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Child Protection Scandal at Great Ormond Street: Negligence and Cover-up?, Exercises of Medicine

This document reveals the child protection scandal at Great Ormond Street Hospital in London, where locum consultant Sabah Al-Zayyat failed to identify signs of abuse on Baby Peter Connelly, despite his bruises and being on the child protection register. The hospital's management is accused of concealing the full report by Sibert and Hodes, leading to public outrage and calls for an investigation. The document also discusses the background of the partnership between Great Ormond Street and Haringey Teaching Primary Care Trust, and the concerns raised by consultants about the administrative systems at St Ann's child development centre.

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CHILD PROTECTION
286 BMJ | 6 AUGUST 2011 | VOLUME 343
Baby Peter Connelly had bruises on his face and
back and a two month old lesion on his head
when he was seen by Sabah Al-Zayyat, a locum
consultant paediatrician, at the child develop-
ment centre at St Ann’s hospital in T ottenham,
north London, on 1 August 2007. The bruises
were typical of abuse, according to the two
leading paediatricians who later reviewed Dr
Al-Zayyat’s work at St Ann’s, and should have
raised suspicion—particularly in a toddler who,
as the notes showed, was on the child protection
register.
It was the last chance to save his life but it was
missed. He was sent home, and a letter went to
Great Ormond Street Hospital referring him for
investigation for possible metabolic disease. Two
days later, aged just 17 months, he was dead. A
postmortem examination found eight fractured
ribs; a broken back; an area of bleeding around
the spine at neck level; numerous bruises, cuts,
and abrasions, including a large gouge in his
head; a tear in his frenulum that was partially
healed; and missing nails. One ear lobe had
been pulled away from his head, and a tooth was
found in his colon. In November 2008 his mother,
Tracey Connelly, her boyfriend, and his brother
were convicted of causing or allowing his death,
and a media storm erupted.
The case of Baby P—his full name was not
released at first—became a cause célèbre. The pic-
ture of the blond, blue eyed toddler in his bright
blue pullover who was so let down by health
professionals and social services sparked public
outrage. Government ministers looked for some-
one to blame. Attention focused mainly on the
social workers rather than the doctors who had
seen Peter, and Haringey’s director of children’s
services, Sharon Shoesmith, lost her job.
How could a consultant paediatrician have
missed the obvious signs that Peter was being
battered? He had already been to North M iddlesex
Hospital three times in his short life, and hospi-
tal staff had diagnosed non-accidental injuries on
one of those visits. But Dr Al-Zayyat was unaware
of this—there was no record of those hospital
visits in the notes. Nor did she have the train-
ing required in the job description for the post of
community paediatrician which she held. There
were only two consultants in a clinic which was
supposed to have four, and there was no one
in the crucial post of “named” doctor for child
protection. In short, concluded Jonathan Sibert
and Deborah Hodes, who were commissioned to
review the case, the state of affairs was “clinically
risky” and “the present arrangements for seeing
child protection cases at St Ann’s cause grave
concern.”1
The doctors at St Ann’s were employed by the
world famous Great Ormond Street Hospital, a
centre of excellence with an international repu-
tation. Seen as one of the world’s great children’s
hospitals, Great Ormond Street now finds itself
at the centre of a murky whirlpool of allegations,
accused of management cover-up, bullying and
targeting of staff who raise safety concerns, and
trading on its reputation.
Newspaper articles, BBC reports, an NHS
whistleblowing special in the magazine Private
Eye, and even an editorial in the Lancet
2
charge
the hospital with concealing the extent to which it
failed Baby Peter by not passing on the full, highly
critical, report by Professor Sibert and Dr Hodes to
the first serious case review set up to learn lessons
from the tragedy.3 Government minister Lynne
Featherstone called on the chief executive officer,
Jane Collins, to resign and demanded that health
secretary, Andrew Lansley, launch an investiga-
tion into the alleged cover-up. Her call was sup-
ported by an unknown number of anonymous
consultants at Great Ormond Street Hospital in
a letter to the Lancet last month.4 But Mr Lansley
has now vetoed an investigation. A Department
of Health spokesperson said: “These matters
have been extensively investigated. GOSH [Great
Ormond Street Hospital] has acknowledged and
apologised for its part in those events. The Secre-
tary of State does not believe it would be benefi-
cial to revisit these events once more.”
Community outreach
Children from all over the UK and indeed the
world come for treatment to Great Ormond
Street’s Bloomsbury site, in the heart of academic
London, where it is building a shiny new medical
unit with donations from, among o thers, the fam-
ily of billionaire Lakshmi Mittal, one of B ritain’s
richest men. Just a few miles to the north is St
Ann’s, a Victorian edifice in Tottenham serving
Haringey, the 10th most deprived of England’s
354 districts. In 2007, 36.4% of its children were
officially deemed to be living in poverty.
Great Ormond Street sees children with rare
and complex disorders who could probably be
treated nowhere else in the UK. The decision to
get involved in community paediatric services in
Haringey was, says Michael Burch, specialty lead
for cardiology at Great Ormond Street, taken with
good intentions but in retrospect was a mistake.
“I don’t think the trust had previous knowledge
of working in complex community matters.
While I think they wanted to get teaching hospi-
tal expertise and ivory tower teaching hospital
medicine out into Haringey, I think it’s just very
difficult to do that. People at the time thought it
was a very noble gesture to try to get involved
with a very deprived borough and to try to offer
help from the service, but it clearly didn’t work
that way.”
Barbara Buckley, one of the two medical
directors at Great Ormond Street Children’s
GREAT
ORMOND
STREET
AND
BABY P:
WAS
THERE A
COVER UP?
Four years after the death of
“Baby P,” arguments are still
continuing about the response
of the UK’s leading children’s
hospital. Clare Dyer reports
bmj.com
ЖHead to head: Has child protection become a
form of madness? (
BMJ
2011;342:d3040)
doc2doc
ЖEvidence based child protection?
http://bit.ly/pJfmHY
pf3
pf4
pf5

Partial preview of the text

Download Child Protection Scandal at Great Ormond Street: Negligence and Cover-up? and more Exercises Medicine in PDF only on Docsity!

Baby Peter Connelly had bruises on his face and back and a two month old lesion on his head when he was seen by Sabah Al-Zayyat, a locum consultant paediatrician, at the child develop- ment centre at St Ann’s hospital in Tottenham, north London, on 1 August 2007. The bruises were typical of abuse, according to the two leading paediatricians who later reviewed Dr Al-Zayyat’s work at St Ann’s, and should have raised suspicion—particularly in a toddler who, as the notes showed, was on the child protection register. It was the last chance to save his life but it was missed. He was sent home, and a letter went to Great Ormond Street Hospital referring him for investigation for possible metabolic disease. Two days later, aged just 17 months, he was dead. A postmortem examination found eight fractured ribs; a broken back; an area of bleeding around the spine at neck level; numerous bruises, cuts, and abrasions, including a large gouge in his head; a tear in his frenulum that was partially healed; and missing nails. One ear lobe had been pulled away from his head, and a tooth was found in his colon. In November 2008 his mother, Tracey Connelly, her boyfriend, and his brother were convicted of causing or allowing his death, and a media storm erupted. The case of Baby P—his full name was not released at first—became a cause célèbre. The pic- ture of the blond, blue eyed toddler in his bright blue pullover who was so let down by health professionals and social services sparked public outrage. Government ministers looked for some- one to blame. Attention focused mainly on the social workers rather than the doctors who had seen Peter, and Haringey’s director of children’s services, Sharon Shoesmith, lost her job. How could a consultant paediatrician have missed the obvious signs that Peter was being battered? He had already been to North Middlesex Hospital three times in his short life, and hospi- tal staff had diagnosed non-accidental injuries on one of those visits. But Dr Al-Zayyat was unaware of this—there was no record of those hospital visits in the notes. Nor did she have the train- ing required in the job description for the post of community paediatrician which she held. There were only two consultants in a clinic which was supposed to have four, and there was no one in the crucial post of “named” doctor for child protection. In short, concluded Jonathan Sibert and Deborah Hodes, who were commissioned to review the case, the state of affairs was “clinically risky” and “the present arrangements for seeing child protection cases at St Ann’s cause grave concern.”^1 The doctors at St Ann’s were employed by the world famous Great Ormond Street Hospital, a centre of excellence with an international repu-

tation. Seen as one of the world’s great children’s hospitals, Great Ormond Street now finds itself at the centre of a murky whirlpool of allegations, accused of management cover-up, bullying and targeting of staff who raise safety concerns, and trading on its reputation. Newspaper articles, BBC reports, an NHS whistleblowing special in the magazine Private Eye , and even an editorial in the Lancet^2 charge the hospital with concealing the extent to which it failed Baby Peter by not passing on the full, highly critical, report by Professor Sibert and Dr Hodes to the first serious case review set up to learn lessons from the tragedy.^3 Government minister Lynne Featherstone called on the chief executive officer, Jane Collins, to resign and demanded that health secretary, Andrew Lansley, launch an investiga- tion into the alleged cover-up. Her call was sup- ported by an unknown number of anonymous consultants at Great Ormond Street Hospital in a letter to the Lancet last month.^4 But Mr Lansley has now vetoed an investigation. A Department of Health spokesperson said: “These matters have been extensively investigated. GOSH [Great Ormond Street Hospital] has acknowledged and apologised for its part in those events. The Secre- tary of State does not believe it would be benefi- cial to revisit these events once more.”

Community outreach Children from all over the UK and indeed the world come for treatment to Great Ormond Street’s Bloomsbury site, in the heart of academic London, where it is building a shiny new medical unit with donations from, among others, the fam- ily of billionaire Lakshmi Mittal, one of Britain’s richest men. Just a few miles to the north is St Ann’s, a Victorian edifice in Tottenham serving Haringey, the 10th most deprived of England’s 354 districts. In 2007, 36.4% of its children were officially deemed to be living in poverty. Great Ormond Street sees children with rare and complex disorders who could probably be treated nowhere else in the UK. The decision to get involved in community paediatric services in Haringey was, says Michael Burch, specialty lead for cardiology at Great Ormond Street, taken with good intentions but in retrospect was a mistake. “I don’t think the trust had previous knowledge of working in complex community matters. While I think they wanted to get teaching hospi- tal expertise and ivory tower teaching hospital medicine out into Haringey, I think it’s just very difficult to do that. People at the time thought it was a very noble gesture to try to get involved with a very deprived borough and to try to offer help from the service, but it clearly didn’t work that way.” Barbara Buckley, one of the two medical directors at Great Ormond Street Children’s

GREAT

ORMOND

STREET

AND

BABY P:

WAS

THERE A

COVER UP?

Four years after the death of

“Baby P,” arguments are still

continuing about the response

of the UK’s leading children’s

hospital. Clare Dyer reports

bmj.com

Ж Head to head: Has child protection become a

form of madness? ( BMJ 2011;342:d3040)

doc2doc

Ж Evidence based child protection?

http://bit.ly/pJfmHY

Hospital NHS Trust, who arrived at the trust in April 2008, acknowledges that it was “naive” of Great Ormond Street management to think there could be effective governance in a situation where it employed the doctors but they worked on another site in a service run and managed by another trust, Haringey Teaching Primary Care Trust. Great Ormond Street took over the full run- ning of the service in April 2008 but transferred it to Whittington Health in north London in May this year. The partnership began in 2003 when Haringey, which was having recruitment prob- lems, approached Great Ormond Street, thinking the “brand” might help. Four consultants were appointed, but a financial crisis at Haringey in early 2006 led to cuts in the child health service’s funding and back-up staffing. In 2006, the four consultants at St Ann’s wrote a letter highlight- ing concerns about a “lack of unified records,” “missing records,” and “no child protection follow-up.” Two of the consultants left and a third, Kim Holt, who complained about the workload, became embroiled in what turned into a long running dispute with Great Ormond Street management. She was signed off with work related stress in 2007, and it was announced last week that she will return this summer to work in the local paediatric community services, now under Whittington Health. Dr Holt says she was offered £120 000 to sign a compromise agreement and leave, but it contained a gagging clause and she refused. She regards herself as a whistleblower who was targeted by management for raising concerns. An investigation in 2009 by the law firm Bevan Brittan, commissioned by NHS London, the stra- tegic health authority, concluded that it was fair to describe her as a whistleblower, that she was a conscientious doctor, and that the workload of the consultant team was excessive between 2006 and 2008—but that she had not been targeted or bullied.^5

It was against that background that Dr Al-Zayyat was hired as a locum in January 2007 to fill a consultant post whose require- ments—two years’ higher professional training in community child health or neurodisability, broad in-depth experience in community child health, and a knowledge and understanding of national guidance and legislation on child pro- tection—she lacked. She had never been on a specialist training programme, although the job description mentioned this as a core requirement. There were only two consultants in a clinic where there should have been four, and Pro- fessor Sibert and Dr Hodes noted that the lead consultant, Sukanta Banerjee, believed the unit was in a “clinically risky” situation, with too few staff, no nurse, and difficulties in linking with the local hospital, the North Middlesex. When Peter arrived with his mother and her friend, the referral was to assess his behaviour, which included head butting family members, head banging, and throwing his body around— behaviour which, the Sibert review noted, could itself point to abuse. Dr Al -Zayyat failed to exam- ine him properly because he was “miserable and cranky.”

Partial disclosure Peter’s death was swiftly followed by the launch of a Metropolitan Police murder investigation and a serious case review by the local safeguard- ing children board. In the course of the serious case review, Great Ormond Street commissioned its own review of Dr Al-Zayyat’s practice at St Ann’s. Professor Sibert, emeritus professor of child health at Cardiff University, and Dr Hodes, a consultant community paediatrician in Cam- den, north London, both experts in child protec- tion, were put forward by the Royal College of

Paediatrics and Child Health. What they found was damning, but the hospital sent the serious case review only a truncated version, with an action plan but with about half the overall con- tent of the report left out.^1 Among the missing findings were the facts that Dr Al-Zayyat was not qualified for the job and had little training in child protection and that Peter had waited around four months to be seen from the original referral. The recommendation that a “named” child protection doctor was needed urgently was omitted. Instead, the action plan called for one to be appointed. A crucial section that was left out said: “Dr Banerjee is clinical director of the service. She says that it is a ‘clinically risky situation.’ Dr Banerjee feels that she is fire-fighting all the time. We agree with her and we believe the present arrangements for seeing child protection cases at St Ann’s cause grave concern. In particular the lack of consultant staff and the problems link- ing with the North Middlesex and Great Ormond Street make things very difficult.” This was important information for the serious case review, whose role is to learn lessons for the future, say the authors of the review, Edi Carmi and Fergus Smith. “We were shocked and disap- pointed not to be given all relevant information by Great Ormond Street,” said Mr Smith, a veteran of more than 30 reviews. “No serious case review can fulfil its purpose if people withhold relevant information. We are used to having to overcome gaps. What we didn’t anticipate, because it had never happened before to our knowledge, was information deliberately being held back.” So why wasn’t the full report sent to the serious case review? Lynne Featherstone, in allegations set out on her website (www.lynnefeatherstone. org), has accused the hospital chief executive, Jane Collins, of a cover-up. The trust board, which

“We were shocked and

disappointed not to be given

all relevant information”

Serious case review co-author Fergus Smith

Locum consultant paediatrician Sabah Al-Zayyat lacked the relevant specialist training

Government minister Lynne Featherstone (left) called on the chief executive officer, Jane Collins (right), to resign and demanded that health secretary Andrew Lansley launch an investigation into the alleged cover-up

Medical director Martin Elliott: “Zero harm is one of the primary core goals of the organisation”

A meeting of senior staff on 23 June ended with a standing ovation for Dr Collins in the face of her media vilification, although one consult- ant wrote to colleagues in an email which was leaked: “Unfortunately, an unwelcome note of triumphalism crept into the final moments of the meeting.... We would indeed have done well to mark the end of the meeting by standing in digni- fied silence to respect the memory of Baby Peter and in quiet contemplation of the fact that in his moment of greatest need we failed him utterly.” The Lancet has since published a letter from 107 consultants and 52 other senior staff mem- bers supporting the chief executive and senior management and adding: “We have seen no evidence of bullying of staff who have raised concerns about clinical risk with management.” 7 Several of the consultants who signed, from spe- cialties including cardiology, cardiac surgery, intensive care, neurosurgery, general paediat- rics, and psychiatry, assured the BMJ that they were happy working at the hospital and had no problems with management. Professor Elliott said: “As soon as I was appointed I wrote to every consultant in the place and said that I expected them to tell me about problems with patient safety and I’ve reiterated that on several occasions when I’ve had the opportunity. We have a culture which is completely devoted to patient safety and qual- ity and have invested heavily in it. The complete culture of the organisation is to put patient safety and quality at the front. Zero harm is one of the primary core goals of the organisation.” Leaked emails from the radiology risk register spoke of a “dire situation,” but Professor Elliott suggested that this showed management was actively seeking to have risks identified. “We have a very aggressive approach to finding out about patient safety, actively looking for what the harm incidence is. By asking for it, people have the potential to use it not as a piece of information but as a weapon.” Although management has still not received the “no confidence” letter, he said, a mecha- nism was set up to allow those with concerns

Christine Hall, who retired from Great Ormond Street in 2006 as professor of paediatric radiol- ogy but is still in contact with her former col- leagues, said a big concern was the decision of management after her retirement not to take any more child abuse referrals from other hospitals, although Great Ormond Street is a tertiary refer- ral centre. The trust said the decision was taken before Baby P’s death “due to the impact on the rest of our services.” Professor Hall said radiologists would get referrals asking whether a child had a bone dis- order or non-accidental injuries and would have to refuse the referral. As a result, “the radiologists were extensively verbally abused down the tele- phone by paediatricians who didn’t know what the hell to do with these patients. I don’t think it was serving the community in the best way, and it wasn’t serving the courts in the best way and it wasn’t serving the families in the best way.” In May 2010 around 20 consultants met at BMA House to draw up a letter expressing a lack of confidence in senior management. BMA rep- resentatives then facilitated a meeting between management and four dissatisfied consultants, Dr Buckley says, and steps were taken to try to address their concerns. The hospital spokes- man said: “We understand that there were lists of names, some of whom were critical of man- agement but not calling on the chief executive to resign.” The trust was “surprised and disap- pointed” at the editorial written by Lancet editor Richard Horton, which concluded: “If GOSH’s management team had been in Wigan they would almost certainly have departed by now. Perhaps GOSH is too important to be seen to fail. Even when a child dies.” The editorial was followed by an anonymous letter from some Great Ormond Street consultants calling for “strong ministerial intervention” in ordering an investigation into the Baby P saga and the treatment of whistleblow- ers by the hospital. They added that they were “alarmed about the way in which senior manage- ment has treated individuals who have voiced concerns, not just in the case of Baby P, but also in relation to other clinical risks within the trust.”

to relay them anonymously to an independent person, the medical director of another trust, who fed them back to management through the chairman of the general medical staff com- mittee. The concerns had been dealt with, and no specific instance of targeting had come up during that process. One consultant who signed the letter support- ing management said: “There are a minority of clinicians who have concerns. I think it’s impor- tant that they’re dealt with constructively.” Another said the case of Baby P was “a defin- ing moment for the hospital,” but added: “Every hospital is going to have its safety issues and we also have our safety issues.” Was there a cover-up or was Great Ormond Street acting prudently on legal advice? Is it an institution with a culture of zero harm or does it silence staff who raise safety concerns? Without an independent investigation, the questions are unlikely to go away. Clare Dyer is legal correspondent,BMJ ClareDyer@aol.com Competing interests: None declared. Provenance and peer review: Commissioned; not externally peer reviewed. 1 Sibert J, Hodes D. Review of child protection practice of Dr Sabah Al-Zayyat (published together with summary supplied by GOSH to SCR, described as Addendum to the Haringey Teaching Primary Care Trust IMR re PC).

  1. www.gosh.nhs.uk/docs/20110505_Sibert_ Addendum_Action%20Plan.pdf. 2 Horton R. The depth of the deception? Lancet 2011;377:2068. 3 Haringey Local Safeguarding Children Board. Serious case review “Child A”, November 2008. 2010. http:// media.education.gov.uk/assets/files/pdf/s/first% serious%20case%20review%20overview% report%20relating%20to%20peter%20connelly% dated%20november%202008.pdf. 4 Anon. GOSH consultants express alarm. Lancet 2011;378:123. 5 Widdowson D, Persaud N. Report on an investigation into allegations made by Dr Kim Holt, consultant community paediatrician. NHS London, 2009. www. london.nhs.uk/webfiles/.../KHOLT_021209.pdf. 6 Haringey Local Safeguarding Children Board. Serious case review “Child A”, March 2009. 2010. http://media. education.gov.uk/assets/files/pdf/s/second% serious%20case%20overview%20report% relating%20to%20peter%20connelly%20dated% march%202009.pdf. 7 Goldin J et al. Support for senior management at Great Ormond Street. Lancet 2011;378:318. Cite this as: BMJ 2011;343:d

❱❱❱ ❱❱❱ ❱❱❱ ❱❱❱ ❱❱❱ ❱❱❱

May 2008 Sibert report into Dr Al-Zayyat’s practice at St Ann’s is completed. Great Ormond Street sends summary, not the full report, to the first serious case review

November 2008 First serious case review completed but deemed “inadequate” by Ofsted (^) October 2010 Both serious case reviews published

May 2011 Full Sibert report with some names and details redacted out is released after freedom of information request

July 2011 Health secretary Andrew Lansley (below) refuses Ms Featherstone’s demand for an inquiry

March 2009 Second serious case review completed

June 2011 Lynne Featherstone MP, Home Office junior minister (right), accuses Great Ormond Street chief executive officer Jane Collins of cover-up. Lancet publishes editorial accusing hospital of cover-up

PROFILE

“I

’m not as undiplomatic as I look,” says Edzard Ernst. Sat in the conservatory of his seaside home by the Suffolk coast, Britain’s first professor of com- plementary medicine does seem to be a picture of polite gentility. Not so a few days earlier when, at a press conference in London, he branded Prince Charles a snakeoil salesman for promoting homoeopathy. The statement made headlines across the world. Ernst chuckles at the mention of this. “I know what I’m doing and I do it on purpose,” he says. “I’m not against roy- alty, I’m just confrontational with Prince Charles because he is speaking out of his proverbial when it comes to medicine and science.” Ernst has spent the past 18 years studying the safety and efficacy of complementary and alter- native medicines (CAMs). He has masterminded over 30 clinical trials and 200 systematic reviews. His results have led him to criticise many CAMs as no better than placebo, and to say some even do harm. He has also found that around 20 work better than placebo ( Br J Gen Pract 2008;58: 208-9). His results have often brought him into open confrontation with both CAM proponents— they feel he’s out to rubbish their field—and conventional medics, who think he’s devoting precious effort and resources to what, they are convinced, is quackery. He insists that neither is the case. “I honestly think that I am entirely evidence led,” he says. Ernst cites his Damascene conversion over homoeopathy as a case in point. At the beginning of his career, Ernst worked in a homoeopathic hospital, and his general practitioner treated his family with homoeopathy. “I was open to the idea that there were laws of nature that we haven’t understood.” Today he still accepts that homoeopathic treat- ments work—“the question is: why?” He says he now has a conclusive answer: “It works because of a very long empathetic consultation. It’s a non-specific effect. The more clear that answer became, and I wrote about it, the more upset the homoeopaths became. “Tomorrow, if homoeopathy—by discovery of a new law of nature—can be explained in science, and the clinical evidence is positive and shows that my present conclusions are wrong, then I will change my mind again. I think it’s a sign of intelligence to change your mind when the evi-

dence changes. I’ve changed once, I could change again.” It is dogma in the face of evidence that riles him, and that is one of the key motivators for his recent snipe at Prince Charles. Arguably, it is a parting shot in revenge for what Ernst believes to be the prince’s contribution to Ernst losing his job. Until a couple of months ago, Ernst held the chair of the world’s first centre for the scientific study of complementary and alternative medicine at the Peninsula Medical School, part of Exeter University. He had been in the post since 1993 and published around 1000 publications on CAMs, run 14 scientific conferences on the sub- ject, and given hundreds of lectures. In May he resigned under rather murky circumstances for which he blames clandestine influence exerted by the prince. The story goes something like this: in 2005 Prince Charles commissioned the retired Barclays bank chief economic advisor, Christopher Small- wood (helped by a team at the Market Research consultancy FreshMinds) to investigate the cost effectiveness of CAMs. The result was the report The Role of Complementary and Alternative Medi- cine in the NHS. An Investigation into the Poten- tial Contribution of Mainstream Complementary Therapies to Healthcare in the UK (http://bit.ly/ qHysy8). Ernst was involved in early drafts of the report, but then things turned sour. Chief among Ernst’s concerns were claims that the NHS could save hundreds of millions of pounds on conven- tional medicine costs if GPs were allowed to prescribe CAMs such as homoeopathy instead. “I saw where it was going and said I don’t want to be involved any- more. This report was not peer reviewed—yet it was going to be put directly into the hands of healthcare politicians.” A few days before the report’s publication, Ernst received a call from a reporter at the Times , who had got hold of it. The final draft contained claims that were “so unspeakable to me, that I had to speak out. I told them what I thought, and that created another headline,” he says.

That put Ernst and Prince Charles on a direct collision course. A short while later, the vice chancellor of Exeter University received a let- ter from Prince Charles’s private secretary, Sir Michael Peat, complaining that Ernst had broken a confidential agreement by speaking out before the report was published. The complaint led to a 13 month disciplinary investigation by the uni- versity, at the end of which Ernst was cleared of any wrongdoing. In a statement, Peat insisted he had written to the university without Prince Charles’s knowledge. One of Ernst’s supporters, former Liberal Democrat science spokesman Evan Harris, says it is a scandal that someone close to the Prince of Wales, acting in his interests, should make a complaint that wasn’t even upheld. Harris adds that it was a “very inappropriate communication between Prince Charles’s office and the univer- sity. Prince Charles’s views are bizarre. He is enti- tled to his views, but he should defend them in public, not behind the scenes.” Harris also says that the university failed in its duty to Ernst. “The job of the university is to stand up for its academics and safeguard their right to give a view based on their expertise. They shouldn’t forget that is their duty just because they are sabre rattled at by the heir to the throne.” The sentiment is echoed by David Colquhoun, a biophysicist at University College London who writes Improbable Science, a blog that’s popu- lar with scientists and sceptics. “The treatment Edzard received is dis- gusting,” he says. Tracey Brown, direc- tor of the charity Sense about Science, who has worked closely with Ernst on several occasions, concedes that diplomacy isn’t his strong suit. “He’s not particularly good at butter- ing up the university authorities. But that’s per- haps why he’s also so good at approaching things scientifically,” she says. Soon after that incident, Ernst was told that funding for his unit was drying up and that it would have to close when funds ran out. This deeply frustrated Ernst. But then light appeared at the end of the tunnel. John Took, the dean of the medical

Edzard Ernst: the prince and me

As he steps down from his post as the UK’s first professor of complementary medicine, Edzard

Ernst talks to David Cohen about homoeopathy, university politics, and Prince Charles

“I’m not against royalty, I’m

just confrontational with

Prince Charles because he is

speaking out of his proverbial

when it comes to medicine”