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Case analysis of Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee, Study Guides, Projects, Research of Property Law

O.P. Jindal UniversityProperty Law

The document analyses the case and reflects on it as per its facts and findings.

Typology: Study Guides, Projects, Research

2020/2021

Available from 07/01/2023

shriya-tandon
shriya-tandon 🇮🇳

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VALIDITY OF NOTICE UNDER SECTION 106 OF TPA
(Case Reflection on Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee)
Shriya Tandon; 21011557
Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee [(1988) 2 SCC 199] is the subsequent case of Amal
Kumar Banerjee v. Sm. Santi Devi (1977 SCC OnLine Cal 147), which sheds light on a different
purview regarding the application of Section 106 and Section 111 (a) of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882. The facts of the case are as follows: By a lease agreement dated March
19, 1956, the appellant, who was the plaintiff, granted the respondent-defendant a four-year
lease with a covenant of two renewals for a term of three years each on a movie theatre called
“Shanti House” located in Sainthia, Anchal Panchayat, district Birbhum. The defendant was
required to get a license before the lease of this movie theatre could begin. On May 2, 1970,
the plaintiff filed a lawsuit for ejectment on the grounds that the lease had run out by effluxion
of time and, alternatively, claimed that he had sent the defendant a notice dated April 3, 1970,
determining the tenancy with the end of April 1970, to both of his addresses in Calcutta and
Sainthia.
The defendant disputed the plaintiff’s claim in the precedent case, Amal Kumar Banerjee v.
Sm. Santi Devi, on several grounds. The defendant argued that he had not received any
registered notification, unlike what the plaintiff previously claimed. Given these
circumstances, it was required of the plaintiff to prove through substantial evidence that the
registered letters were delivered to the defendant. In other words, the defendant argued, inter
alia, that because he had not received a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, the lawsuit could not be upheld. However, the learned attorney for the plaintiff raised an
extremely persuasive presumption that the registered letters were delivered to the defendant
and that the learned courts below were correct in rejecting the defendant's contention. The
defendant’s simple denial that he was not provided with the correspondence cannot rebut the
presumption.
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VALIDITY OF NOTICE UNDER SECTION 106 OF TPA

(Case Reflection on Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee) Shriya Tandon; 21011557 Smt. Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar Banerjee [(1988) 2 SCC 199] is the subsequent case of Amal Kumar Banerjee v. Sm. Santi Devi (1977 SCC OnLine Cal 147) , which sheds light on a different purview regarding the application of Section 106 and Section 111 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The facts of the case are as follows: By a lease agreement dated March 19, 1956, the appellant, who was the plaintiff, granted the respondent-defendant a four-year lease with a covenant of two renewals for a term of three years each on a movie theatre called “Shanti House” located in Sainthia, Anchal Panchayat, district Birbhum. The defendant was required to get a license before the lease of this movie theatre could begin. On May 2, 1970, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit for ejectment on the grounds that the lease had run out by effluxion of time and, alternatively, claimed that he had sent the defendant a notice dated April 3, 1970, determining the tenancy with the end of April 1970, to both of his addresses in Calcutta and Sainthia. The defendant disputed the plaintiff’s claim in the precedent case, Amal Kumar Banerjee v. Sm. Santi Devi , on several grounds. The defendant argued that he had not received any registered notification, unlike what the plaintiff previously claimed. Given these circumstances, it was required of the plaintiff to prove through substantial evidence that the registered letters were delivered to the defendant. In other words, the defendant argued, inter alia, that because he had not received a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the lawsuit could not be upheld. However, the learned attorney for the plaintiff raised an extremely persuasive presumption that the registered letters were delivered to the defendant and that the learned courts below were correct in rejecting the defendant's contention. The defendant’s simple denial that he was not provided with the correspondence cannot rebut the presumption.

Without delving into the debate over whether or not such notice was required, the High Court and the courts below focused solely on the issue of whether any legitimate quit notice had been issued to the defendant. Both the learned Subordinate Judge and the learned District Judge supported the plaintiff’s assertion that the lease had been properly determined by the issuance of a quit notice to the defendant, and as a result, they decided his case. The plaintiff’s ejectment lawsuit, however, was ruled to be unmaintainable by the High Court, which overturned that decision and stated that it had not been proven that the defendant had received a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Consequentially an appeal was filed to the Supreme Court by the plaintiff, and the issue of whether the plaintiff's suit for ejectment was not maintainable without notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 18821 , was raised. In the cited case, the Supreme Court determined that because the lease had a defined period, it expired by efflux of time, and no prior notification was required. I agree with this statement given by the Apex Court. The term ‘lease’ is wide enough to include all kinds of leases, one of them being leases for a definite term. Such leases are exempt from the provisions of Section 106 of the Act, for therein exists a contract to the contrary, within the meaning of this section, may well be implied. Because leases with defined terms automatically expire by efflux of the time specified by them under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, a notice under Section 106 of the same Act is not required to determine such leases^2. A provision in a lease for a fixed period stating that the lessor would end the tenancy in the case of unpaid rent would turn the lease into a monthly tenure. Leases for a set amount of time automatically terminate on the last day of the term under the concept of efflux of time^3 , allowing the lessor to enter without prior notice or other formality. Because a lease is a transfer of an estate of inheritance in these circumstances, even the death of the original lessee does not result in the termination (^1) “Shanti Devi v. Amal Kumar AIR 1981 SC 1550 23” ( Trace Your Case ) <https://traceyourcase.com/shanti-devi- v-amal-kumar-air- 1981 - sc- 1550 - 23%EF%BF%BC/> accessed April 10, 2023 (^2) Manupatra, “Shanti Devi vs. Amal Kumar Banerjee [MANU/SC/0536/1981]” ( Manupatra ) https://www.manupatrafast.com/ accessed April 9, 2023. (^3) Ibid, footnote 1.

of time under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, and that the Defendants were tenants at sufferance and that no quit notice was necessary. The Court continued that though it is undoubtedly true that where a lease has a set duration, it expires by the efflux of time under Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, and the former tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance , but in this instance, that is not the case. The legal position remained unchallenged, and it was fairly acknowledged that the Defendants were tenants holding over under Section 116 of the Act on a monthly basis. In addition, no notice under Section 106 was served on the defendants. That being so, the suit for ejectment filed by the Plaintiffs was deemed not maintainable. The aforementioned case further supports the main argument of this, i.e., the plaintiff’s suit for ejectment without notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, is maintainable since the lease in question was of a definite term. From the above case reflection, I draw the conclusion that a lease that has a predetermined expiration date terminates in line with Section 111(a) of the Transfer of Property Act owing to the efflux of time. Therefore, a notification under Section 106 of the Act, is not required to be given. The key takeaway from the judgment is that first, the applicability of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should be decided before we decide upon the validity of the notice which is being served under it^4. (^4) Sri KM Manjunath versus Sri Erappa G Dead Through Lrs (Supreme Court)