a letter to Fr. Guido Lan- franco superior of the Congregation of the Holy Family of Nazareth, owner of the Queriniana publishing house responsible for the book, informing him that "according to canon law, a publishing house which wants to be faithful to the Church cannot print works or magazines lack- ing the necessary imprimatur."^1 The father superior got the message... and promptly transferred his rights to the book to a group of Italian laymen, less susceptible than he to ecclesiastical sanctions and pressure, who arranged for the second printing—thus proving that in Italy too the Council has opened doors which not even the Curia can close. Küng's book soon found praise from Protestant critics. Dr. Willem Visser 't Hooft, long-time General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, confessed to the feeling while reading the book that he had "an atom bomb in my hands. For if these ideas are taken up by Catholics, a completely new situation will arise. Then Protestantism will no longer (^1) Cited from the London Tablet, Dec. 19-26, 1970, p. 1260. The lack of an imprimatur is explained below. 183
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have any important reason for its protest."^2 Catholic reactions, on the other hand, have ranged from reserved to hostile. Prof. Karl Lehmann, Wunderkind of the Mainz theological faculty and personally close to Kving, published two lengthy "yes-but" criticisms, one in the Catholic weekly Publik, the other in the secular Welt, which provoked Küng to reply in the latter paper with a bitingly sarcastic article crammed with direct quotations from Lehmann and challenging his erstwhile friend at the end to stop dodging and feinting and come out of his corner and fight, or else retire from the ring. In early November the German bishops, who like their colleagues elsewhere have manifested since the Council distinct symptoms of the transalpine syndrome (progressive at Rome, conservative at home), attempted to enter the lists. A meeting of the bishops' doctrinal commission, summoned to consider what action, if any, should be taken against what some of their excellencies held to be an open scandal, listened as the professors Karl Rahner, Walter Kasper, and Karl Lehmann criticized Küng's book (which, as part of its bitter in- dictment of the Church establishment, attacks the bishops for failing since the Council to make use of theologians' advice—a charge for which there is considerably more ground outside Germany than in it).
Despite their criticisms, the three professors urged the bishops not to issue any condemnation, but to permit the discussion of Küng's argu- ments to continue among the theologians. No sooner had this wise and mature advice been accepted by the doctrinal commission than word arrived from south of the Alps that the Italian bishops were proposing to condemn the book, and could not their German colleagues be persuaded to some joint action? This alarming message necessitated a hastily sum- moned meeting of the full conference of German bishops, who met on November 19 and 20 in secret session before deciding to issue no public statement—a policy which also seems to have been adopted by the Italian bishops, in whose counsels cooler heads ultimately prevailed.^20 In place
(^2) Cited from Der Spiegel, Jan 4, 1971, p. 34. Küng has since disclosed that Dr Visser 't Hooft's comments were taken from a private letter to him (Küng). Cf. H. Küng, "Un- fehlbare Satze: Wer hat die Beweislast?" Publik, Jan. 29,1971, pp. 19 f. 2a (^) On Feb. 3 and 4 the doctrinal commission of the Italian Bishops' Conference formu- lated a condemnation of Küng's book, but did not at first publish it. On February 13 Osser- vatore romano published the skilfully formulated and nuanced declaration of the German bishops, which stops short of condemnation. (See text and analysis at the end of this article.) Küng thereupon insisted that the Vatican newspaper publish his reply. This appeared in Osservatore romano for Feb. 19. The following day the doctrinal commission of the Italian bishops released their previously passed condemnation. This says in part: "The teachers of the various theological disciplines, true to their responsibility in the Church, will certainly not fail to investigate critically the author's individual claims, to give fitting scholarly an- swers to his difficulties, and to investigate more deeply the questions he has raised. But
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conveys to the reader the spirit in which the author wishes his book to be read: "Where the reader is as certain as I am, he may accompany me; where, like me, he hesitates, he may question me; when he sees himself in error, he may follow me; where I go wrong, he may lead me back."^3 The Open Foreword which follows swiftly sets the tone for this inquiry. Five years after the close of Vatican Π it cannot be overlooked that the great work of Church renewal which the Council initiated has come to a virtual standstill. The old ecclesiastical power structure is still intact, the Church's leaders refuse all too often to lead, and exercise their teach ing office in a way which is essentially preconciliar. Paul VI, though a man of the highest motives who has repeatedly shown his desire to be a moder ate progressive, open to the needs of the age, has all but thrown away the unprecedented new credibility which John ΧΧΠΙ gained for the Church, acting and allowing his Curia to act in a manner which gravely threatens the Church's unity. The fundamental question to be examined in the book is therefore that of the Church's teaching authority. This has not been sought out by the author; it has been forced on him by the exigencies of the hour. To remove all misunderstanding, Küng states that he "is and remains despite all his criticisms a convinced Catholic theologian."^4 But for this very reason he feels obliged by his duty to the Church and in full con- sciousness of his own limitations and fallibility to state publicly that in all the ways he has listed (and his examples of attempts to frustrate post- conciliar reform constitute a lengthy and searing indictment), and des- pite all subjective good intentions, the Church is being robbed of the fruits of the Council. His intention is not to create unrest and uncertainty, but to give voice to the widespread unrest and uncertainty already exist- ing in the Church. The work's sharp tone is due not to aggressiveness but to concern. The book dispenses with an imprimatur, not because it does not wish to be Catholic, but because it is Catholic even without the im- primatur. This official stamp of ecclesiastical approval has not prevented his previous book, The Church, from being subjected to Roman inquisi- tion; and more than one bishop has requested that for certain books the imprimatur be no longer requested, since it is misunderstood in Rome as an episcopal recommendation of the work in question. The whole sys- tem of ecclesiastical censorship is outdated and should be abolished. The Open Foreword closes on page 24 with two quotations which reveal the
_Detrinitate_* 1, 2, 5. (^4) Hans Küng, Unfehlbar? Eine Anfrage (Zurich, Einsiedeln, Cologne, 1970) p. 21. All references are to the original German edition. To facilitate reference to other versions, chapter and section numbers are given, where possible, following the page number of the German edition.
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master publicist, keenly aware of the tastes of the audience for which he is writing: Cardinal Alfrink at the close of the Dutch pastoral council, and the "let us begin" passage from the inaugural address of John F. Kennedy. Chapter 1 ("An Infallible Teaching Office?") opens with a long list of past errors on the part of the Church's magisterium. These can no longer be concealed, as in the past, or explained away with the pat formula: either it was not an error, or (when the error could no longer be denied) it was not an ex-cathedra decision and hence not infallible.^5 The most re- cent example of an error on the part of the magisterium, according to Küng, is the Encyclical Humarme vitae, which has been rejected by a large majority of the people of God, including their episcopal leaders. Taking this alleged rejection as sufficient proof that the doctrine of the Encyclical is wrong, Küng concentrates on the strictly formal question: the authority of the magisterium. Why did Paul VI, who clearly desired to declare in favor of artificial methods of contraception, refuse to accept the arguments of the majority of his own commission in this sense? Be- cause, Küng answers, the commission majority failed to offer the pope any real answer to the even stronger argument of the minority: that the prohibition of artificial methods of contraception, though never the sub- ject of an ex-cathedra papal utterance, had been solemnly asserted by two popes in this century and by the morally unanimous world episcopate and the body of theologians up to the eve of Vatican Π. Thus, according to the accepted principles of Roman-school theology, this doctrine, though not infallibly taught by the extraordinary magisterium (the pope speaking ex cathedra), had been infallibly taught by the Church's ordinary magis terium (pope and bishops, supported by the theologians). Hence Paul VI had no choice but to adopt the position of the commission minority, which in the crucial formal question (the Church's teaching authority) had the stronger arguments. The Encyclical, Küng maintains, has made a radical and fearless examination of the Church's teaching office both inescapable and imperative. Chapter 2 ("Sure Foundations?") begins the investigation of the basis for the doctrine of the Church's infallible teaching office as found in the manuals of dogmatic theology. These define infallibility as "the impossibility of falling into error," and say that this is possessed both by the pope alone (under the narrowly defined conditions stated by Vatican I) and by the universal episcopate together with the pope. Though Vati- can Π attempted to supplement and correct Vatican I by emphasizing this second instance of infallibility, it never examined the basis for the doc- (^5) Küng is here expressing a criticism made more than a decade previously by the Angli- can theologian E. L. Mascall in his Recovery of Unity (London, 1958) p. 221.
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papal infallibility be solved by emphasizing the strict limits placed on papal infallibility by the Vatican I definition (as was done at the Council itself by Bishop Gasser, the spokesman for the doctrinal commission re- sponsible for the definition). It is enough, Küng writes, that a single pope should once in the course of two thousand years have made use of the prerogative of papal infallibility. This would inevitably raise the question: "a man, who is not God—free of error?" (p. 112; III d 2). Equally the problem cannot be solved by replacing the misleading term "infallibility" with a better one ("freedom from error," "reliability"), desirable though this is in itself. The question is not whether the pope does not in fact err in ex-cathedra decisions, but whether every possibility of error in such cases is excluded in advance. What is really at stake, Küng writes, is the Church's truth and authority. While the Church's truth may not be equated with that of God, the Church is empowered to witness to God's truth in an authoritative manner. But does the Church's infallibility (in this sense) depend on infallible propositions? With this mention of "infallible propositions" (p. 116; III 2 beginning) Küng passes to his positive statement of the problem and with it the heart of his whole argument. Christian faith is not mute, and Küng grants that the Church is bound to express her faith in confessional statements, and that these inevitably consist of propositions. But the early credal state- ments were spontaneous expressions of faith and not laws limiting faith to one form of expression. He grants too the necessity under certain con- ditions of "defensive propositions" which define the boundary between truth and error in genuine emergency situations, where all attempts at dialogue with the proponents of error have broken down and the status confessionis has been reached. Such confessional statements must be clearly understood as temporary measures, however, valid and neces- sary only until the Church's peace shall be restored. But faith does not depend on propositions formulated merely to promote the development of dogma. The Church has never defined all that it could, but only what it had to. Departures from this tradition (in the two modern Mariological definitions, and at Vatican I) are problematical and have deepened the divisions between Christians. Furthermore, it is not proved, Küng main- tains, that faith depends on infallible propositions: propositions which are not only de facto true (the existence of which Küng admits), but which are incapable of being untrue before they are uttered. No proof of such dependence was offered by either Vatican I or II. And the dogmatic text- books claim merely that the promises made to the Church (that she will always be preserved in the truth) presume infallible propositions. No- where are we offered any solid reason for rejecting the opposite possibil- ity: that the promises made to the Church could be fulfilled without in-
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fallible propositions. Nor was this possibility discussed at either Vatican I o r H. In his final Chapter 4 ("An Answer") Küng proceeds to discuss this hitherto neglected possibility: that Christ's promises to His Church, which, he writes, we can neither doubt nor abandon, can be fulfilled without infallible propositions. He emphasizes that his is not the only pos- sible answer (this is excluded by the complexity of the problem). It is merely one answer, spoken not ex cathedra (for "a single infallible pope would be preferable to many infallible theologian-popes") and motivated by a feeling of pastoral and theological responsibility (p. 128; IV 1 begin- ning). Küng prefaces his answer by pointing out some of the problems of all propositions, including those in the Church's credal statements and definitions. Propositions inevitably fall short of the truth which their author wishes to express; they are frequently subject to misunderstanding and only to a limited degree translatable from one language to another. The words of which they are composed are, like all language, not some- thing static but dynamic, subtly but constantly changing in meaning. Moreover, propositions are liable to exploitation in the interests of ideology and propaganda: the proposition "God exists," for instance, may be used to strengthen the suffering or to justify a holy war. Nine- teenth-century Catholic theology, and with it Vatican I, although os- tensibly combating rationalism, betrayed in their desire for dogmatic definitions expressed in clear propositions a theory of perception and cognition which goes back ultimately to Descartes and owes far more than is generally admitted to the very rationalism which this tradition sup- posed it was rejecting.
Küng then applies what has already been said about the problems of propositions in general to the Church's dogmatic statements. These can be both true and false; and this possibility applies especially to polemical definitions formulated to condemn error. Thus, Trent's condemnation of a false idea of sola fide nowhere states in what sense the sola fide doctrine can be admitted as true. The result: the Catholic understands Trent's words as applying to a false doctrine and assents to the condemnation as true. But a Protestant who believes in justification by faith alone in a true sense not condemned by the Council reads Trent's words as applying to his doctrine and rejects the condemnation as false. We seem to be left, then, with a dilemma: either Christ's promises to His Church are not fulfilled (because of the undeniable errors in the Church's teaching, of which Humarme vitae is the most recent and obvious example)—and this is the view of unbelievers; or certain errors on the part of the magisterium must on no account be admitted—the answer of a triumphalistic church. Rejecting both of these solutions of the dilemma, Küng says it can be
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indefectibility removes all certainty, Küng argues that certainty comes only to him who believes in the person of Jesus Christ as presented in the Church's preaching of the gospel. Certainty is not given to us by the hier- archy or through infallible propositions—any more than in interpersonal relationships the certainty of being loved can be conveyed by declara- tions of love (infallible or not) on the part of the beloved, but only to the extent that one gives one's self to the other in loving trust. In the pages following, Küng develops some of the ecumenical conse- quences of his explanation of infallibility. If accepted by Catholics, this explanation could provide a basis for ecumenical understanding. This statement is hardly open to dispute, for Küng's understanding of the Church's infallibility is indeed close to the views of numerous orthodox Protestants on this subject.^8 The likelihood of his premise being ful- filled is more questionable, however; and although Küng offers evidence which he believes presages the acceptance of his position by Catholics, it is slender. This is a point to which we shall have to return later. To the extent that Orthodox theologians replace papal infallibility with that of ecumenical councils, their theories are open to all the objections already urged against infallible propositions. Councils can be expressions of the Church's infallibility or indefectibility. But they are not so a priori (in the sense that their definitions are preserved in advance from all pos- sibility of error), but only to the extent that they are mouthpieces of the truth. The same must be said of all attempts to substitute for the infallible authority of pope, bishops, or councils the supposedly infallible word of Scripture. Not the least valuable pages in the book are those in which, under the subheading "The Truth of Scripture," Küng criticizes all theories of purely verbal inspiration or inerrancy, points out that the Holy Spirit makes use of the biblical writers with all their limitations and nat- ural human errors, and reminds his readers that the Bible is not itself revelation but the primary witness to revelation (IV 10).
In an important final section of his fourth chapter Küng raises the question: Is there any legitimate basis for the claim that the Church pos- sesses a teaching office, and that this office is limited to the hierarchy? Emphasizing that he can offer no more than stimuli for discussion and will welcome better answers than his book gives, Küng argues that the notion of a teaching office is quite recent and remains largely unclarified. It pre- sumes the distinction, for which there is no scriptural basis, between the
(^8) A notable illustration is the brilliant essay by the Anglican theologian Austin Farrer, "Infallibility and Historical Revelation," in M. D. Goulder (ed.), Infallibility in the Church: An Anglican-Catholic Dialogue (London, 1968) pp. 9-23. Farcer's position is virtually identi- cal with Küng's. Congar discerns a parallel between Kiing's position and that of Karl Barth; cf. art. cit. (η. 6 above) p. 616. Cf. also the judgment of Visser 't Hooft cited at the outset of this article.
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teaching and the learning Church. And it overlooks the fact that all Chris- tians are called to proclaim the gospel; indeed, the rapid spread of Chris- tianity in the ancient world was due to the faithfulness of the primitive Church to this universal vocation. The Church's leaders are not neces- sarily and exclusively her teachers. In the New Testament teachers and prophets were a separate group in the Church. Their functions may not be monopolized today by the hierarchy, who should respect the indepen- dent contribution of the theologians. Emergency situations may make it necessary for the hierarchy to lay down clear boundaries between truth and error; but similarly, theologians have a duty to bear constant witness to the truth vis-à-vis the hierarchy, in season and out. There follow five pages which correspond to the Open Foreword which introduces the book. Taking as his point of departure the famous May 1969 interview of Cardinal Suenens, whom Küng places on a pedestal only slightly less elevated than the recurrent hero of his book, John XXIII, Küng sketches a picture of "The Pope as He Could Be" which is as beau- tiful and edifying as it is Utopian. The work concludes with a long pas- sage emphasizing that the book and its author remain open to correction and seek a dialogue. This is cleverly printed in the German original (yet another instance of the skilful attention to detail which characterizes this rhetorically and technically brilliant work), so that only upon turning the final page of the book does the reader discover that what he has been read- ing is the continuation of the opening passage from Augustine following the book's title page.
THE DEBATE Probably no work of Catholic theology published since World War II has provoked controversy on the scale of this one. The reactions already reported at the beginning of this article, though representative, are far from exhaustive. A full account of the controversy to date would far tran- scend the bounds of this article, and would in any case be obsolete by the time of publication. We shall concentrate, therefore, on the critical reac- tions of two of the most eminent of living Catholic theologians: Yves Congar and Karl Rahner. The contributions of these two men to the great movement of liberation from the defensive and sometimes even paranoid posture which characterized Catholic theology almost until the eve of Vat- ican II are well known. Less familiar, or too often forgotten, is the fact that both Rahner and Congar experienced the heavy hand of Roman censure and discipline under Pius XII. The unjust attacks and secret as well as not-so-secret denunciations which have dogged Hans Küng ever since his first work, Justification (1957), was delated to the Holy Office (where the dossier on him has grown steadily ever since) are a sad tale, all too fa- miliar to students of Church history in almost any age. This campaign of
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apostolicity and hence the teaching office pertain to the whole people of God and not merely to the hierarchy, he charges that Küng fails to do justice to the special charism of teaching possessed by the Church's or- dained pastors. While Küng's incisive criticisms are, in Congar's view, often too massive, he feels they will help to rectify the imbalance in ec- clesiology resulting from the myth of papal authority which has been built up since Pius IX. At the same time, Congar says that the work of theological aggiornamento cannot proceed simply by replacing one ex- aggeration with another: substituting the Reformation for the Counter Reformation. It means rediscovering the authentic tradition behind the exaggerations. This involves criticism and inquiry; and it is here, Congar writes, that Küng's book has a contribution to make. In short, while Con- gar's criticisms are tempered by recognition and appreciation ("praise" would be too strong a word), it is clear that it is the objections which hold the balance, so that we are justified in speaking of a dissent, how- ever qualified. If Congar's dissent is muted and his recognition of the positive elements of Küng's book emphasized wherever possible, the position is exactly reversed in the case of Karl Rahner. In one of the sharpest pieces ever to have come from his typewriter, Rahner states flatly that "through- out his entire book Küng disputes something which has been hitherto an unquestioned assumption of all inner-Catholic theological discussion." Rahner charges Küng with adopting a position which makes it possible to debate with him "only as one would with a liberal Protestant" for whom councils and even Scripture are not absolutely binding, as they are for a Catholic theologian. Scripture and tradition must, of course, be properly understood and interpreted, and the Catholic theologian will take full account of the historical relativity of their statements. But he can never dismiss these statements simply by saying that "they are wrong and he knows better."^12 Rahner confesses that he finds Küng's style "overbear- ing" (p. 362) and maintains that, "viewed objectively, it is no longer pos- sible to consider the discussion of Küng's thesis as an inner-Catholic con- troversy" (p. 365). Indeed, should Küng deny the existence of any propo- sitions at all which command our absolute assent and which may therefore be termed absolutely true for the practical intellect, "one could dispute with him [only?] as one would with a sceptical philosopher." 13
modern discussion of religious language" (p. 446). To be fair, we should point out that Küng himself admits the inadequacy of his argument at this point and refers the reader to the forthcoming work of one of his students, J. Nolte, Dogma in Geschichte: Versuch einer Kritik des Dogmatismus in der Glaubensdarstellung; cf. Unfehlbar?, pp. 128 f., η. 1. 1 2 Κ. Rahner, "Kritik an Hans Küng," Stimmen der Zeit 186 (1970) 361-77, at 365. (^13) Ibid.y p. 372. Rahner gives as an example of such a proposition the following: "Every single man is to be respected and loved as neighbor."
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Rahner prescinds from a discussion of the biblical evidence for papal infallibility and of the historical development of the papal primacy. He charges that Küng is guilty, however, of the very rationalism which he deplores in his opponents: when he is unable to discover the Church of today in the past, he denies any connection between past and present. Küng's use of the Encyclical Humarme vitae is oversimplified; for it is not really certain that the Encyclical has in fact been rejected by the majority of the Church (as Küng claims); and the mere fact that the minority of the papal commission held the teaching of the Encyclical to be infallible in virtue of the ordinary magisterium does not prove that it is infallible. "We can speak of an absolutely binding article of faith coming from the 'ordinary' magisterium only when that magisterium teaches the doctrine not only generally and without contradiction, but when the doctrine is clearly taught as something requiring the ab- solute assent of faith and as divinely revealed, so that there can be no serious doubt about the specific qualification of the doctrine" (p. 367). These conditions are not fulfilled with regard to the prohibition of artifi- cial methods of contraception. The most that can be said, therefore, of the doctrine of Humarme vitae is that it may offer "an example of the fact that the Church's magisterium proposes many doctrines which later turn out to be erroneous" (p. 368). In one passage at least, Rahner misrepresents Küng's argument. He charges that "Küng's rhetorically impressive arguments often convey the impression that for him all individual propositions are always true and false at the same time, though in varying degrees" (p. 369). (In his reply Küng points out that his book had clearly reckoned with the existence of true propositions in the statements of Scripture, councils, and popes; what he disputed was the possibility of propositions guaranteed to be free of error in advance.) Rahner's argument for the existence of such propositions in the Church is speculative. Man lives in the truth through true propositions: his basic decision for the truth must be expressed in a proposition of some kind. If this be true in the moral life of the individual, why not in the Church as well? If the Church remains indefectibly in the truth (as Küng admits), there must be some propositions which make this indefectibility concrete. If they are then false, the Church does not remain in the truth and is therefore not indefectible. Despite his disavowal of Protestantism, Küng is really repeating the Protestant thesis that every article of faith, no matter how absolute, is fallible, but that there is an in- visible, indefectible Church, comparable to the synagogue which existed before Christ and before God's absolute and historical self-revelation in Christ.
Rahner concedes that there is far more error in Church teaching than
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so lengthy that it is divided into two parts, each one longer than Rahner's original criticism. The first part is heavy with rhetoric and sarcasm, much of it emotionally charged, and Küng scores a number of debating points, but without really furthering the argument substantively. He attempts to refute Rahner's criticism of his interpretation of Humarme vitae (unsuc- cessfully, in the view of this writer) by repeating over no less than eight pages the arguments of his book. The alert reader will not fail to note that at one point Küng executes a cautious and discreet retreat. It is now no longer simply the majority of the Church which has rejected the teach- ing of the Encyclical, 1δ but "the overwhelming majority of public opinion, Catholic and non-Catholic, in the informed and developed countries." 16 Only towards the end of his first reply to Rahner does Küng tum to really substantive questions. He charges that, in an article published on the oc- casion of the one hundredth anniversary of Vatican I, Rahner adopted a position far closer to his (Küng's) own than that represented by Rahner's attack on Infallible? And defending himself against Rahner's charge that he has abandoned an essential article of Catholic faith, Küng points out that in his book he carefully avoided saying that Vatican I erred. Rather he maintains that the Council was blind to the fundamental problem: neither majority nor minority ever considered the possibility that the Church could be indefectible without infallible propositions. Since this was simply assumed without proof or even consideration, no contradic- tion of faith was involved in arguing that this assumption was unjustified. Küng concludes by charging that Rahner's speculative argument for the necessity of infallible propositions, based on the practical intellect, is so radically different from the argumentation of Vatican I on infallibility as to amount to a tacit reformulation of the doctrine. In the second installment of his reply Küng takes up the argument at this point, charging that in a previous work Rahner has admitted that the practical intellect can attain truth despite all error in the propositions which attempt to express that experience of truth.^17 And if Rahner wishes to shift the argument from the speculative level to that of practical ethics, the truth of conscience is not a matter of propositions. His one example of such a proposition, "Every single man is to be respected and loved as neighbor," is unhappy; for in accordance with changing circumstances,
(^16) Cf. Unfehlbar? p. 26. (^16) "Im Interesse der Sache," p. 51. This is a tacit recognition that the response to the En- cyclical by the Catholic hierarchies in Communist countries and in the Third World has been more positive than elsewhere. (^17) Cf. Κ. Rahner, Dynamic Element in the Church (New York, 1964) p. 148. The sec
ond installment of Rung's answer to Rahner will be found in Stimmen der Zeit for February, 1971, pp. 105-22. The passage referred to here is on p. 106.
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this proposition could be used to support the rights of minority blacks or white blindness and the status quo. Küng's heavy artillery is concentrated, however, on what he charges is Rahner's exclusively speculative and unhistorical approach to dogma. Though he rightly rejects the positivistic dogmatics of Neo-Scholasticism, Rahner's recognition of the historicity of dogmatic statements remains lip service. He does not really study these statements historically, but simply takes them as the starting point of his theology, which is con- cerned exclusively with the speculative interpretation of dogma ac- cording to the dialectical method. Rahner's contribution, which Küng admits to have been enormous, has been to make the dogmas theologi- cally respectable. The intellectual contortions involved in this exercise are part of the explanation for Rahner's often tortured and unintelligible liter- ary style. Valuable through this interpretation of dogma was in a day when this was the limit of freedom permitted to a Catholic theologian, Rahner's interpretations not infrequently made dogmas say something quite different from what those who first formulated them intended. This is intellectually dishonest. Rahner's allergic and violent reaction to Infal- lible? is due, Küng writes, to the fact that the book challenges Rahner's whole theological system at its most vulnerable point. Rahner builds on dogma and regards theology as the interpretation of dogma. Küng says that he himself builds on Jesus Christ as revealed in Scripture (the norma normativa for all theology, for all councils, for the Church herself). Küng sees the essential task of theology not in the interpretation of dogma (necessary though that be), but in "translating with all the means and ways of biblical and theological hermeneutics the original Christian mes- sage from its setting in the past into terms intelligible to men today and tomorrow" (p. 115 f.). The burden of proof, Küng maintains, rests upon him who asserts that the Church's indefectibility stands or falls with infallible propositions. Rahner's speculative argument in support of infallibility so conceived falls far short of proof; and in line with his whole theological method, he does not even attempt to offer biblical or historical proofs. To Rahner's ques- tion as to who has "the last word" in matters of faith, "the professor or the bishop,"^18 Küng replies in the final sentence of his article: "Neither the professor nor the bishop will have the last word here,... but only He who alone is infallible and whose word will prevail in history and in the Church as a whole—which is more important than all bishops and all professors" (p. 122). Rahner's concluding rebuttal^19 is a ringing confession of personal faith (^18) Cf. Rahner, "Kritik an Hans K<ingL" p. 376. (^19) K. Rahner, "Replik. Bemerkungen zu: Hans Kong, Im Interesse der Sache," Stim- men der Zeit 187 (1971) 145-60.
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believer and theologian, but that both are themselves subject to judgment and correction by Scripture, which is alone the norma normans non nor- mata). However, an article of belief does not become binding for the dogmatic theologian only after this demonstration has been successfully proposed. It was, Rahner explains, Küng's contention that assent to in- fallible propositions was not binding for the Catholic theologian until the necessity of such propositions was first demonstrated which had caused him (Rahner) to suspect that Küng had abandoned an essential Catholic position. This was why he had written that the argument between him and Küng could no longer be considered an inner-Catholic controversy. And Küng's latest reply, insisting that Rahner had the burden of proof in the matter, confirmed the original charge. Rahner goes on, however, to point out that in the second procedure fol- lowed by Catholic theology there is a burden of proof on him who asserts the necessity of infallible propositions. The fundamental theologian, speaking ad extra, is obliged to prove all the articles of faith. The proof for the Church's infallibility in fundamental theology is indeed difficult, Rahner admits. But he reminds Küng that it is hardly less difficult to prove the absolute authority of Jesus Christ (which Küng maintains). Küng has written that in disputing the necessity of infallible propositions he cannot be contradicting Vatican I, since no one at the Council con- sidered the possibility that the Church's indefectibility could be preserved without such propositions. Rahner disputes this. Küng's position, so far as Rahner understands it, is tantamount to Calvin's. This view was not explicitly discussed at Vatican I; but is it therefore safe to assume that none of that Council's fathers or theologians were familiar with Calvin's position? With no little ability and energy Rahner defends himself against the charge that his theology is overly speculative and neglects exegesis and history. His speculative argument for infallible propositions, based on man's practical intellect, was intended to supplement his previously published arguments for infallibility (with which Küng is familiar), not to supplant them. Rahner discloses that he is the first German theologian to have an exegete present at his lectures in Christology for the purpose of criticizing, correcting, or confirming his dogmatic presentation in the light of the biblical evidence. And if Küng says that it was from Rahner that he first learned to understand dogma historically, then his theology cannot be totally nonhistorical. Almost defiantly Rahner confesses that he has always theologized "within the system" (i.e., the dogmas given him by the magisterium), and that he has never desired to break out of this system. He has always fought against too narrow a conception of this sys- tem, and especially against the false notion of Roman-school theology that
202 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES
all statements in Denzinger are more or less equally binding. But the living faith of the Church is, Rahner says, one of the norms for his theol- ogy. And his own interpretations of dogma are subject to the judgment of the magisterium. Admitting that to theologize thus "within the system" (Rahner coins the adjective "system-immanent" for his theology) means giving the magisterium a blank check, Rahner writes that he has never had cause to regret this free decision of faith, the responsibility for which is his alone. Far from limiting his freedom, his acceptance of a magisterium which is, under certain narrowly defined conditions, infallible delivers him from something even worse than the tyranny of the Roman system under which Küng suffers, often with reason: his own subjectivity. For, Rahner confesses, he has not yet encountered an ultimately binding dogma which he cannot accept as reconcilable with the evidence of Scrip- ture. And it is part of his faith, based on the eschatological hope in the Church's indefectibility which he shares with Küng, that he never will encounter a dogma which is on the one hand finally binding and on the other hand erroneous.^21 And when the Church's magisterium proposes doctrines which, though authentic, are not binding dogmas, then Catho- lic dogma itself gives him the right to protest—a right he has never hesi- tated to use freely. A necessarily brief and incomplete summary can only indicate some of the main lines of Rahner's argument. Passages in the article are elo- quent and even moving. One senses the quiet but deep fervor of the steadfast believer and veteran of a lifetime's battles. Indeed, it is tempting to cast him in the role of the revivalist preacher who, having issued the pulpit call to repentance, announces the hymn "Give me that old-time religion, it's good enough for me," to encourage the reluctant sinners in the back of the tent to hit the sawdust trail. Like most such encounters, the debate between Rahner and Küng is open-ended, and in this sense in- conclusive. Küng's contributions nowhere go beyond the arguments of his book. And while opinions will inevitably differ about the value of Rahner's objections, some of them at least are weightly. And of this number more than one remain without an adequate answer. SIC AUT NON? In an argument so many-sided and complex a simple yes or no verdict would inevitably involve oversimplification. Already, however, it is pos- sible to draw certain provisional conclusions, though parts of the battle- field remain shrouded in smoke. In Küng's favor it can be clearly dis- cerned that on the level of the general public, even those with a certain (^21) Rahner reiterates his charge that Küng has failed to prove that the doctrine of Humanae
vitae has been infallibly taught by the ordinary magisterium.
