Constitution law of India part II, Exams of Constitutional Law

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AL-AMEENCOLLEGEOFLAW

IISEMESTER3YEARSLL.B.,COURSE

CONSTITUTIONALLAW-II

MODELANSWERPAPER-MAY2 019 /

IMORTANTQUESTIONSWITH

ANSWERS

PreparedBy: Ms.SahanaFlorence Asst.Prof. Al-AmeenCollegeofLaw.

Q.No. 1 .DiscusstheFederalCharacteristicsoftheIndianConstitution. SYNOPSIS: Introduction DefinitionsofFederalism IstheConstitutionofIndiaFederal? FederalCharacteristicsofIndianConstitution Conclusion. Introduction: Federalism isatitscoreasystem wherethedualmachineryofgovernment functions.Generally,underfederalism,therearetwolevelsofgovernment.Oneisacentral authoritywhichlooksafterthemajoraffairsofthecountry.Theotherismoreofalocal governmentwhichlooksafterthedaytodayfunctioningandactivitiesoftheirparticular region. Federalism isamethodofsegregatingpowerssothattheCentralandlocal governmentsareeachwithinadomain,harmonizing and autonomous.Federalism postulates a constitutionalapparatus forbringing unityin diversitybytoning the divergentforcesofcentripetaltrendsintheCountryfortheattainmentofconjoint nationaltargets. Definition: AccordingtoK.C.Wheare:“Themethodofdividingpowerssothatthegeneral andregionalgovernmentsareeachwithinaspherecoordinateandindependent”. AccordingtoA.V.Dicey,whoidentified3leadingscharacteristicsofacompletely developedfederalism. a.Distributionofpowersamonggovernmentalbodies b.SupremacyoftheConstitutionand c. TheauthorityoftheCourtsastheinterpretersoftheConstitution. ISTHECONSTITUTIONOFINDIAFEDERAL? According to the traditionalclassification followed by the politicalscientists, Constitutionsareeitherunitaryorfederal.InaunitaryConstitutionthepowersofthe Governmentare centralised in one governmentviz.,the CentralGovernment.The provincesaresubordinatetotheCentre.InafederalConstitution,ontheotherhand,

alsoincorporated.Therelationbetweenthecitizensandthegovernmentisalso clearlymentioned.Intheabsenceofawrittenconstitution,conflictsmayarise betweenthecentreandthestates.Thismakesthewrittenconstitutionhighly essentialforthesuccessfulworkingofthefederation. 4 .Rigidity:Theconstitutionofafederalgovernmentisnotonlywrittenbutalsorigidin itsnature.Whentheconstitutionisrigid,therewillbenofrequentchanges.Butthe consentofboththecentreandthestateisnecessaryforchangingitsprovisions.If thisarrangementisnotmade,eitherthecentreorstatesmaytrytochangethe provisionsoftheconstitutionfortheirselfishends

5. AuthorityofCourts:AFederalStateisfeaturedbytheexistenceonindependent judiciary.Thecentreand thestateshaveto fulfilltheirobligationswithin the frameworkoftheconstitution.However,conflictsmayarisebetweenthem.Inorder tosettlesuchconflicts,federalstateestablishesanindependentjudiciary,wherein judges possess independentposition enabling them to deliverindependent judgmentshonestly,impartiallyandwithoutanyfearorfavour.Hence,thejudiciary infederationactsasthefinalinterpreteroftheconstitution. TheIndianConstitutionpossessesalltheessentialcharacteristicsofafederal Constitutionmentionedabove.TheConstitutionestablishesadualpolity,asystem of doublegovernmentwiththeCentralGovernmentatonelevelandtheStateGovernment attheStatelevel.ThereisadivisionofpowerbetweentheCentralandtheState Governments.EachlevelofGovernmentissupremeinitsownsphere.TheConstitution ofIndia iswritten and issupreme.The provisionsofthe Constitution which are concernedwithfederalprinciplescannotbealteredwithouttheconsentofthemajority oftheState.TheConstitutionestablishesaSupremeCourttodecidedisputesbetween theUnionandtheStates,ortheStatesinterseinterpretfinallytheprovisionsofthe Constitution. Letusnow examine whatare those provisionsofthe Constitution which are producedinsupportoftheaboveargumentandhowtheymodifythestrictapplication ofthefederalprinciple.Inthefollowingmatters,itispointedout,theIndiaConstitution containsthemodificationsofthefederalprinciple:- 1 .AppointmentofGovernors 2 .Parliament’spowertolegislateinthenationalInterest 3 .Parliament’spowertoform newstateandalterboundariesofexistingStates. 4 .EmergencyProvisions. Conclusion: Inshort,itmaybeconcludedthattheConstitutionofIndiaisneitherpurely federalnorpurelyunitarybutitisacombinationofboth.ItisaunionofcompositeState ofanoveltype.Itenshrinestheprinciplethatinspiteoffederalism,thenationalinterest oughttobeparamount.Thus,theIndianConstitutionismainlyfederalwithunique

safeguardsforenforcingnationalunityandgrowth. Q.No. 2 .DiscusstheCentreandStaterelations. SYNOPSIS Introduction Centre-StateRelations a.LegislativeRelationship b.AdministrativeRelationship c.FinancialRelationship After independence India adopted the federal structure for, perhaps, administrativeconvenience.Thestatedidnotimposecompulsions.Thatiswhylimited autonomyhasbeengiventothestates.Thereisdualpolicy,withtheUniongovernment atthe centre and the state governments atthe periphery—each enjoying powers assignedtothem.Theautonomyofthestatesissoadjustedwiththecentrethatthe lattercanperform itsfunctionofensuringunityofthecountry.Pt.Nehruwanteda happyandharmoniouscompromisebetweenthestrongcentreandautonomousstates. TheConstitution ofIndia dividespowersbetween theUnion and theState governments.TheSeventhScheduleoftheConstitutionincludesthreelistsofsubjects- theUnionList,theStateListandtheConcurrentList.TheCentralorUnionGovernment hasexclusivepowertomakelawsonthesubjectswhicharementionedintheUnion List.TheStateshavethepowertomakelawonthesubjectswhichareincludedinthe StateList.WithregardtotheConcurrentList,boththeCentralandStategovernments canmakelawsonthesubjectsmentionedintheConcurrentList.Finally,thesubjects whicharenotmentionedintheabovethreelistsarecalledresiduarypowersandthe Uniongovernmentcanmakelawonthem ItmaybenotedherethatinmakinglawsonthesubjectsoftheConcurrentlist, theCentralgovernmenthasmoreauthoritythantheStategovernments.Andonthe subjectsoftheStateListalsotheCentralgovernmenthasindirectcontrol.Allthis showsthatthoughtheIndianConstitutionhasclearlydividedpowersbetweenthetwo governments,yettheCentralgovernmenthasbeenmadestrongerthantheState governments.Wecandiscussthedivisionofpowersbetweenthetwogovernmentsin Indiaunderthreeheadings,suchas, 1 .Legislativerelations, 2 .Administrativerelationsand

hasexclusivepowertomakelawswithrespecttoanymatternotmentionedintheState listorthe ConcurrentList.Residuarylegislative powersrestwith the Parliament. Moreoverwhenthereisstateofemergency,Parliamentcanmakelawsonthesubjects givenunderUnionList.Inthecaseofaconflictbetweenthelawsmadebythestateand thelawspassedbythecentrethecentrallawwillprevail.Clearlythecentreisdecidedly strongerasfaraslegislativepowersareconcerned. II. ADMINISTRATIVERELATIONS[ ARTS- 256 - 263 ] Asinlegislativematters,inadministrativemattersalso,theCentralgovernmenthas beenmademorepowerfulthantheStates.TheConstitutionhasmadeitclearthatthe StategovernmentscannotgoagainsttheCentralgovernmentinadministrativematters. TheStategovernmentshavetoworkunderthesupervisionandcontroloftheCentral government.TheStatesshouldexerciseitsexecutivepowersinaccordancewiththe lawsmadebytheParliament.TheCentralgovernmentcanmakelawsformaintaining goodrelationsbetweentheCentreandtheStates.ItcancontroltheStategovernments bydirectingthem totakenecessarystepsforproperrunningofadministration. IftheStatefailstoworkproperlyoraccordingtotheConstitution,itcanimpose President’srulethereunderArticle3 5 6andtakeoverits(theState’s)administration. Again,therearesomeofficialsoftheCentralgovernment,workingintheStates,through which itcan havecontrolovertheStategovernments.TheframersoftheIndian Constitutionthereforedecidedtoincludedetailedprovisionstoavoidclashesbetween centre and states in the administrative domain and to ensure effective Federal ExecutivecontrolofmattersfailingwithintheJurisdictionoftheParliament.Inorderto ensuresmoothandproperfunctioningtotheadministrativemachinery,theymade provisions formeeting alltypes ofeventualities resulting through the working of federalism oremergenceofnew circumstancesduetodifferenceofopinionbetween thedualauthorities III.FINANCIALRELATIONS[ ARTICLES- 26 5TO2 91 ] Infinancialmattersalso,thecentralgovernmentismorepowerfulthanthe States.ThePresidentofIndiahasthepowertomakealterationsinthedistributionof revenuesearnedfrom income-taxbetweenthecentreandtheStates.TheCentrehas also the powerto greatloans and great-in-aid to the State governments.The ComptrollerandAuditorGeneralIndiaandtheFinanceCommissionofIndiawhichare thecentralagenciesalsohavecontrolovertheStatefinances.Divisionoffinancial powersandfunctionsamongdifferentlevelsofthefederalpolityareasymmetrical,with apronouncedbiasforrevenuetaxingpowersattheUnionlevelwhiletheStatescarry theresponsibilityforsubjectsthataffectthedaytodaylifeofthepeopleentailinglarger

expenditurethancanbemetfrom theirownresources. Toruntheadministrationproperly,boththeCentralandtheStategovernments needadequatesourcesofincome.Theincomeofthegovernmentcomesmainlyfrom varioustaxesimposedbyit.Infinancialrelationsbetweenthetwogovernments,wewill discusshowthesourcesofincomeareadjustedbetweenthetwogovernments.There arecertaintaxeslikelandrevenue,taxonagriculturalincome,estateduty,etc.,which areleviedandcollectedbytheStates.TheyarethesourcesofStaterevenue.Some taxesaretherelikestampduty,exciseonmedicine,toiletpreparations,etc.whichare leviedbytheUnionbutcollectedandappropriatedbytheStates.Therearesomeother taxesalsowhicharethesourcesofincomeoftheUniongovernmentalone.Theyare revenueearnedfrom railways,postsandtelegraphs,wireless,broadcasting,etc. Onanaverage,therevenueofStatesfrom theirownresourcessufficesonlyfor about 5 0to60percentofStates’currentexpenditure.Sincetheinsufficiencyofthe States’fiscalresourceshadbeenforeseenatthetimeofframingtheConstitution,a mechanism intheshapeofFinanceCommissionwasprovidedunderarticle2 8 0for financialtransfersfrom theUnion.Itsfunction isto ensureorderlyand judicious devolutionthatisdeemednecessaryfrom thepointofview ofavoidingverticalor horizontalimbalances. TheFinanceCommissionisonlyonestream oftransferofresourcesfrom the UniontotheStates.ThePlanningCommissionadvisestheUnionGovernmentregarding thedesirabletransferofresourcestotheStatesoverandabovethoserecommendedby theFinanceCommission.Bulkofthetransferofrevenueandcapitalresourcesfrom the UniontotheStatesisdeterminedlargelyontheadviceofthesetwoCommissions.By and large,such transfers are formula-based.Then there are some discretionary transfersaswelltomeettheexigenciesofspecificsituationsinindividualStates. These institutionalarrangements served the countrywellin the firstthree decadesafterindependence.Testifyingtothestrengthoftheseinstitutionsneitherthe UnionnortheStatessufferedfrom anylargeimbalanceintheirbudgets,althoughthe sizeofthepublicsectorintermsofproportionofgovernmentexpendituretoGross DomesticProducthadnearlydoubledduringthisperiod.Imbalanceshavebecome endemic during the lasttwo decades and have assumed alarming proportions recently.For this state of affairs,the constitutionalprovisions can hardly be blamed.Broadly,thecauseshavetobesoughtintheworkingofthepoliticalinstitutions. Thereareshortcomingsinthetransfersystem.Forexample,the‘gap-filling’approach adoptedbytheFinanceCommissionandthesoftbudgetconstraintshaveprovided perverseincentives.Thepoint,however,isthatthesedeficienciesarecapableofbeing correctedwithoutanychangeintheConstitution.

andConcurrentListwith47subjects. SofarasthelegislativerelationsbetweentheCentralgovernmentandtheState governmentsisconcerned,theCentralgovernmenthasbeengivenexclusivepowerto makelaw onthesubjectsoftheUnionlist.Theunionlisthas97subjects.These subjectsareofgreatimportanceforthecountryanduniform incharacter.So,these subjectsaregiventotheUniongovernment.Somesuchsubjectsaredefense,foreign affairs,currencyandcoinage,citizenship,census,etc. TheStategovernmentscanmakelawsonthesubjectsmentionedintheStatelist. TheStatelisthas 6 6subjects.Thesubjectswhichareoflocalimportanceandmayvary from StatetoStateareincludedintheStatelist.SomesubjectsoftheStatelistare-law andorder,publichealth,forests,revenue,sanitation,etc.ThoughtheStategovernments havepowertomakelawsonthesubjectsoftheStatelist,yettheCentralgovernment, oncertainoccasions,canalsomakelawsonthesesubjects.Forexample,duringthe periodofemergency,theParliamentmakeslawsonStatesubjects. TheConcurrentlisthas 47 subjects.Onthesesubjectsboththecentralandthestate governmentscanmakelaws.Thesubjectswhichareofgreatimportanceanduniform incharacterbutmanrequirelocalvariations,areincludedintheConcurrentlist.In respectofConcurrentlistalso,thoughboththegovernmentscanmakelawsonthe subjectsincludedinthelist,yetthelawsmadebytheCentralgovernmentwillprevail overtheStatelawsincaseofaconflictbetweenthetwo.Somesubjectsofthislistare

• economicplanning,socialsecurity,electricity,education,printingandnewspapers, etc.Incaseofresiduarypowers,theUniongovernmenthasexclusivepowertomake laws.TheStateshavenothingtodointhisregard. Thus,wefindthatinlegislativematters,theUnionParliamentisverypowerful.Ithas notonlyexclusivecontrolovertheUnionlistandtheresiduarypowers,butithasalso dominanceovertheConcurrentlistandtheStatelist. TheResiduaryPowers-Article- 248 Article2 4 8veststheresiduarypowersintheParliament.ItsaysthatParliamenthas exclusivepowertomakeanylaw withrespecttoanymatternotenumeratedinthe ConcurrentListortheStateList.Entry 9 7intheUnionListalsolaydownthatParliament hasexclusivepowertomakelawswithrespecttoanymatternotmentionedintheState listorthe ConcurrentList.Residuarylegislative powersrestwith the Parliament. Moreoverwhenthereisstateofemergency,Parliamentcanmakelawsonthesubjects givenunderUnionList.Inthecaseofaconflictbetweenthelawsmadebythestateand thelawspassedbythecentrethecentrallawwillprevail.Clearlythecentreisdecidedly strongerasfaraslegislativepowersareconcerned.

PrinciplesofInterpretationofLists ThepowersofCentreandStatesaredivided.Theycannotmakelawsoutsidetheir allottedsubjects.Itistruethataparticularsubjectfallsinthesphereofoneortheother government.ThisdutyinafederalconstitutionisvestedintheSupremeCourtofIndia. TheSupremeCourthaveevolvedthefollowingprinciplesofinterpretationinorderto determinetherespectivepoweroftheUnionandtheStateunderthethreelists: 1 .PredominanceoftheUnionList:- TheopeningwordsofArt. 24 6expresslysecurethepredominanceoftheUnion ListovertheStateListandtheConcurrentListandthatoftheconcurrentlistoverthe Statelist.ThusincaseofoverlappingbetweentheUnionandtheStateListitisthe UnionListwhichistoprevailovertheStateList.Incaseofoverlappingb/w theUnion andtheConcurrentList,itisagaintheUnionListwhichwillprevail.Incaseofconflict betweentheConcurrentListandStateList,itistheConcurrentListthatshallprevail.

2. EachEntrytobeInterpretedBroadly:- SubjecttotheoverridingpredominanceoftheUnionList,entryinthevarious listsshouldbeinterpretedbroadly.InCalcuttaGasLtd.v/sStateofWestBengal:-the SupremeCourtsaidthatthe“widestpossible”and“mostliberal”interpretationshould begiventothelanguageofeachentry.TheCourtshouldtry,asfaraspossible,to reconcileentriesandtobringharmonybetweenthem.Whenthisisnotpossibleonly thentheoverridingpoweroftheUnionLegislature appliesandthefederalpower prevails.
3. DoctrineofPithandSubstance:- Pithmeans"truenature"or"essence"andsubstancemeanstheessentialnature underlyingaphenomenon.Thus,thedoctrineofpithandsubstancerelatestofinding outthetruenatureofastatute.Thisdoctrineiswidelyusedwhendecidingwhethera stateiswithinitsrightstocreateastatutethatinvolvesasubjectmentionedinUnion ListoftheConstitution.Thebasicideabehindthisprincipleisthatanactoraprovision createdbytheStateisvalidifthetruenatureoftheactortheprovisionisabouta subjectthatfallsintheStatelist. ThecaseofStateofMaharashtrav/sFNBalsaraAIR1 951 illustratesthis principleverynicely.Inthiscase,theStateofMaharashtrapassedBombay ProhibitionActthatprohibitedthesaleandstorageofliquor.Thisaffectedthe businessoftheappellantwhousedtoimportliquor.Hechallengedtheactonthe groundthatimportandexportarethesubjectsthatbelonginUnionlistandstate isincapableofmakinganylawsregardingit.SCrejectedthisargumentandheld thatthetruenatureoftheactisprohibitionofalcoholinthestateandthis subjectbelongstotheStatelist.

ParliamentPowertomakeLawsonStateSubjects-Arts. 249 , 250 , 252 , 25 3and2 56 ] Thoughinnormaltimesthedistributionofpowersmustbestrictlymaintainedand neithertheStatenortheCentrecanencroachuponthesphereallottedtotheotherby the Constitution,Yetin certain exceptionalcircumstances the above system of distributioniseithersuspendedorthepoweroftheUnionParliamentareextendedover thesubjectsmentionedintheStateList.Theexceptionalcircumstancesare:- 1 .PoweroftheParliamenttoLegislateintheNationalInterest: AccordingtoArt- 249 ,iftheRajyaSabhapassesaresolutionsupportedby 2 / 3 rd ofthememberspresentandvotingthatitisnecessaryorexpedientinthe nationalinterestthatparliamentshouldmakelawswithrespecttoanymatter enumeratedwithintheStatelaw.ThenitshallbelawfulfortheParliamentto makelawsforthewholeoranypartoftheterritoryofIndiawithrespecttothat mattersolongastheresolutionremainsinforce.Sucharesolutionlastsfora year;itmayberenewedasmanytimesnecessarybutnotexceedingayearata time.TheselawsofParliamentwill,however,ceaseto haveeffecton the expirationoftheperiodofsixmonthsafterresolutionhasceasedtooperate. 2 .DuringaProclamationofEmergency:- AccordingtoArt- 25 0whiletheProclamationofEmergencyisinoperationthe Parliamentshallhavepowertomakelawsforthewholeoranypartoftheterritoryof IndiawithrespecttoallmattersintheStateList.Suchalaw,however,shallceaseto haveeffectontheexpirationofsixmonthsaftertheproclamationofemergencyhas ceasedtooperate. 3 .Parliament’sPowertoLegislatewiththeConsentoftheStates:- AccordingtoArticle2 5 2iftheLegislatureoftwoormoreStatespassresolution totheeffectthatitisdesirabletohavealawpassedbyparliamentonanymattersinthe StateList.ItshallbelawfulforParliamenttomakelawsregulatingthatmatter.Any otherStatemayadoptsuchalaw bypassingaresolutiontothateffect.suchlaw can onlybeamendedorrepealedbytheActofParliament.

4. Parliament’s Powerto Legislate forGiving Effectto Treaties and International Agreements:- Article- 25 3empowerstheParliamenttomakeanylawforthewholeorany partofthe territory ofIndia forimplementing treaties and international agreementsandconventions.Inotherwords,thenormaldistributionofpowers willnotstandinthewayofParliamenttopassalaw forgivingeffecttoan Internationalobligationeventhoughsuchlawrelatestoanyofthesubjectsinthe StateList.Art. 25 3enablestheGovernmentofIndiatoimplementallinternational obligations and commitments.Treaties are notrequired to be ratified by

Parliament.Theyare,however,notself-operative.Parliamentarylegislationwill benecessaryforimplementingtheprovisionsofatreaty.Butlawsenactedfor theenforcementoftreatieswillbesubjecttotheconstitutionallimits,thatis, suchalawcannotinfringefundamentalright. 5 .InCaseofFailureofConstitutionalMachineryinaState:- UnderArticle2 56 ,Parliamentisempoweredtomakelawswithrespecttoall mattersintheStateListwhentheParliamentdeclaresthattheGovernmentofthe StatecannotbecarriedoninaccordancewiththeprovisionsoftheConstitution. Thusfrom theschemeofdistributionoflegislativepowersbetweentheUnionand theStatesitisquiteevidentthattheframershavegivenmorepowerstotheUnion Parliamentas againstthe States.The States are notvested with exclusive jurisdictionevenoverthesubjectsassignedtothestatesbytheConstitutionand thusitmakestheStatestosomeextentsubordinatetotheCentre. Conclusion TheConstitutionofIndiadividespowersbetweentheUnionandtheStategovernments. TheSeventhScheduleoftheConstitutionincludesthreelistsofsubjects-theUnionList, theStateListandtheConcurrentList.TheCentralorUnionGovernmenthasexclusive powertomakelawsonthesubjectswhicharementionedintheUnionList.TheStates havethepowertomakelawonthesubjectswhichareincludedintheStateList.With regardtotheConcurrentList,boththeCentralandStategovernmentscanmakelaws onthesubjectsmentionedintheConcurrentList.Finally,thesubjectswhicharenot mentioned in the above three lists are called residuary powers and the Union governmentcanmakelawonthem. Q.No. 5 .Explainthefreedom ofInterStateTradeandCommerce. OR ElucidatetheConstitutionalprovisiononInter-Statetradeandcommerce SYNOPSIS 1 .Introduction 2 .TheObjectofArticles 30 1To3 07 3 .MeaningoftheTermsTrade,CommerceandIntercourse 4 .Freedom ofInterStateTradeandCommerce

provisionsofpartXII(Arts- 30 2to3 05 ).Thefreedom guaranteedbyArticle- 30 1isinthe widesttermsandappliestoallformsoftrade,commerceandintercourse.Article3 01 cannotbetakenawaybyanexecutiveaction.Restrictionsfrom whichthefreedom is guaranteedshouldbesuchrestrictionsasdirectlyandimmediatelyrestrictthefree-flow ofmovementoftradeandnotincidentalorindirectrestriction. MeaningoftheTermsTrade,CommerceandIntercourse: Theword‘trade’means‘buying’or‘selling’ofgoodswhiletheterm ‘commerce’ includesallformsoftransportationsuchasbyland,airorwater.Theterm intercourse meansmovementofgoodsfrom oneplacetoanotherplace.Thus,thewords‘trade, commerceandintercourse’coversallkindsofactivitieswhicharelikelytocomeunder thenatureofcommerce. Freedom ofInterStateTradeandCommerce: ItistobenotethatArt. 19 ( 1 )(g)alsoguaranteestocitizenstherighttopractice anyprofessionorcarryonanytrade,business,etc.butwhileArt. 19 ( 1 )(g),confersa fundamentalrightoncitizenstocarryontradebusinessetc.Art. 30 1confersonlya statutoryright.TherightunderArt. 19 ( 1 )(g)canclaimedonlybycitizensbuttheright underArt. 30 1canbeclaimedbyanyone. Theword‘free’inArt. 30 1doesnotmeanfreedom from lawsorregulations. Thereisacleardistinctionbetweenlawsinterferingwithfreedom tocarryoutthe activitiesconstitutingtradeandlawimposingrulesofproperconductorotherrestraints forthedueandorderlymannerofcarryingouttheactivities.Apurelyregulatoryand compensatorylaw cannotbe regarded as violative ofthe freedom oftrade and commerce.Suchlawsareintendedmerelytoregulatetradeandcommerce,theytend, tofacilitate,andnotrestrictorrestrainfreedom ortrade.Thussuchmeasuresastraffic regulations,pricecontrol,economicandsocialplanning,licensingofvehicles,charging forthemaintenanceofroads,marketingandhealthregulations,prescribingminimum wagesarepurelyregulativemeasures Anykindoftaxthatisleviedonanyparticularactivitywhichinvolvesinter-state transactioncanbetakentobearestrictiononthefreedom oftrade.Butastaxesare alsonecessaryforthefunctioningoftheCentreandtheStateallofthem cannotbe treatedasrestrictionsviolatingtheArticle 301. ThisquestionwasfirstbroughtupintheAtiabariTeaCo.v/sStateofAssam caseinwhichtheApexcourtheldthattaxlawsarenotoutsidethescopeof‘the Freedom'.AndthereforetheAssam StateLegislaturehadtoamendtheprovisionasto meettherequirementsoftheexceptioninArticle3 04 (b)sothatthetaxthatitimposed didnotamounttoadirectandimmediateimpactofthemovementofthegoods.

InStateofMysorev/sSanjeeviah,theGovernmentmadearuleundertheMysore ForestAct, 1900 ,banningmovementofforestproducebetweensunlightandsunrise. TheSupremeCourtheldtherulevoidasitwasnota‘regulatory’but‘restrictive’ measureswhichinfringedtherightguaranteedunderArt. 301. InAutomobileTransportLtd.v/sStateofRajasthan,theappellantchallengedthe validityoftheRajasthanMotorVehiclestaxationAct, 1951 ,asviolatingArt- 301 .The StateGovtimposedataxonallmotorvehiclesusedandkeptwithintheStateof Rajasthan.TheCourtheldthatthetaxvalidastheywereonlyregulatorymeasures imposingcompensatorytaxesforfacilitatingtrade,commerceandintercourse. Limitations/RestrictionsonTradeandCommerce[Articles- 302 - 305 ]: Thefreedom oftradeandcommerceissubjecttocertainlimitationswhichmay beimposedbyParliamentorbytheLegislaturesofthevariousStates,subjecttothe factthatthelimitationscontainedinthepowerofParliamentisconfinedtocases arisingfrom scarcityofgoodsinonepartoftheterritoryofIndia,andinthecaseofthe Statesitmustbejustifiedonthegroundofpublicinterest."Article3 0 1isgeneralin scopeandenactsthat"subjecttotheotherprovisionsofthisPart,trade,commerceand intercoursethroughouttheterritoryofIndiashallbefree".Afterhavingstatedthe generalnatureofthefreedom oftradeandcommerce,theConstitutiondetailsthe limitationstothisfreedom. Therearefivesuchlimitations: ( 1 )ParliamentmayimposerestrictionsinanypartoftheterritoryofIndiainthe publicinterest(Art. 302 ).The purpose ofthisprovision isto allow the GovernmentofIndiatorestrictthemovementofgoodssoastosafeguarda well-balancedeconomyandtheproperorganisationandorderingofsupplies ofgoodsandservices.IfParliamenthasnoeffectivepowerstochecksuch abnormalsituations,freedom oftradeandcommerce,insteadofablessing, willbecomeamenacetothefreedom oflifeitself. ( 2 )AlthoughParliamentisempoweredtorestrictthefreemovementorarticles oftradeandcommerce,normallythelawspassedbyParliamentinthis contextoughttobenon-discriminatoryincharacter.Inotherwords,itshould notpreferoneStatetoanother.Butwhenanypartofthecountryissuffering from scarcityofgoods,Parliamentmay,meetsuchasituation;passevena discriminatorylaw(Art. 303 ). ( 3 )AStateLegislaturemayimposeongoodsimportedfrom otherStatesanytax ifsimilargoodsproducedinthatStatealsoaretaxedinalikemanner.AState Legislature is also authorised to impose reasonable restrictions on the

TherearesomeStateswhichhavetwotierPanchayats–oneatthevillageleveland secondatthedistrictlevel.AndtherearealsootherStateswherePanchayatiRaj Institutionisathreetiersystem-Gram/GaonPanchayatasfirstlevel,Samiti,Mandalor AnchalikorTalukorBlockorJanapadorUnionorKshetraassecondlevelandZillaor Districtasthethirdlevel.AttheruralleveltheGaonSabhaconstitutesthefoundationof thePanchayatiRajsystem.GaonSabhaperformsthefunctionsandpowersentrusted toitbythestatelegislatures.The7 3 rdAmendmentActaimstoprovidethreetier system intheLocalSelfGovernmentconstitutedthroughelectionsheldregularlyevery fiveyears.TheActalsoprovidesreservationofseatsforScheduledCastes,Scheduled TribesandWomen.Moreover,theActprovidesforaStateFinanceCommissionto makerecommendationsregarding thefinancialpowersofthePanchayatsand to constitute DistrictPlanning Committee to prepare draftdevelopmentplan forthe district. 1 6ProvisionhasalsobeenmadetoconstituteaStateElectionCommissionin everystate to supervise,directand controlthe regularand smooth elections to Panchayatbodies. 73 rdConstitutionalAmendment The 7 3 rd ConstitutionalAmendmentActwas passed by the Parliamentin April 1993 .TheAmendmentActhasaddedpartIXtotheConstitutionofIndiaentitledas ‘Panchayats’.Thepartconsistsofprovisionsfrom Article2 4 3to2 43 - 0 .Anewschedule calledasEleventhSchedulelists29functionalitemsthatpanchayatsaresupposedto dealwithunderArticle 243 - G. Thesalientfeaturesofthe 73 rdAmendment  TheGram Sabha: Theactprovidesthatagram sabhawillconsistofpersonsregisteredinthe electoralrollsofavillagewithintheareaofapanchayatatthevillagelevel.Thus,it isavillageassemblyconsistingofalltheregisteredvotersintheareaofthe panchayat.Itexercisessuchpowersandperformssuchfunctionsatthevillagelevel asthelegislatureofastatedetermines.  The7 3 rdAmendmenthasaddresseditselftothisailmentandhasprovidedthe followingforactivisationofthiscoreinstitution: ( 1 )Publicproblemsofthevillagewillbediscussedandbeneficiariesofwelfare programmeswouldbeidentified. ( 2 )Thepanchayatsecretarywillbethesecretaryofthesabhaalso. ( 3 )Twocompulsorymeetingsotherwisethesarpanchwillbeaskedtoquit. ( 4 )Thequorum ofmeetingswillbeone-tenthofthetotal. ( 5 )Assistancetopanchayatintheexecutionofruraldevelopmentschemes.

( 6 )Vigilancecommitteeofthesabhawillkeepaneyeonthepanchayats. ( 7 )Thebudgetandprogrammesofthepanchayatwillkeepthesuggestionsof thesabhainview. ( 8 )Aconstitutionalstatustogram sabhas.  TheThree-TierSystem: TheUniongovernmenthasprescribed auniform three-tiersystem of panchayatiinstitutionsforaperiodoffiveyears.  ReservationofseatsforSchedulecasteandTribes TheActprovidesforthereservationofseatsforScheduledCastesand ScheduledTribesineverypanchayat(i.e.,atallthethreelevels)inproportionoftheir populationtothetotalpopulationinthepanchayatarea.Further,thestatelegislature providesforthereservationofofficesofchairpersonsinthepanchayatatthevillage oranyotherlevelfortheSCsandSTs.  ReservationofSeatsforWomen Itfurtherprovidesforthereservationofnotlessthanone-thirdofthetotal numberofseatsforwomen(includingthenumberofseatsreservedforwomen belongingtheSCsandSTs).Further,notlessthanone-thirdofthetotalnumbersof officesofchairpersonsinthepanchayatsateachlevelaretobereservedforwomen.  ReservationofSeatsinPanchayats TheActalsoauthorisesthelegislatureofastatetomakeanyprovisionfor reservationofseatsinanypanchayatorofficesofchairpersoninthepanchayat atanylevelinfavourofbackwardclasses.Theterm ofofficeisfiveyearsbuta panchayatcanbedissolvedbeforethecompletionofitsterm. Q.No. 7 .ExplainthepowersandfunctionsofPresidentofIndia. Article 5 2oftheconstitutionsaysthatthereshallbeaPresidentofIndia.Heisthehead ofthestate.TheExecutivepoweroftheunion,Article53says,shallbePresident.In accordancewiththeconstitutioneitherdirectlyorthroughofficerssubordinatetohim. Qualifications:-Article 5 8laysdownthequalificationswhichapersonmustpossessfor beingelectedtotheofficeofthePresidentofIndia; 1 .HemustbeacitizenofIndia.