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A legal case study analyzing the distinction between culpable homicide and murder under the indian penal code. It examines the case of sher shah, gajendar shah, and suri shah v. State of haryana, focusing on the elements of provocation, intention, and the nature of injuries. Relevant case law and legal principles to determine the appropriate charges and sentencing in such cases. It highlights the importance of considering factors like the nature of the weapon, the intention of the accused, and the circumstances surrounding the incident.
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The appellants (Sher Shah, Gajendar Shah, and Suri Shah) did not have the intention to administer the use of the lathi and deliver blows to the deceased (Karim) with the purpose of causing his death.
The act committed by the appellants was in the spur of the moment and does not attract heavy punishment and penalty under Sections 302 (Punishment for Murder) and 34 (Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
There are several reasons that were not brought to the attention of the Sessions Court, which the appellants now submit before the Hon'ble Court to prove the non-culpability of the accused under the aforementioned sections of the Indian Penal Code.
The contention of the respondent (State of Haryana) that there was a common intention among the appellants to kill the deceased cannot be considered, as the appellants went to the backyard of the house unarmed to investigate the whispers they heard.
In the cases of Mahbub Shah v. Emperor and Chandrakant Murgyappa Umrani & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, it was observed that to invoke Section 34, it must be shown that the criminal act was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, and care must be taken not to confuse the same or similar intention with common intention. This requirement was not satisfied in the present case, as there was no dispute, malice, or personal grudges against the deceased by any of the appellants, and the requisite intention cannot be attributed to them.
In the case of Suresh and Anr. v. State of U.P., it was held that the intention is to be judged by the act in relation to the surrounding circumstances. The circumstances in the present case show that the incident happened in the heat of the moment without any predetermination of mind, as Appellant 2 (Gajendar Shah) brought a lathi, which is a common household item, instead of a lethal weapon.
In the case of Marinal Das v. State of Tripura, it was observed that Section 34 requires a pre-arranged plan and presupposes prior concert; therefore, there must be a prior meeting of minds, which can be developed at the spur of the moment but must have a pre-arrangement
or pre-meditation concept. This was not the case in the present matter, as all the appellants lost their temper on seeing Karim and Naina together.
The Supreme Court, in the cases of Nagraja v. State of Karnataka and Girija Shankar v. State of U.P., held that a past enmity by itself may not be a ground to draw any inference of the formation of common intention among the parties, and that Section 34 is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence.
Considering the background in which the occurrence took place, the appellants were not actuated by a common intention. If there had been any malice to kill the deceased, they would not have called Karim to their house. Therefore, the prosecution has gravely erred in invoking Section 34 of the IPC against the appellants, and the Sessions Court was also not justified in convicting them under Section 302 r/w Section 34 of the IPC.
(This section is not present in the original text, so I will not include it in the elaboration.)
(This section is not present in the original text, so I will not include it in the elaboration.)
(This section is not present in the original text, so I will not include it in the elaboration.)
Whether the Nature of Injuries and the
Nature of Weapon was such as to Cause Death
of a Person?
Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh (5 (2008) 17 SCC 277): The Supreme Court held that if a person picks up a handy weapon in the heat of the moment during a sudden quarrel and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, they would be entitled to the benefit of the exception.
imputed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause death, and the court altered the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The facts on record show that none of the injuries by itself was sufficient to cause death but were only cumulatively sufficient to cause death.
The case law presented suggests that the nature of the injuries and the weapon used by the appellants do not necessarily warrant a conviction under Section 302 IPC (murder). The courts have recognized that the use of a lathi or a similar non-lethal weapon, even if it results in a fatal injury, may not be sufficient to establish the intent to kill required for a murder conviction. The courts have emphasized the importance of considering the circumstances surrounding the incident, such as the sudden nature of the provocation, the lack of premeditation, and the absence of any intention to cause death. In such cases, the courts have often found the offenders guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC.
Whether the Act of the Deceased Amounted to
Grave and Sudden Provocation?
K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1962 SC 605): The court held that no abstract standard of reasonableness can be laid down for what amounts to grave and sudden provocation, as it depends on the customs, manners, way of life, and traditional values of the individuals involved. The circumstances that led to the act of the appellants, such as seeing the deceased (Karim) and Naina together late at night in the backyard of their house in a small village in Haryana, where the customs and traditional values are different from those in a city, can be considered as grave and sudden provocation.
There was no period of cooling down, and the act of the appellants was in the spur of the moment.
R. Duffy (1949) 1 ALL ER 932:
Lord Goddard, C.J., defined provocation as "some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not master of his mind."
The law attaches great importance to whether there was time for cooling down and whether the mode of resentment bears a proper and reasonable relationship to the provocation given.
Boya Munigadu v. The Queen (ILR 3 MAD 33):
The Madras High Court held that the state of mind of the accused, having regard to the earlier conduct of the deceased, may be taken into consideration in determining whether the subsequent act would be sufficient provocation to bring the case within the Exception of Section 300 IPC.
In Re C. Narayan (A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 235):
The court held that the mental state created by an earlier act may be taken into consideration in ascertaining whether a subsequent act was sufficient to make the assailant lose his self-control.
Ayyanar v. State of Tamil Nadu:
The courts have recognized the concept of 'sustained provocation', where the provocation may not be sudden but may be lingering in the mind of the accused for some time, eventually leading to a loss of self- control and the commission of the offense.
The case law presented suggests that the concept of provocation under Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC is not limited to a single, sudden act of provocation. The courts have recognized that the state of mind of the accused, the customs and traditional values of the community, and the duration of the provocation (i.e., sustained provocation) can all be considered in determining whether the act of the deceased amounted to grave and sudden provocation.
In the present case, the circumstances surrounding the incident, such as the deceased (Karim) meeting Naina in the backyard of their house in a small village in Haryana, where the customs and traditional values are different from those in a city, can be considered as grave and sudden provocation. Additionally, the fact that there was no cooling-down period and the act of the appellants was in the spur of the moment suggests that the provocation was grave and sudden, as per the judicial pronouncements.
Whether the Session Court was Justified in
Sentencing the Appellants with Life
Imprisonment?
The incident happened at the spur of the moment, without any premeditation or intention to kill. The appellants did not use any lethal weapons to attack the deceased, Karim. The fatal injuries were caused by the appellant Suri Shah using a lathi, which is not a lethal weapon.
Although the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the court altered the conviction from Section 302 (murder) to Section 304 Part II (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) as the intention to cause such an injury likely to cause death was not made out.
Similarly, in the case of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of positive proof that the appellant caused the death of the deceased with the intention of causing death or intentionally inflicted a particular injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, neither Clause I nor Clause III of Section 300 IPC (murder) would be attracted.
The court must consider various factors while awarding an appropriate sentence to the accused, including:
Motive or previous enmity Whether the incident occurred on the spur of the moment The intention or knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days The gravity, dimension, and nature of the injury The age and general health condition of the accused Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight The nature and size of the weapon used and the force with which the blow was inflicted The criminal background and adverse history of the accused Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, but the death was due to shock The number of other criminal cases pending against the accused Whether the incident occurred within the family members or close relations Whether the accused had taken the injured or deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure proper medical treatment
These factors are not exhaustive, and the court must ensure that the accused receives an appropriate sentence according to the gravity of the offence to meet the ends of justice.