Proportionalism in Moral Theology: A Debate at the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley | Lecture notes Theology

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PROPORTIONALISM: METHOD OR MENACE?

A panel on the thorny question of "proportionalism" in moral theology was

held June 14; more than half the convention attended. Participants were Richard

A. McCormick, S.J., and Jean Porter, both of the University of Notre Dame, James

Walter of Loyola University of Chicago, and Philip Foubert of the Medical School

of the University of Nebraska at Omaha. The panel was chaired by William C.

Spohn, S.J., of the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley. Each panelist gave his

or her understanding of this approach to moral theology and then assessed its

strengths and weaknesses.

1. Richard A. McCormick. S.J. The name "proportionalism" was coined by

those who opposed this approach; the "ism" term conveys the deceptive impres-

sion of an ideologically unified movement. In fact, it is not a method but a way

of examining received moral norms according to a conflict model of reality. Every

moral choice occurs in a context where competing values and disvalues must be

weighed critically. "Proportionalists" hold that causing certain disvalues in con-

duct does not ipso facto make the action morally wrong. Traditional moral the-

ology appealed to "proportionate reason" in excusations from positive law and

affirmative obligations (e.g., the duty to procreate) and the nonimputation of ef-

fects in applying the principle of double effect. A fitting, morally important rea-

son justified specific evil effects or "disvalues" in these instances.

Opponents of this approach claim that it cannot weigh the competing values and

disvalues in a choice because they are "incommensurable," that is, lack a common

standard of comparison. McCormick pointed out that reasoning according to the prin-

ciple of double effect would have been impossible if such values were truly incom-

mensurable. Other critics indict this approach for employing a quantitative weighing

of values such as occurs in some forms of utilitarianism; however, even a cursory

reading of the literature would show that this charge is mistaken.

2. James Walter. Proportionalism is a method for (a) resolving conflicts of

values, (b) determining objectively what is morally right or wrong about an action

(as distinguished from judging the goodness or badness of the agent), and (c)

grounding concrete behavioral norms and exceptions to them. Concerning the term

"proportionate reason," there is no common agreement on "proportionate." It

can mean either the proper relation of means to end or the relation between the

end and further consequences. "Reason" means the value which the agent seeks

in the act. Values and disvalues derive their moral character from the correspond-

ing moral virtues and vices. "Premoral" refers to conditional values, ones that

are not absolute. They are "pre" because this category of values/disvalues exists

independent of our willing; they are termed "moral" because they are always rel-

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PROPORTIONALISM: METHOD OR MENACE?

A panel on the thorny question of "proportionalism" in moral theology was held June 14; more than half the convention attended. Participants were Richard A. McCormick, S.J., and Jean Porter, both of the University of Notre Dame, James Walter of Loyola University of Chicago, and Philip Foubert of the Medical School of the University of Nebraska at Omaha. The panel was chaired by William C. Spohn, S.J., of the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley. Each panelist gave his or her understanding of this approach to moral theology and then assessed its strengths and weaknesses.

Richard A. McCormick. S.J. The name "proportionalism" was coined by those who opposed this approach; the " i s m " term conveys the deceptive impres- sion of an ideologically unified movement. In fact, it is not a method but a way of examining received moral norms according to a conflict model of reality. Every moral choice occurs in a context where competing values and disvalues must be weighed critically. "Proportionalists" hold that causing certain disvalues in con- duct does not ipso facto make the action morally wrong. Traditional moral the- ology appealed to "proportionate reason" in excusations from positive law and affirmative obligations (e.g., the duty to procreate) and the nonimputation of ef- fects in applying the principle of double effect. A fitting, morally important rea- son justified specific evil effects or "disvalues" in these instances. Opponents of this approach claim that it cannot weigh the competing values and disvalues in a choice because they are "incommensurable," that is, lack a common standard of comparison. McCormick pointed out that reasoning according to the prin- ciple of double effect would have been impossible if such values were truly incom- mensurable. Other critics indict this approach for employing a quantitative weighing of values such as occurs in some forms of utilitarianism; however, even a cursory reading of the literature would show that this charge is mistaken.
James Walter. Proportionalism is a method for (a) resolving conflicts of values, (b) determining objectively what is morally right or wrong about an action (as distinguished from judging the goodness or badness of the agent), and (c) grounding concrete behavioral norms and exceptions to them. Concerning the term "proportionate reason," there is no common agreement on "proportionate." It can mean either the proper relation of means to end or the relation between the end and further consequences. "Reason" means the value which the agent seeks in the act. Values and disvalues derive their moral character from the correspond- ing moral virtues and vices. "Premoral" refers to conditional values, ones that are not absolute. They are " p r e " because this category of values/disvalues exists independent of our willing; they are termed "moral" because they are always rel-

Forum: Proportionalism: Method or Menace? 159

evant to our decision making but not decisive. Rather, the prudential judgment concerning the proportionate character of the act as a whole, a judgment that weighs values and disvalues, is morally determinative. More work needs to be done on the criteria for determining when a propor- tionate reason exists and discussing rational hierarchies of values. We do rank cer- tain goods above others, but on what grounds? Up until now the proponents of "proportionalism" have not developed a sufficient moral anthropology, unlike their critics Germain Grisez and John Finnis whose theory of "basic goods" holds that one can never act against certain primary human goods (making any toleration of action against them always immoral).

Jean Porter. The debate has become politicized on both sides to the detriment of clarity. Proportionalism is neither a menace nor a method. Although there are grounds for agreeing with the approach's practical program in bringing flexibility to magisterial teaching and casuistry, significant theoretical problems remain. This re- visionist movement began in the writings of Peter Knauer, S.J., as a way to move beyond double-effect thinking. The first criterion of that principle (some acts are in- trinsically evil and can never be legitimate means to moral ends) was denied and the other criteria were assumed under the rubric of proportionality. The criteria, however, for weighing values and disvalues remain sketchy, often appear to be ad hoc to particular issues, and have not been detailed in any system- atic explanation. The relevant literature contains at least six different candidates for the standard of commensuration. "Proportionalism" gradually became a gen- eral label for justifying some harm in pursuit of moral ends. A false irenicism among proponents of this approach has prevented critical development of the terms. There are other ways of doing ethics, other starting points from reason, virtue or char- acter, and other ways of reasoning morally that have not been explored in moral theology. Nevertheless, we could not have come to the present state of develop- ment in moral theology without the work of "proportionalists."
Philip Foubert. Proportionalism is a family of approaches based on the tra- ditional "three fonts of morality" (that is, the judgment is based on the act in it- self, the agent's intention, and relevant circumstances). It emphasizes that they must be taken as a relational totality for sound moral judgment. Its proponents are attempting to reform Roman Catholic moral theology from within the tradition, which in recent decades had focused almost exclusively on the act considered in itself. Nevertheless, the focus remains on the moral act even though interpersonal and social considerations are included. It is not clear how individual moral agents can balance the wide range of factors that proportionate reason seems to demand. Two pivotal questions remain: First, does proportionalism as a style of moral analysis advance the theological integrity of moral theology? The Vatican Coun- cil's mandate to make moral theology more biblical, christocentric and histori- cally centered gave legitimacy to the movements to revise the discipline. However, it remains unclear how theological convictions work in practical reflection; most proportionalist writings give them scant attention. Secondly, can values ever be "premoral"? Feelings and emotions have an intentionality, a direction, even in the prediscursive state of moral knowing. Even at this early stage they tend in di- rections that are morally fruitful or not, and are shaped by the stories and images supplied by the agent's community.

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PROPORTIONALISM: METHOD OR MENACE?