1ST INTERA DEPARTMENT MOOT COURT COMPETITION
COMPENDIUM OF THE CASE CITED ON
BEHALF PETITIONER IN MATTER OF
Raghvendra Singh Shekhawat and others …PETITIONER
V.
State of Rajathan …RESPONPONDENT
Prepare for your exams
Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points to download
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Guidelines and tips
Prepare for your exams
Study with the several resources on Docsity
Earn points to download
Earn points by helping other students or get them with a premium plan
Community
Ask the community
Ask the community for help and clear up your study doubts
University Rankings
Discover the best universities in your country according to Docsity users
Free resources
Our save-the-student-ebooks!
Download our free guides on studying techniques, anxiety management strategies, and thesis advice from Docsity tutors
Dowry Death Analysis: A Legal Case Study of IPC Sections 304B & 306, Schemes and Mind Maps of Mock Trial and Moot Court
A legal case study analyzing the application of section 304b and 306 of the indian penal code (ipc) in a dowry death case. It delves into the legal interpretation of these sections, highlighting the key elements required for conviction and the presumption of causation under section 113b of the evidence act. The case study examines the specific circumstances of the case, including the evidence presented and the arguments made by both the prosecution and the defense. It provides valuable insights into the legal framework surrounding dowry deaths in india and the challenges faced by the judiciary in adjudicating such cases.
Typology: Schemes and Mind Maps
2023/2024
1 / 9
This page cannot be seen from the preview
Don't miss anything!
Related documents
Partial preview of the text
Download Dowry Death Analysis: A Legal Case Study of IPC Sections 304B & 306 and more Schemes and Mind Maps Mock Trial and Moot Court in PDF only on Docsity!
INTERA DEPARTMENT MOOT COURT COMPETITION
COMPENDIUM OF THE CASE CITED ON
BEHALF PETITIONER IN MATTER OF
Raghvendra Singh Shekhawat and others …PETITIONER
V.
State of Rajathan …RESPONPONDENT
1 INTERA DEPARTMENT MOOT COURT COMPETITION SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER …APPELLANTS Versus STATE OF HARYANA … RESPONDENT JUDGMENT N. V. RAMANA, CJI. 1. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment dated 06.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal Nos. 3 SB of 1998 and 16 SB of 1998, whereby the High Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the appellants and upheld the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court on 11.12.1997. 1 REPORTABLE 2. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased and accusedappellant no.1 were married on 01.07.
- On 31.7.1995, at about 4 or 4.30 P.M, some persons informed the complainant that his daughter was ailing and admitted in the hospital. On this information he, along with his wife and son, reached the hospital and found that the deceased passed away due to burn injuries. The prosecution’s case was that the deceased committed suicide by setting herself ablaze just after one year of her marriage and that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of bringing less dowry by both the accused. 3. The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court vide order dated 11.12.1997 for the offences under Sections 304 B and 306, IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304 B, IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence punishable under Section 306, IPC. 2 4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached the High Court to set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. The High Court vide impugned judgment dated 06.11.2008, upheld the order of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants. The appellants have filed the present appeals by way of Special Leave, challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below. 5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the possibility of accidental fire has not been ruled out in the present case. Moreover, most importantly, the prosecution failed to prove that there was a demand for dowry. Lastly, the prosecution has failed to prove that the demand, assuming there was one, was made proximate to the death of the deceasedvictim. 6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondentState submitted that the appellants had n ot been able to show any material which would merit the interference of this Court in the concurrent findings of the Courts below. The counsel 3 especially emphasized upon the fact that the suspicious death of the deceased victim occurred within almost 1 year of marriage. Moreover, the witnesses have stated the specific instances of demand for dowry with consistency. 7. Having heard counsel appearing on either side and perusing the material on record, this Court needs to answer following questions: I. Whether the Trial Court, and the High Court, was correct in convicting the accused on the charge under Section 304B, IPC? II. Whether the Trial Court, and the High Court, was correct in convicting the accused on the charge under Section 306, IPC? ISSUE I 8. At the outset, it is pertinent to analyze the law on dowry death. Section 304 - B IPC, which defines, and provides the punishment for dowry demand, reads as under: “304B. Dowry death. —(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal 4 circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
1 INTERA DEPARTMENT MOOT COURT COMPETITION death, the facts are such as to satisfy the legal ingredients of an offence already known to the law, and if those facts can be proved without much difficulty, the existing criminal law can be resorted to for bringing the offender to book. IN practice, however, two main impediments arise (i) either the facts do not fully fit into the pigeon- hole of any known offence; or (ii) the peculiarities of the situation are such that proof of directly incriminating facts is thereby rendered difficult.” (emphasis supplied) 8
- Taking into consideration the aforesaid Law Commission Report, and the continuing issues relating to dowry related offences, the Parliament introduced amendments to the Dowry Prohibition Act, as well as the IPC by enacting Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 43 of 1986). By way of this amendment, Section 304 B, IPC was specifically introduced in the IPC, as a stringent provision to curb the menace of dowry death in India. Shrimati Margaret Alva, who presented the Amendment Bill before Rajya Sabha observed as follows: “This is a social evil and social legislation, as I said cannot correct every thing. We are trying to see how and where we can make it a little more difficult and therefore we have increased the punishment. We have also provided for certain presumptions because upto now one of our main problem has been the question of evidence. Because the bride is generally burnt or the wife is burnt behind closed doors in her inlaw’s home. You have never really heard of a girl being burnt while cooking in her mother’s house or her husband’s house. It is always in the motherinlaw’s house that she catches fire and is burnt in the kitchen. Therefore, getting evidence 9 immediately becomes a great bit problem. Therefore, we have brought in a couple of amendments which give certain presumptions where the burden of proof shifts to the husband and to his people to show that it was not a dowry death or that it was not deliberately done.” (emphasis supplied) 13. There is no denying that such social evil is persisting even today. A study titled “Global study on Homicide: Genderrelated killing of women and girls”, published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, highlighted that in 2018 female dowry deaths account for 40 to 50 percent of all female homicides recorded annually in India. The dismal truth is that from the period 1999 to 2016, these figures have remained constant. In fact, the latest data furnished by the National Crime Records Bureau indicates that in 2019 itself, 7115 cases were registered under Section 304 - B, IPC alone. 14. Considering the significance of such a legislation, a strict interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was 10 enacted. Therefore, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature used the words, “soon before” they did not mean “immediately before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the courts. The factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite varied, as it can range from physical, verbal or even emotional. This list is certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore be laid down by this Court to define what exacts the phrase “soon before” entails. The aforesaid position was emphasized by this Court, in the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, wherein the three- Judge Bench held that: “15. … “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any timelimit. … In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the
1 INTERA DEPARTMENT MOOT COURT COMPETITION deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. …. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be 11 proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough.” (emphasis supplied) A similar view was taken by this Court in Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477. 15. Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if the period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the victim would come within the term “soon before”. What is pivotal to the above determination, is the establishment of a “proximate and live link” between the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim.
- When the prosecution shows that ‘soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry’, a presumption of causation arises against the accused under Section 113 - B of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the accused has 12 to rebut this statutory presumption. Section 113B, Evidence Act reads as under: “113B. Presumption as to dowry death—When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation. For the purpose of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)” 17. This Court, in the case of Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana, (2011) 11 SCC 359, emphasized the mandatory application of the presumption under Section 113 B of the Evidence Act once the ingredients of Section 304 - B of IPC stood proved: “19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its wisdom has used the word ‘shall’ thus, making a mandatory application on the part of the court to presume that death had been committed by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry. … 13 Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section 113 B relatable to Section 304 B IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. … 20. Therefore, in case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death.” (emphasis supplied) 18. Therefore, once all the essential ingredients are established by the prosecution, the presumption under Section 113 B, Evidence Act mandatorily operates against the accused. This presumption of causality that arises can be rebutted by the accused. 19. The usage of rebuttable presumption of causality, under Section 113 B, Evidence Act, creates a greater responsibility on Judges, defense and prosecution. They need to be extra careful during conducting criminal trials relating to Section 304 B, IPC. In order to address this precarious situation, procedural law has some safeguards, which merits mentioning herein. 14 20. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement of an accused under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This provision incorporates
1 INTERA DEPARTMENT MOOT COURT COMPETITION dowry. Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific demand of a scooter. Pursuant to this disclosure, she was brought back to her paternal house where this fact was disclosed to father of the deceased (P.W.6). It is pertinent to 18 note that, only a month prior to her death, the deceased had returned to her matrimonial house. However, the accused still used to harass the deceased for dowry. The aforesaid fact was revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to visit him. 27. It must be emphasized herein that, just a week before the death, on the occasion of Teej festival, another brother of the deceased (P.W.10) had visited her while she was in her matrimonial home. The deceased had reiterated her plight to her brother. Thereafter, on 31.07.1995, the father of the deceased was informed by some villagers that his daughter has been admitted in the hospital. Upon reaching, the father discovered that the deceased succumbed to burn injuries. The aforesaid chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry and the death of the deceased. The Trial Court, and the High Court, upon a close appreciation of the aforesaid witnesses came to the conclusion that the statements were corroborative and consistent. They found the witnesses to be reliable and on 19 the basis of the same held that the deceased was subjected to cruelty soon before her death as she failed to bring sufficient dowry. We are in complete agreement with the aforesaid finding of the Trial Court and the High Court. 28. From the above analysis, it is clear that the prosecution was able to successfully prove that the death of the deceased due to burn injuries took place within approximately one year of her marriage. It has further been proved that soon before her death she was subjected to harassment and cruelty pursuant to demands of dowry. Since the ingredients of Section 304 - B, IPC stand satisfied, the presumption under 113 B, Evidence Act operates against the appellants, who are deemed to have caused the offence specified under Section 304 B of IPC. 29. The burden therefore shifts on the accused to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The counsel for the appellants has canvassed before us that it was a case of accidental death, and hence no liability can be fixed upon them. However, in the present case, the accused persons failed to place any evidence 20 on record to prove that the death was accidental or unconnected with the accused persons. 30. Here, it ought to be noted that, according to the evidence of the doctor, the entire body of the deceased was doused with kerosene oil. Therefore, the possibility of an accident can be safely ruled out. As the Trial Court concluded: “All these circumstances go to prove that either deceased committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body or she was burnt by sprinkling kerosene on her body either by the accused or by somebody else and the plea of accident tried to be made out by the learned counsel for the accused, is not at all proved.” 31. Therefore, the presumption adumbrated in Section 113 B, Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has not been rebutted by the accusedappellants herein. The appellants have failed to make out a case for us to interfere in the concurrent opinions of the Courts below, convicting the accusedappellants under Section 304 - B, IPC. ISSUE II 21 32. Apart from their conviction under Section 304 B, IPC, the appellants have also additionally challenged their conviction under Section 306, IPC. Section 306, IPC relates to the abetment of suicide and is extracted below:
1 INTERA DEPARTMENT MOOT COURT COMPETITION “306. Abetment of suicide. —If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 33. A bare reading of the provision indicates that for the offence under Section 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed. Secondly, the prosecution must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same. With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113 A, Evidence Act creates a presumption against the husband and/or his relative with respect to the abetment of suicide of a married woman, under certain conditions. Not going into the other conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has 22 been established by the prosecution first. The necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306, I.P.C. were considered by this court in Wazir Chand v. State of Haryana, (1989) 1 SCC 244, wherein this Court held that: “5. …Reading Sections 306 and 307 (sic 107) together it is clear that if any person instigates any other person to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation the other person commits suicide, the person causing the instigation is liable to be punished under Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860 for abetting the commission of suicide. A plain reading of this provision shows that before a person can be convicted of abetting the suicide of any other person, it must be established that such other person committed suicide.” (emphasis supplied) 34. In the present case, the Trial Court and the High Court have concluded that the deceased committed suicide. However, we are of the considered opinion that the conclusion reached by the Courts below is based on assumptions, as there is no evidence on record to support the same. The reasoning of the Trial Court in this regard is as follows: 23 “Further, there is no direct evidence having been adduced by the prosecution the (sic) any of the accused caused death by sprinkling kerosene on the body of the deceased, the only possibility is that Meena Kumari put an end to her life by sprinkling kerosene on her body.” 35. In light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to prove the factum of suicide beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption under Section 113 A, Evidence Act, is not of much help for the prosecution. The essential ingredient of deceased committing suicide has not been proved by the prosecution by adducing sufficient evidence. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due to suicide. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the finding of the Courts below convicting the appellants under Section 306, IPC merits interference by this Cour