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Winter 2007 Labor Economics Field Exam: Income Support Programs and Crime, Exams of Economics

The winter 2007 labor economics field exam, focusing on questions related to income support programs and their impact on work participation, as well as the estimation of the effect of high-school graduation on crime committal. Students are required to answer all questions using equations and well-labeled graphs, demonstrating a clear understanding of the problems.

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2011/2012

Uploaded on 12/06/2012

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WINTER 2007
LABOR ECONOMICS FIELD EXAM
Be as formal and precise as you can in all of your answers, using equations
(and well-labeled graphs, where appropriate). Your will be graded on the extent
to which you demonstrate your understanding of the problem, and the clarity
and precision of your answers.
ANSWER ALL THE QUESTIONS. YOU HAVE 3 HOURS
PART I
1. Many income support programs for low-income families can be described
as a guaranteed income grant of Gdollars, where earned income is “taxed
away” at rate τ, so that the total subsidy from the government is given
by max (0, G τ Y ), where Yis earned income. Suppose a government
changes its existing program by increasing the tax rate τsignificantly. By
doing so, it expects that it will lower the “effective”/after-tax wage, and
therefore discourage work, causing many to drop out of the labor force.
Therefore, it expects that the total number of people participating in the
program to rise. Contrary to this expectation, they discover that as a
result of this change, the number of families who receive any subsidy falls
sharply. Explain carefully and precisely the leading explanations for this
“surprising” result.
2. Suppose you are hired as a consultant by a government that currently has
no income support program. They are, however, considering exactly the
kind of subsidy described in question 1: with guaranteed income level G0,
with earned income taxed away at rateτ0. They would like to know how
much the program will cost.
(a) Describe how you would produce this number if you were only given
CPS-type data on income, earnings, etc., and specify the assumptions
that need to hold (however potentially unrealistic) for the estimate
to be valid.
(b) Now suppose the government gives you the authority to run a so-
cial experiment. Given this ability, describe how you would run the
experiment, what data you would collect, and how you would ana-
lyze the data to better answer the question. In particular, describe
how you might try to separate costs due to “mechanical” effects from
those due to behavioral responses to the program, and compare the
magnitudes of these two components.
(c) Consider an alternative scenario: the government does not let you run
an experiment, because they have done so already... sort of. They tell
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WINTER 2007

LABOR ECONOMICS FIELD EXAM

Be as formal and precise as you can in all of your answers, using equations (and well-labeled graphs, where appropriate). Your will be graded on the extent to which you demonstrate your understanding of the problem, and the clarity and precision of your answers. ANSWER ALL THE QUESTIONS. YOU HAVE 3 HOURS

PART I

  1. Many income support programs for low-income families can be described as a guaranteed income grant of G dollars, where earned income is “taxed away” at rate τ , so that the total subsidy from the government is given by max (0, G − τ Y ), where Y is earned income. Suppose a government changes its existing program by increasing the tax rate τ significantly. By doing so, it expects that it will lower the “effective”/after-tax wage, and therefore discourage work, causing many to drop out of the labor force. Therefore, it expects that the total number of people participating in the program to rise. Contrary to this expectation, they discover that as a result of this change, the number of families who receive any subsidy falls sharply. Explain carefully and precisely the leading explanations for this “surprising” result.
  2. Suppose you are hired as a consultant by a government that currently has no income support program. They are, however, considering exactly the kind of subsidy described in question 1: with guaranteed income level G 0 , with earned income taxed away at rateτ 0. They would like to know how much the program will cost.

(a) Describe how you would produce this number if you were only given CPS-type data on income, earnings, etc., and specify the assumptions that need to hold (however potentially unrealistic) for the estimate to be valid. (b) Now suppose the government gives you the authority to run a so- cial experiment. Given this ability, describe how you would run the experiment, what data you would collect, and how you would ana- lyze the data to better answer the question. In particular, describe how you might try to separate costs due to “mechanical” effects from those due to behavioral responses to the program, and compare the magnitudes of these two components. (c) Consider an alternative scenario: the government does not let you run an experiment, because they have done so already... sort of. They tell

you that they carried out an experiment as you would have (in ques- tion b), but did not use simple random assignment. Instead, treat- ment and control status were assigned with different probabilities, based on a number of pre-experimental demographic characteristics X (e.g. family size, education, age, earnings histories). Describe why it would be problematic to do simple treatment-control comparisons in analyzing the data from this experiment, and propose a way to adjust for this non-standard assignment mechanism, assuming that you know the exact treatment probability for each value of X. Can you generalize your estimates to the overall population? Why or why not? (d) Now suppose that they ran the experiment in question c, but some important information was lost: the mapping between X and the probability of assignment to treatment. You still have all the other data from the experiment. Describe in detail what you could do to nonetheless obtain sensible estimates, and what further assumptions (if any) are needed. As with question c, can you generalize your estimates to the overall population? Why or why not?

PART II

(1) You are interested in estimating the effect of high-school graduation, HS, on the probability of committing a crime, Y. You do not have credible exclusions restrictions and you are therefore concerned with the potential endogeneity of HS. Assume that the latent propensity to commit a crime is Y ∗^ = W Γ + αHS where W is the full set of variables, both observed and unobserved, that determine Y ∗. Call X the subset of W that includes observable variables. (a) In this context, present a framework that formalizes the notion that selection on observables is the same as selection on unobservables to address the potential endogeneity of HS. To get credit, make sure to use formulas, and to give the intuition for the formulas. Be very specific. Make sure to formally characterize all the necessary assumptions. (b) Are these assumptions realistic for the type of datasets that are typically available in labor economics? Using a couple of examples of datasets, explain why you think the assumptions are or are not realistic. (c)Under what conditions can this model be used to identify bounds for the effect of high-school graduation in propensity to commit crime? (d) In the framework developed in point (a), what are the assumptions that you need for the OLS estimator to be consistent?