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If the Queen Has No Reserve Powers Left,
What Is the Modern Monarchy For?
Le monarque moderne n’a pas de pouvoir politique. Les prérogatives personnelles de la Reine, c’est-à-dire le pouvoir de nommer le premier ministre, de convoquer et de dissoudre le Parlement et de donner la sanction royale aux projets de loi, ont presque entièrement été abolies. En exerçant ces pouvoirs, le monarque ne conserve plus de discrétion réelle. Ce qui reste de la monarchie sont les plus hautes fonctions symboliques et cérémonielles et des fonctions de représentant de chef d’État. Cependant, la Reine a également d’autres devoirs importants qui ne sont pas rattachés à la Constitution : servir de symbole d’ identité nationale, assurer la stabilité en période de changement et encourager le service public. On peut faire l’analyse de ces fonctions en examinant quatre caractéristiques du rôle moderne de la monarchie : la monarchie nationale, la monarchie internationale, la monarchie religieuse et la monarchie du bien- être ou de service. Le rôle plus large de la monarchie atténue-t-il la perte de discrétion sur le plan de ses fonctions constitutionnelles « dures »?
La monarchie subira d’autres changements au fur et à mesure qu’elle réagit aux pressions extérieures, y compris de la part des 15 royaumes, ainsi que les diff érentes préférences des monarques individuels. Bien que le public et les médias demeurent fermement monarchistes, ceci ne devrait pas être tenu pour acquis : les médias sont inconstants et leurs atteintes continuelles à la vie privée demeurent une des plus grandes menaces pour l’avenir de la monarchie.
Robert Hazell and Bob Morris*
The modern monarch has no political power. The Queen’s personal prerogatives — the power to appoint the Prime Minister; to summon and dissolve parliament; and to give royal assent to bills — have been almost entirely extinguished. In exercising these powers, the monarch no longer retains any eff ective discretion.
What remains of monarchy are symbolic ‘ high’ state ceremonial, and head of state representative duties. However, the Queen also has other important, non-constitutional functions: to symbolise national identity; provide stability in times of change; and encourage public service. These functions can be analysed by looking at four features of the modern monarchy’s role: the national monarchy, the international monarchy, the religious monarchy, and the welfare or service monarchy. Does the monarchy’s wider role mitigate the loss of discretion in terms of its ‘ hard’ constitutional functions?
The monarchy will undergo further change as it responds to external pressures, including from the 15 realms, and the diff ering preferences of individual monarchs. Although at present the public and media remain firmly pro-monarchy, this should not be taken for granted: the media are fickle, and their persistent invasions of privacy remain one of the greatest threats to the future of the monarchy.
- Formerly a civil servant and Director of the Nuffield Trust, Professor Robert Hazell is Emeritus Professor of Politics and founder of the Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, University College London. Dr Bob Morris is a Senior Honorary Research Associate at the Unit and a former Assistant Under-Secretary at the British Home Office.
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Introduction
Ever since the English Civil War, which determined that the Monarch reigned subject to Parliament, the powers of the Monarchy have gradually been re- duced. In each century, those powers have grown less, and this process of at- trition has continued into modern times, so that Queen Elizabeth II has less power than she did on her accession in 1952. As this paper will show, all the important prerogative powers remaining in the hands of the Monarch in the UK have been removed or diluted in recent years. In particular, the power to choose a prime minister and the power to dissolve Parliament have been significantly curtailed. So, if the Queen has no reserve powers left, what is the modern Monarchy for?
This article goes on to discuss the answers traditionally given by Buckingham Palace about the role of the Monarchy by looking at four prin- cipal current aspects: the national Monarchy, the international Monarchy, the religious Monarchy, and the welfare or service Monarchy. To anticipate the re- mainder of our argument, we conclude that the loss of the Monarchy’s “hard” constitutional functions has not necessarily depleted its standing; indeed, its acceptance by the political class may well depend on its powerlessness and com- plete neutrality. But for the general public, its popularity will depend on its wider roles, in particular the welfare Monarchy, and its contribution to celebri- ty culture, which may prove a double-edged sword.
I. The loss of the Monarch’s reserve powers
In writing about the royal prerogative, it is customary to distinguish between those powers still remaining in the hands of the Monarch and those powers which are now exercised directly by government ministers. The majority of prerogative powers now come into the latter category. But the Queen still ex- ercises some prerogative powers herself, known variously as her reserve powers, constitutional powers, or the personal prerogatives (a term first coined by Sir Ivor Jennings).^1 The most important powers are:
- to appoint and dismiss ministers, in particular the prime minister
- to summon, prorogue and dissolve Parliament
- to give Royal Assent to bills passed by Parliament.
1 Sir Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government , 3rd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959) ch XIII.
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who could command confidence in the event of a hung Parliament, and the Queen would then appoint that person. A full draft of the Cabinet Manual was published after the election, and after minor revision following scrutiny by three parliamentary committees, the first edition of the Cabinet Manual was published in October 2011. It follows quite closely the New Zealand Cabinet Manual, which is now in its fifth edition.
Chapter 2 of the Cabinet Manual, on Elections and Government Formation, codifies the constitutional conventions about the appointment of the prime minister. The key paragraphs about a hung Parliament are as follows:
Parliaments with no overall majority in the House of Commons
2.12 Where an election does not result in an overall majority for a single party, the incumbent government remains in office unless and until the Prime Minister tenders his or her resignation and the Government’s resignation to the Sovereign. An incum- bent government is entitled to wait until the new Parliament has met to see if it can command the confidence of the House of Commons, but is expected to resign if it becomes clear that it is unlikely to be able to command that confidence and there is a clear alternative.
2.13 Where a range of different administrations could potentially be formed, politi- cal parties may wish to hold discussions to establish who is best able to command the confidence of the House of Commons and should form the next government. The Sovereign would not expect to become involved in any negotiations, although there are responsibilities on those involved in the process to keep the Palace informed …
The Cabinet Manual goes on to describe what happens if the prime min- ister resigns mid term, stating that it is for the party or parties in government to identify who can be chosen as the successor (para 2.18). So, the Monarch is left with no discretion in any circumstance in which she may be required to appoint a prime minister, whether post election or mid term. Indeed, the Cabinet Manual makes clear that the whole purpose is to remove any residual discretion:
In modern times the convention has been that the Sovereign should not be drawn into party politics, and if there is doubt it is the responsibility of those involved in the political process, and in particular the parties represented in Parliament, to seek to determine and communicate clearly to the Sovereign who is best placed to be able to command the confidence of the House of Commons (paragraph 2.9).
One further reform advocated by the Institute for Government and the Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee would be to hold a vote on the floor of the House of Commons as the first piece of business after
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an election, to determine who commands confidence in the new Parliament.^6 This is the practice followed in Scotland and Wales,^7 and would help clearly to distance the Monarch from the political process; but it has not yet found favour with the government at Westminster.
The power to summon and dissolve Parliament
The summoning and dissolution of Parliament has also been done by the per- sonal prerogative. By convention, it has been the constitutional right of the prime minister to determine the timing of a dissolution and hence of the next election, and to advise the Monarch accordingly. The majority view amongst constitutional experts has been that the Monarch could refuse an untimely re- quest for dissolution, even though there has been no refusal in modern times.^8 But any doubt or dispute is now academic, because the prerogative power of dissolution has been abolished by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011. Unlike the Canada Elections Act of 2007, which expressly preserved the prerogative power of the Governor General to dissolve Parliament, dissolution in the UK is now regulated by statute and not the prerogative; it is a matter for Parliament, not the Executive (the prerogative power was preserved in Canada in order to avoid the need for constitutional amendment).
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 provides for five-year parliaments, with polling on the first Thursday in May five years after the previous gen- eral election, and automatic dissolution 17 working days before the election. Section 3(2) states baldly, “Parliament cannot otherwise be dissolved.” There is provision for midterm dissolution in section 2, but again by statute not un- der the prerogative. Section 2 allows for a midterm dissolution in only two circumstances: if two thirds of all MPs vote for an early general election; or, if the House passes a formal no confidence motion “that this House has no con- fidence in Her Majesty’s Government,” and no alternative government which can command confidence is formed within 14 days. The only tiny element of discretion which remains is the timing of an election following a mid term dis- solution: section 2(7) provides that “the polling day … is the day appointed by Her Majesty by proclamation on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.” The election would normally be held within three to four weeks.
6 UK, House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Government Formation Post-Election (HC 1023, London: The Stationary Office Ltd, March 2015) paras 62-63. 7 Scotland Act 1998 (UK), c 46, s 46; Government of Wales Act 2006 (UK) , c 32, s 47. 8 Robert Blackburn disagrees, Blackburn, supra note 2 at 561. For a rejoinder, see Rodney Brazier “Monarchy and the Personal Prerogatives - A personal response to Professor Blackburn” (2005) Public L 45, 45-47.
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The power to give Royal Assent to Bills, and Royal consent to Bills
affecting the prerogative, and personal interests of the Crown
Royal Assent to a Bill was last refused in 1707, when Queen Anne, on the advice of her ministers, withheld Royal Assent to a bill to arm the Scottish Militia. It is inconceivable that the Monarch would withhold Royal Assent today, save on the advice of ministers. Robert Blackburn suggests that the Monarch’s role is limited to one of due process, and Royal Assent is a certificate that the bill has passed through all its established parliamentary procedures.^12 Rodney Brazier has argued that a monarch might still veto a Bill which sought to subvert the democratic basis of the Constitution, but accepts that this leads to grave dif- ficulties of definition.^13 Even in such an extreme case, Brazier would prefer the Monarch to find a means other than withholding Royal Assent to express their concerns.^14 The only circumstance in which it is conceivable that Royal Assent might be withheld is if a bill had been passed by both Houses against the wishes of the government, and it afforded the government a last-ditch means of preventing the bill from becoming law. That might happen with a minority government which could not prevent the passage of legislation by the opposi- tion majority, but did not wish to see it enacted.
The retention of a deep reserve power
To conclude the argument of Part I, the Monarch’s personal prerogative powers contain no real political power. The Queen has no effective discretion in decid- ing whom to appoint as prime minister, whether to summon, dissolve, or pro- rogue Parliament, or to grant Royal Assent to bills. It is true that the Monarch might, in very exceptional circumstances, still have to exercise a choice: for example, if the prime minister is killed or suddenly dies. In that event, there would be no time to hold a vote of the party membership. A caretaker prime minister would need to be appointed until the party had elected a new leader; the Monarch would look to the cabinet to nominate the caretaker.^15 Other hy- pothetical examples are possible: if the prime minister sought a sudden proro- gation in order to avoid a parliamentary vote of no confidence (as happened re- cently in Canada);^16 or if the government appears to have lost confidence while
12 Blackburn, supra note 2 at 554. 13 Mike Bartlett’s play King Charles III (2014) is predicated on the new King Charles refusing Royal Assent to a bill restricting the freedom of the press. 14 Brazier, supra note 8 at 47. 15 Philip Norton, “A Temporary Occupant of No 10? Prime Ministerial Succession in the Event of the Death of the Incumbent” (2016) Public L 18. 16 Peter Russell & Lorne Sossin, eds, Parliamentary Democracy in Crisis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
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Parliament is prorogued, and then refuses to advise that Parliament be sum- moned (as has happened in realms in the South Pacific). In such circumstances, the Monarch retains a deep reserve power to dismiss the prime minister or to summon Parliament against the wishes of the prime minister. The Monarch is the ultimate constitutional longstop; but in Britain’s political culture, it is hard to see those longstop powers ever needing to be exercised.
II. What is the modern Monarchy for?
The Sovereign’s own website expressed the situation as follows:
The Queen’s role is to:
Perform the ceremonial and official duties of Head of State, including
representing Britain to the rest of the world; Provide a focus for national identity and unity;
Provide stability and continuity in times of change;
Recognise achievement and excellence;
Encourage public and voluntary service.^17
Part I of this paper has already dealt with the UK Head of State constitu- tional functions. This Part will group the rest as follows:
- The national Monarchy — those head of state functions outside the purely political/constitutional as described in Part I; - The “ international” Monarchy , that is where the UK Sovereign is also the head of state in 15 other Commonwealth states, known as the “realms,” and is styled as Head of the Commonwealth; - The religious Monarchy — the Sovereign as head of the Church of England, the “established” church, together with the Monarchy’s rather different relationship with the Presbyterian Church of Scotland; and - The welfare/service Monarchy — this aspect includes those functions where the Sovereign, and members of the royal family, exercise forms of social patronage in relation to charities and other parts of civil society.
17 In December 2015. In 2016 the website underwent a major redesign, and this text no longer appears.
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a military pageant involving the Household regiments on the Horse Guards parade. Late summer/early autumn includes a long stay at Balmoral Castle in Aberdeenshire and a visit to the Highland Games as well as other engage- ments in Scotland. 23 Remembrance Day in November has the Queen attend- ing the cenotaph service in Whitehall. Visits also take place to Windsor Castle in Berkshire (both a weekend retreat and a site of formal entertainment), and (more privately) Sandringham House in Norfolk where Christmas and the New Year is spent. State visits, both inwards by foreign heads of state and by the Queen outwards, are accommodated in the programme. The daily engage- ments of the Queen and other senior members of the royal family are published in the Court Circular. Every January, their number is totted up by an obliging private citizen who writes to the Times newspaper with the results. 24
For the Queen, there is also much other and more formal business. She hosts investitures where honours are conferred. She greets new and retiring am- bassadors and newly-appointed Church of England bishops and High Court judges. She presides over meetings of the Privy Council which conducts swift- ly — and whilst standing — much public business including the approval of subordinate legislation. She will meet outgoing and incoming senior civil and military officers, and the colonels of her regiments. Normally, too, she will see the prime minister for an hour or so every Wednesday evening for a private audience. 25 The Queen reads a considerable range of Cabinet and other papers to prepare for such occasions. In general, her labours relieve executive govern- ment from the burdens of ceremonial rule unlike in states where the head of the executive is also head of state. 26
The Monarchy comes with financial costs defrayed by the taxpay- er. Formerly, the costs of undertaking public duties were underwritten by
Administration Committee, The Honours System , (HC 19, London: The Stationary Office Ltd, August 2012) at para 36. 23 Scottish independence is the aim of the governing party, the Scottish National Party (SNP), in the devolved Scottish government. Although the SNP’s official policy is to retain the Queen as head of state of an independent Scotland, it is thought that this position might not last if independence were achieved. 24 The Queen completed 393 engagements in 2014, the Prince of Wales the most of all the active royal family at 533, closely followed by his sister, the Princess Royal, at 528. The Queen’s rate of strike is understandably declining as she reaches her 90 th^ year: Martin, “Prince Charles ‘Hardest Working Royal’ for Seventh Year Running” (1 January 2015) Royal Central, online: <http://royalcentral. co.uk/state/prince-charles-hardest-working-royal-for-seventh-year-running-42005>. 25 See Peter Morgan’s play The Audience , first performed in 2013 with Helen Mirren playing the Queen. 26 In the USA, for example, the President is not only his own prime minister but, in responding to expectations of exercising moral leadership, also as it were an American Archbishop of Canterbury, Roman Catholic Cardinal and Chief Rabbi.
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Parliament in Civil List settlements made at the beginning of each reign. Well into Elizabeth II’s reign it was discovered that undeclared concessions had meant the Sovereign paid no tax on personal income. This was rectified from 1993 and the Queen (and the Prince of Wales) now voluntarily contributes tax like everyone else.
The recent coalition government decided to move to a different support system under the Sovereign Grant Act 2011. This set the level of support initially (reviewable every five years) at 15 per cent of the profits of the Crown Estate. The latter was until 1760 managed directly by the Sovereign and used for the cost of civil government until George III surrendered the Estate in return for a fixed Civil List. The new arrangement delivers an annual sum in the region of £36 million. It is a form of indexation previously resisted because indexation was thought to discourage economy. 27
Whatever reservations may exist about the new financial regime, what can- not be said is that the Monarchy is unpopular. On the contrary, it remains very popular indeed with solid 70 per cent approval ratings.
27 The Palace publishes detailed annual accounts of how the Sovereign Grant is spent: see <https:// www.royal.uk/royal-finances-0>. The new arrangements have been criticised for being insufficiently austere: Gordon Rayner, “Queen’s Finances are Safe from Cuts for Two Years” (21 June 2015) Daily Telegraph , online: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/queen-elizabeth-II/11689154/ Queens-finances-are-safe-from-cuts-for-two-years.html>.
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may be seen as another instalment in the incremental rise of democratic republican- ism, which brought the crowned republic into sharper focus. 30
The international Monarchy
Uniquely amongst remaining world monarchies, the British Monarchy is not contained by its geographical boundaries. The British Sovereign is both “head” of the Commonwealth of 53 independent sovereign countries and actually head of state in 15 of these countries — the “realms”^31 — other than the UK. In those countries, the Queen is represented by a Governor General carrying out constitutional and public functions similar to those undertaken in the UK. Her long reign since 1952 means that she has visited all the realms, and all the other Commonwealth countries with the exception of the relatively late joiners, Cameroon (1995) and Rwanda (2009). She has, as a result, become personally familiar with their societies and their leading politicians.
When visiting the realms, the Queen acts on the advice of the responsible ministers in the particular country and not on the advice of her UK ministers. This can, on occasion, lead to tensions if their interests conflict.^32 On the other hand, her visits outside the Commonwealth occur solely in her UK persona and not in respect of her headship of the other realms. On such occasions, her as- sociation with the promotion of solely UK interests has led to criticism in that regard 33 and a tendency for the realms to promote international roles for their Governors General.
These arrangements are a residue of empire, the outcome of local politi- cal maturation, and British withdrawal, forced or otherwise. The Succession to the Crown Act 2013 required the agreement of all the realms before it could be brought into force in the UK. This was because altering the rules of royal succession to make them gender neutral meant that all the monarchies had to agree lest different rules in different realms resulted in different people as mon- archs. The realms were free to alter their constitutions without reference to the UK, but the UK could not do so on this occasion without seeking the realms’
30 Prochaska, supra note 21 at 153. 31 The countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Grenada, Jamaica, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. 32 For example when Canada hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in 1973 and Pierre Trudeau invited the Queen to attend (which she did), against the wishes of the UK government. See Philip Murphy, Monarchy and the End of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press
- at 131. 33 Bogdanor, supra note 4 at 293.
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consent; the realms were relatively freer to alter their constitutions than was the UK itself. This inversion of former imperial realities took some people by surprise. On the other hand, as Peter Boyce has pointed out, the fact that the initiative for change remains in the hands of the UK also reminds the realms that “their crown is derivative, if not subordinate.”^34
As to the realms generally, the present position appears to be as follows. Of the “old” Dominions, New Zealand has the least-developed republican movement. The totemic significance given to the 1840 Waitangi treaty and its monarchical dimension by the important Maori minority would have to be navigated with particular care. In Australia, a once-clear majority in favour of a republic has dwindled, and in Canada there may be still but a small minority. Writing in 2008, Peter Boyce thought that, although the argument is rarely about principled republicanism rather than symbolism and national identity, “One of the most significant findings of recent opinion polls in Canada and Australia has been that a clear majority believe that the Crown links should be severed at the expiry of Queen Elizabeth’s reign.”^35 Attempts in Australia to claim that the outcome of the recent UK referendum on EU membership has increased support for a republic have been discounted. Significantly, the Australian prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull, who led the campaign for a re- public in the Australian 1999 referendum, has not made it an election issue and has discouraged any further initiative on the basis that the next opportunity to return to the issue should not be before the end of the Queen’s reign, a posi- tion true, perhaps, for all the realms — whatever the present state of opinion within them.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to expect some change after the reign of Elizabeth II. Early runners could include Australia and Jamaica, as well as Tuvalu, Saint Vincent, and the Grenadines where referenda have previously failed.^36 However, it would not always be a simple process. Both Australia and Canada would need the agreement of their constituent states/provinces. Despite majority opinion in favour, the 1999 Australian referendum failed because there was no agreement on how the new head of state should be ap-
34 Peter Boyce, The Queen’s Other Realms: The Crown and its Legacy in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Sydney: Federation Press, 2008) at 23. 35 Ibid at 210. 36 The Australian republic referendum was in 1999; St Vincent and the Grenadines in 2009; Tuvalu has held two referendums on the constitution, in 1986 and 2008, both asking whether Tuvalu should become a republic. The last two Prime Ministers of Jamaica, Portia Simpson-Miller (2012-16), and her successor Andrew Holness, have both promised to amend the constitution to make Jamaica a republic.
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ronistic and presumptuous”; not expressing interest would be characterised as neglectful. But quite apart from the prince’s purely personal dilemma, Murphy and Cooper maintain that “ … Charles would not merely be an un- suitable symbol but a positively harmful one, reinforcing the prejudice that the Commonwealth is merely a throwback to Empire.”^39 They argue, too, that it is the very existence of the headship that may have inhibited the growth of the Commonwealth Secretariat into a stronger and more significant institution. Nonetheless, a report that the Prince of Wales was to accompany the Queen to the 2015 Malta CHOGM claimed that the Queen was understood to be determined to see the headship descend to her son even while understanding that “it is not a done deal.”^40
Throughout all this, Elizabeth II’s devotion to the Commonwealth has remained notable. However, the Queen’s enthusiasm for the Commonwealth has not always been shared by her governments.^41 The relationship with the Commonwealth added a post-imperial role and reach to an otherwise wholly UK institution which in important ways compensated for the decline in mo- narchical roles elsewhere. Harold Evans, press head at 10 Downing Street under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, records Macmillan debriefing him after a discussion with the Queen revealed her disappointment that a planned visit to Ghana might not go ahead: “She took very seriously her Commonwealth responsibilities, said the PM, and rightly so for the responsibilities of the UK Monarchy had so shrunk that if you left it at that you might as well have a film star.”^42
The religious Monarchy
Since 1689, at a time of intense struggle against Roman Catholic monarchies in continental Europe, the Sovereign of England has had to be “in communion with” the protestant Church of England and, since 1707 onward, has sworn an oath on accession to uphold the Church of Scotland, the Kirk, a protestant
39 Phillip Murphy & Daisy Cooper, Queen Elizabeth II Should be the Final Head of the Commonwealth (London, Commonwealth Advisory Bureau, 2012). 40 Royal Nikkah, “Charles Courts Commonwealth” (22 November 2015) Sunday Times, online: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/Society/article1636087.ece. The final communique was silent on the point though it “welcomed the presence” of the Prince of Wales and his wife, The Commonwealth, Press Release, “Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Communiqué” (29 November 2015), online: <http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/fi les/news- items/documents/CHOGM%202015%20Communique.pdf>. 41 See Ben Pimlott, The Queen: A Biography of Elizabeth II (London: Harper Collins, 1996) at 462- especially. 42 Harold Evans, Downing Street Diary: The Macmillan Years 1957-63 (London: Hodder & Stoughton,
- at 71, cited in in Murphy, supra note 38 at 171.
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Presbyterian church. Until the Succession to the Crown Act 2013 , in addition to the ban on Roman Catholics, non-Trinitarian Christians and all other religions or none, no one married to a Roman Catholic could succeed as sovereign. A new sovereign has to make a declaration of their Protestantism and swear a coronation oath which includes upholding the Church of England and its privileges. Virtually all civic disabilities imposed on Roman Catholics from the seventeenth century were abolished during 1828-1829.
In England, the Sovereign is “Supreme Governor” of the Church of England, and formally makes all senior Church appointments. The Sovereign does not have any sacerdotal role. Accession is not dependent on coronation, though since the tenth century Wessex Saxon kings, the ceremony has used similar formulae to signify the descent of God’s grace and blessing on the Monarch. In Scotland, the Sovereign is not in any sense head of the Kirk but sends representatives (and very occasionally attends herself) to the Kirk’s an- nual General Assembly without participating in its deliberations.
All these arrangements were features of a confessional state. Theological uniformity was regarded as a good in itself and something that worked towards the security of the nation. One effect was to bind executive government and the Church of England together into a joint project of governance and social control, roles managed more at arm’s length in Scotland.
Much has changed since 1689, and only a small residue of the confessional state remains. Government control of the Church of England is attenuated to the point that the Church is, for all intents and purposes, autonomous. Committees of the Church recommend and, in effect, appoint to all senior posts: the prime minister nowadays automatically advises the Sovereign to ap- point the Church’s nominees. Whilst the Measures of the Church’s Synod, its Parliament, are subject to the approval of a parliamentary committee, they are enabled to amend statute and themselves have the force of statute. In the past, even these residues were attacked as inconsistent with the religious freedoms of others and demands were made for disestablishment. Disestablishment oc- curred only in Ireland (1869) and Wales (1920), and active hostility has, apart from certain secularist sources,^43 declined along with Christian religious obser- vance in general.
43 The best known and oldest is the National Secular Society. See its Charter at <http://www.secularism. org.uk/secularcharter.html>, accessed 13 December 2015. Nonconformist Christian churches were also formerly actively opposed to Anglican establishment but seem no longer to make it a current campaigning issue. See Bob Morris (ed), Church and State: Some Reflections on Church Establishment in England (London: Constitution Unit, University College London, 2008).
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Elizabeth II has throughout remained a strong supporter of the Church of England, although she is in no way hostile to other religious groups. On the contrary, she has seen the Church of England as an appropriate spokesman for and protector of all religions.^47 As John Wolffe has put it, “the monarchy has been looking towards a Christian Britain giving way to a religiously plu- ral rather than a secular one.”^48 This is a view apparently reciprocated by all the other main religious groups who seem to value the benign interest of an English national church which, amongst other things, has 26 Bishops sitting as full members of the Upper House of Parliament. The classic defence of this arrangement is that of the sociologist, Tariq Modood:
… the minimal nature of an Anglican establishment, its proven openness to other denominations and faiths seeking public space, and the fact that its very existence is an ongoing acknowledgment of the public character of religion, are all reasons why it may seem far less intimidating to the minority faiths than a triumphal secularism.^49
In addition to the citation “Head of the Commonwealth,” all the Commonwealth realms have adopted that part of the Queen’s UK title that refers to the citation “by the Grace of God.” Two realms — Canada and New Zealand — also include the citation “Defender of the Faith.”^50 The Prince of Wales has mused on whether the latter title should be reinterpreted as “Defender of Faith,” reflecting Britain’s multicultural society. He subsequently clarified that he intended no change to the title as such, and his official website comments that
He believes very strongly that the world in which we live can only become a safer and more united place if we all make the effort to tolerate, accept and understand cultures, beliefs and faiths different from our own.^51
47 Archbishop of Canterbury, Press Release, “Faith Communities Display Sacred Objects to the Queen” (15 February 2015), online: <http://rowanwilliams.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/2355/ faith-communities-display-sacred-objects-to-the-queen>. Norman Bonney has characterised these claims as “Anglican Multifaithism,” an attempt to shore up Anglican significance. See Norman Bonney, Monarchy, Religion and the State: Civil Religion in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the Commonwealth, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013) at 128-143. 48 Wolffe, supra note 28 at 70. 49 Tariq Modood, “Establishment, Multiculturalism and Citizenship” (1994) 65:1 Political Q 53 at 72-73. 50 The title “Fidei Defensor” was granted to Henry VIII in 1521 by one Pope and taken away by another after Henry’s break with Rome in 1530. Originally awarded for a book defending the seven sacraments, it was later reconferred by Parliament. 51 “Do the Prince and Duchess Attend Church?” The Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall (2016), online: http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/faqs/do-the-prince-and-the-duchess-attend-church and “Does The Prince of Wales Intend to Have a Multi-Faith Coronation?” The Prince of Wales and the Duchess of Cornwall (2016), online: <http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/faqs/does-the-prince- of-wales-intend-have-multi-faith-coronation-0>. For the argument that it should be emphatically a
24 The Crown in the 21st Century - Volume 22, Issue 1, 2017
If the Queen Has No Reserve Powers Left, What Is the Modern Monarchy For?
The website also makes clear that the Prince has no expectation that the next coronation will be a multifaith event. The next accession and corona- tion will expose these religious questions. Whilst there is probably nothing to be done about the Scottish oath under the Act of Union 1707 and sworn immediately on accession to uphold the Church of Scotland, the Protestant Declaration oath (1910) and the Coronation Oath (1688) raise sharper ques- tions.^52 As John Wolffe maintains:
It is improbable that any government will choose to grapple with such potentially contentious issues until forced to do so by the accession of a new monarch, but equal- ly unlikely in the vastly changed circumstances of the twenty-first century that these texts would remain unaltered without considerable controversy.^53
There is still the point that the UK Sovereign’s obligatory Anglicanism might be thought dissonant in those Commonwealth realms such as Australia and Canada where majorities are anything but Anglican and may be, in fact, Roman Catholic — the religion that continues to face constitutional discrimi- nation in the UK. This fact featured, if to no great extent, in the 1999 Australian referendum campaign. Australian monarchists argued that the point was irrel- evant because the real head of state was the Governor General and no religious tests applied to that office. Indeed, office holders had included two Jews and at least one atheist.^54 Though true, that response is less than a complete rebut- tal of an affront to non-Protestant religious groups in the Commonwealth; it may be contended that “the national Church of England is apparently able to dictate the rules of succession in respect of heads of state not only for the whole of the United Kingdom but also outside it.”^55 It remains to be seen whether the remaining Roman Catholic disabilities will feature significantly in constitu- tional discussions of this kind in the realms. They have not so far been salient when the practical implications on the ground must normally seem remote and uncontentious.
Christian event, see Nick Spencer & Nicholas Dixon, Who Wants a Christian Coronation? (London: Theos, 2015), online: <http://www.theosthinktank.co.uk/publications/2015/09/01/who-wants-a- christian-coronation>. 52 See Appendix for the text of the oaths. 53 Wolffe, supra note 28 at 69. 54 Gareth Grainger & Karen Jones, The Australian Constitutional Monarchy (Sydney: ACM Publishing,
- at 191-193. 55 Norman Bonney & Bob Morris, “Tuvalu and You: The Monarch, the United Kingdom and the Realms” (2012) 83:2 Political Q 368 at 372.
