Anomie Final Draft, Thesis of Sociology

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Anomie: Concept, Theory, Research Promise

Max Coleman Oberlin College Sociology Department Senior Honors Thesis April 2014

Table of Contents

• Dedication and Acknowledgements
• Abstract
  • Introduction I. What Is Anomie?
  • Anomie in The Division of Labor
  • Anomie in Suicide
  • Debate: The Causes of Desire
    • A Sidenote on Dualism and Neuroplasticity
  • Merton vs. Durkheim
  • Critiques of Anomie Theory
    • Functionalist?
    • Totalitarian?
    • Subjective?
    • Teleological?
    • Positivist?
    • Inconsistent?
    • Methodologically Unsound?
    • Sexist?
    • Overly Biological?
    • Identical to Egoism?
    • In Conclusion
  • The Decline of Anomie Theory
  • The Anomic Nation II. Why Anomie Still Matters
    • Anomie in American History
    • Anomie in Contemporary American Society
  • Mental Health
    • Anxiety
    • Conclusions
  • Soldier Suicide
  • School Shootings
• III. Looking Forward: The Solution to Anomie
  • Sociology as a Guiding Force
  • Gemeinschaft Within Gesellschaft
  • The Religion of Humanity
• Final Thoughts
• Bibliography

Abstract:

The term anomie has declined in the sociology literature. Apart from brief mentions, it has not featured in the American Sociological Review for sixteen years. Moreover, the term has narrowed and is now used almost exclusively to discuss deviance. This project explores Durkheim’s original use of the term, and whether modifications of his work—by Merton, Parsons, and others—are useful or muddling. We also present critiques of the term, evaluating them in light of Durkheim’s intentions. Possible explanations for the decline of anomie theory are given, including academic explanations (e.g., classical sociology was replaced by newer theories like symbolic interactionism) and political explanations (e.g., Durkheim’s functionalism became too “conservative” for the New Left). Finally, we argue that the United States is a highly anomic nation, with its focus on freedom, eternal striving, and self-advancement. We apply a Durkheimian perspective to contemporary issues like mental illness, exploring rising rates of depression, anxiety, and suicide as a consequence of these anomic conditions.

Freedom, however, is not the last word. Freedom is only part of the story and half of the truth. Freedom is but the negative aspect of the whole phenomenon whose positive aspect is responsibleness. In fact, freedom is in danger of degenerating into mere arbitrariness unless it is lived in terms of responsibleness. —Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning Let us even recognize that in a general way liberty is a delicate instrument which one must learn to handle; and let us train our children accordingly. —Émile Durkheim, “Individualism and the Intellectuals”

tome all its own. This bizarre quotation illustrates how contentious anomie has become—at once magical and marginal, at times the “sociological concept par excellence ” and at times an elder on its deathbed. Anomie is a very old term. The word entered the English language in 1591, and in the next century became associated with a “disregard for divine law” (Midgley 1971: 37). Émile Durkheim himself became familiar with the term through philosopher Jean Marie Guyau, but “after reviewing Guyau’s work, Durkheim coined his own definition of anomie in exact opposition to Guyau’s” (Orrù 1990: 232). After a period of disuse, the term resurfaced in the 1930s in the works of Elton Mayo, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton. The 1950s saw a heavy backlash against anomie theory, since it was associated with functionalism and therefore seen as conservative. But the term revived itself, again, in the work of criminologists and psychologists, who used anomie to explain deviance and “disaffection,” respectively (Borgatta & Montgomery 2000: 165). Today, even those passionate movements are beginning to dissipate: the word has seen fewer and fewer mentions every year since 1993. 1 Besnard’s death sentence may be entirely superfluous; anomie theory is dying of its own accord. But as I will argue throughout this paper, anomie itself has only continued to rise. In the United States, where limitlessness is a cardinal virtue, rates of depression and anxiety have reached unprecedented heights. As the sociologist Jean Twenge observes, major depression has increased tenfold in the past century: only 1–2 percent of people born before 1915 in the U.S. had a major depressive episode; that number is 15–20 percent today (Twenge 2006: 105). In fact, the United States now has the highest depression rate in the world.^2 Anxiety disorders are even (^1) Google Books Ngram Viewer, English language search. (^2) “Mild and Bitter” (2009). The Economist. http://www.economist.com/node/

more prevalent: affecting 40 million Americans (18 percent of the U.S. population), they constitute the most common mental illness in the nation. 3 Anomie affects not only our mental health, but our behavior: as we shall see, rates of mass shootings, soldier suicides, and other disturbing practices are on the rise. While social constraint produces “happiness and moral health,” as Durkheim argued^4 , the anomic condition leads to a great deal of avoidable suffering. It is my contention that anomie theory is declining at the precise moment it is most needed. Put another way, the term is losing its place in the literature just when its explanatory power is greatest. Indeed, I worry that as anomie worsens in the United States, anomie theory — which presupposes a critique of freedom and individualism—will become increasingly unpopular. Ideas, as Marx would have it, are tied to dominant ideologies; as the cult of the individual gains strength, it is sure to infect academia as well as popular culture. The goal of this paper is to revive anomie theory. Barring this lofty feat, I hope to at least suggest some contemporary uses for the term, including (as I have already said) mental illness, school shootings, and soldier suicide. I will begin with Émile Durkheim’s description of anomie—focusing particularly on The Division of Labor in Society (1893) and Suicide (1897). After this close reading, I will consider expansions of the term, especially Robert Merton’s famous essay, “Social Structure and Anomie” (1938). I will also consider critiques of anomie theory, evaluating them in light of Durkheim’s original analysis. Finally, I will explore why the term has declined, why it is still useful, and how it can be revived. I will end with Durkheim’s own solutions to the anomic crisis. (^3) Anxiety and Depression Association of America, Facts & Statistics: http://www.adaa.org/about-adaa/press- room/facts-statistics. (^4) Cited in Lukes 1977: 83

The anomic division of labor, Ritzer and Goodman (2004: 173) explain, “refers to the lack of regulation in a society that celebrates isolated individuality and refrains from telling people what they should do.” This must be stressed: anomie is not merely a lack of group identity (egoism), but the insufficient sense of constraint that results. For as Durkheim emphasizes, groups share not only a sense of purpose but a sense of mutual dependence, which restrains their desire and develops in them “a taste for altruism”, a “forgetfulness of self and sacrifice” (1893/1997: xxxiv). The anomic division of labor is one of the “pathological” forms of modernization; that is, it is not a normal result of specialization but an unfortunate malady that sometimes occurs. On the whole, the division of labor is a desirable process: it leads to a sense of empowered individualism, where each can pursue his passions and develop his talents (Durkheim 1898/1973).^6 Those who claim Durkheim was “regressive” or anti-modern must take note of this blatant praise of modernity. “In the main body of this work,” he writes, we have been especially concerned to demonstrate that the division of labor can bear no responsibility for this [anomic] state of affairs, a charge that has sometimes unjustly been leveled against it. Nor does that division necessarily produce fragmentation and lack of coherence. Indeed, when its functions are sufficiently linked together they tend of their own accord to achieve an equilibrium, becoming self-regulatory (1893/1997: xxxiv, emphasis added). While the division of labor sometimes produces anomie, this is not an inevitable result, but an aberration.^7 Yet we have not properly examined what anomie is. “Anomie is prevalent,” Steven Lukes writes, “because of the rapid growth of the market and big industry, for since ‘these changes have been accomplished with extreme rapidity, the interests in conflict have not yet had time to be equilibrated’; also there is the harmful existence of ‘the still very great (^6) This notion of specialization is not unlike that of Marx, who saw in the “kingdom of freedom” a highly individuated society. (^7) Even so, Durkheim admits that “the division of labour, by its very nature, may therefore exert a dissolving influence.” But he clarifies that specialization “is both useful and necessary” and we should not “return societies to what [Comte] calls the age of generality... that state of indistinctiveness and homogeneity that was their point of departure” (1893/1997: 295).

inequality in the external conditions of the struggle’” (Lukes 1977: 79, citing Durkheim). Here we can see anomie’s economic character: as modernization progresses, and more and more of society is subsumed under the economic sphere, constraints on individual desire become insufficient. External circumstances—wealth, industry, technology—are advancing at a startling rate, and social forces cannot keep up. Thus “anomie is due to a lag in growth of the relevant rules and institutions” (Lukes 1977: 80). This concept is not elaborated until Durkheim’s Suicide, but the basic notion is that when economic change outpaces the rate of social change, desires are not properly constrained by society. An individual who gains (or loses) a tremendous amount of money is beset with new desires, but society can no longer rein in those desires. Thus the individual feels a sense of moral confusion , not knowing how to properly behave in society. The suffering the individual experiences is twofold: first, one is given the means to achieve new desires, so expectations dramatically increase. Since not all of these desires can be satisfied, a sense of frustration and anxiety results. Second, the individual lacks moral direction; she is forced to pursue a “chaotic utilitarian calculus” 8 that seeks to maximize pleasure. It is the latter understanding that most theorists emphasize, which is why anomie is often translated as “normlessness” or “aimlessness.” The common refrain among American college students— What am I going to do with my life? —is indicative of this aimlessness. Such a question is not merely an existential quandary, but (as Durkheim believes) a failure of society to provide proper constraint for individuals. I say constraint , and not guidance , because anomie is above all a moral concern. It is not that society should tell us what to do^9 , but rather, that it should tell us what we must not do: it must constrain our desires. The “aimlessness” of (^8) This is a paraphrase of Merton 1938: 185. (^9) Historically speaking, this is an evolution: while premodern societies typically assigned functions to individuals (serf, priest, feudal lord), modernity in Durkheim’s conception requires that individuals pursue their own passions. If their roles are merely assigned, they will experience not anomie but its opposite: the “forced division of labor.”

Anomie in Suicide

In The Division of Labor , we observed, Durkheim “treats anomie as a consequence of economic upheaval, people not knowing what rules apply across the business cycle of boom- bust-boom-bust” (Sennett 2006: xix). But in Suicide, the concept becomes far more philosophical. Here, Durkheim grounds his argument in an ontological claim about human nature. We are, Durkheim argues, vessels of endless desire. Unique among beings, we are blessed with tremendous intellect, but that blessing is also our downfall. “When the hole that life has dug out of its resources is filled,” the animal is satisfied and asks for nothing more,” Durkheim writes (1897/2006: 269). Animals, being simple creatures, have simple needs—their flourishing depends on “purely material conditions.” We do not have that luxury: “most of [man’s] needs are not (or at least not to the same degree) dependent on his body” (1897/2006: 269). Here Durkheim’s argument differs from Freudian id —for desire is not merely biological, but a product of intellect. “Human intelligence is more aware and can suggest better conditions which appear as desirable ends and inspire activity” (1897/2006: 270). It is not our “drives” that produce desire, but our capacity for imagination: “Beyond the pleasures that we have experienced, we imagine and yearn for others, and if one should happen to have more or less exhausted the realm of the possible, one dreams of the impossible – one thirsts for what is not” (1897/2006: 299).^11 There is nothing wrong with imagination, Durkheim writes. Indeed, it is the “spirit of progress” that drives society forward (cited in Meštrović 1988 b: 543). Yet even in the best of (^11) To give a concrete example: Later in the chapter, Durkheim notes that sexual desire is very complex in humans. It is not merely about satisfying bodily needs, as it is for most animals. “Though this natural urge may have been the germ of all sexual evolution, it has been progressively complicated by many varied aesthetic and moral feelings and is now only the least element in the complete and densely woven process to which it has given rise. On contact with these intellectual elements, it was itself partly freed from the body and, as it were, intellectualized” (1897/2006: 298, emphasis added).

circumstances, not all of our desires can be achieved. This is the curse of imagination—we are drawn toward goals that cannot possibly be fulfilled, and we suffer as a result. In a passage reminiscent of Buddhist philosophy, Durkheim writes: No living person can be happy or even live at all unless his needs are sufficiently well adjusted to his means. In other words, if he demands more than can be provided for him, or even something other than can be provided, he will be constantly irritated and unable to function without suffering. And an action that cannot be accomplished without suffering tends not to be repeated. Aptitudes that are not satisfied atrophy and, since the aptitude for life is only the result of all the rest, it is bound to weaken if the others also slacken (1897/2006: 269). To be sure, Durkheim reasons, most of us will accept “that appetites of this kind will sooner or later encounter a limit that they cannot pass.” But where is this limit located? “How can one assess the amount of well-being, comfort and luxury that a human being can legitimately seek? Neither in the organic make-up nor in the psychological make-up of the human being is there anything that marks the limit of such desires” (1897/200 6 : 270). The individual may experience wondrous flights of imagination. But there is no mechanism that can shut imagination down. Our intellect brings us ever greater possibilities, ever higher horizons, until suddenly we wake from our illusions and begin a headlong plummet downward. “It is not human nature that can set the variable limit to these needs that they demand,” Durkheim warns. “Consequently, to the extent that they depend solely on the individual, they are limitless. In itself, setting aside any external power that governs it, our sensibility is a bottomless abyss that nothing can fill” (1897/2006: 270, emphasis added). Individuals cannot self-regulate. Instead, they require the discipline of “an authority that they respect and before which they spontaneously bow.” That authority, Durkheim writes, is society. Society is “the only moral power superior to the individual whose superiority the

Anomie is often translated as “normlessness,” and this point is somewhat misleading. While it is true that acute anomie—which emerges from a sudden change in social state—may produce a disruption in norms, this is not true of chronic anomie. In some nations (especially, as I will argue, the United States), norms and values do exist, and they have quite a grip on society. But they are not what Durkheim called “social facts”: they do not provide moral constraints on individual will. Indeed, they may do the opposite. The emphasis of Western democratic nations on liberty, choice, and opportunity is a very real cultural phenomenon. But these values do not constrain individual will; they encourage it, and in doing so, they foster anomie. It is the absence of social facts specifically, not norms and values generally, that produces the anomic condition. Indeed, as we shall see, this is the primary difference between anomie and egoism: both entail poor integration, but the former implies poor regulation as well. If there is any simple definition of anomie, this is it: the suffering caused by unrestrained desire. Everything else follows from this principle. All the symptoms of anomie—anxiety, weariness, disenchantment, unease, agitation, discontent, and groping, as Durkheim variously wrote—are linked to “frustrations of desire.”^13 It is baffling to me that most sociologists fail to make this connection—instead, they describe the “lawlessness” of the anomic condition, or the breakdown of community, or the collapse of social order. But as Stjepan Meštrović reminds us, “anomie has meaning precisely in the fact that the incorrect arrangement of social representations produces distressing psychological symptoms which eventually produce physical, organismic pain” (1987: 571). It is desire that is painful—specifically, the overflow of desire that social facts have not properly constrained. When this desire becomes overwhelming, it leads us to take our own lives. (^13) This term is borrowed from the philosopher Peter Carruthers, who uses it in a very different context (Carruthers 2005: 167).

Anomic suicide is thus the most dramatic example of the anomic condition—it is anomie taken to its furthest personal extreme (Sennett 2006: xix). While I do not wish to discredit the role of suicide in Durkheim’s work, it must be seen as only one point along the spectrum of anomie, an anomie which nearly everyone experiences. By normalizing anomie in this way, I hope to emphasize that suicide is not the pathological tendency of sick individuals^14 , but a gradual weakening of the “aptitude for life” (Durkheim 1897/2006: 269). Durkheim’s emphasis on suicide was, it must be remembered, a strategic choice. Ever the social realist, Durkheim devoted his life to legitimizing sociology as a discipline. If he could show that even suicide—the most personal, private act available to human beings—had a social etiology, he would prove that society existed as a concrete force: “Sociological method, as we practice it, rests wholly on the basis that social facts must be studied as things; that is, as realities external to the individual. There is no principle for which we have received more criticism; but none is more fundamental” (cited in Nisbet 1974: 45). As we explore anomic suicide, keep in mind that Durkheim’s discussion is far broader than the act of taking one’s life. The observations in this chapter can be applied not only to economic and domestic suicide, but to a miscellany of factors that strengthen the anomic condition. Do not be fooled: suicide is merely the mask through which all anomic suffering is presented.^15 Durkheim begins his chapter with an analysis of economic crises. To be sure, he says, economic downturns cause suffering and increase the suicide rate. But they do not do so for the reason we suppose. It is not that life becomes more difficult during an economic crisis, but rather (^14) It is pathological, but the pathology is social, not individual. My point in making this distinction is to place blame on society rather than the individual psyche. (^15) Another important point: though anomie is difficult to measure, suicide rates provide a clear and consistent metric for which data is available. They are not , of course, the only symptom of anomie.

analyzing the relationship between income and suicide.^17 Making what is today one of his most famous claims, Durkheim writes: “One might even say that poverty protects” (1897/2006: 267). If anomie is caused by unchained desire, Durkheim reasons, it will be particularly prevalent among the wealthy. “Wealth... by the powers that it confers, gives us the illusion that we depend only on ourselves. By lessening the resistance that things put in our way, it persuades us that they can be constantly overcome. And, the less one feels limited, the more intolerable any limitation becomes” (1897/2006: 278). But the poor do not face this problem: their desires are already constrained by external circumstances—i.e., the inability to meet basic needs. The analysis then becomes rather muddled—it is unclear whether Durkheim is describing chronic or acute anomie when he says: “So little is it the case that a rise in poverty leads to a rise in suicide that even fortunate crises, the effect of which is rapidly to increase a country’s prosperity, act on suicide in the same way as economic disasters” (1897/2006: 264). A rise in poverty should lead to suicide, by Durkheim’s own argument, since it is a sudden change in social state. Granted, that newfound poverty may “protect” once the individual becomes used to it, but the transition will cause suicide for some. It seems Durkheim is conflating chronic and acute anomie here. Nonetheless, Durkheim’s economic observations are otherwise clear, and can be divided into two claims. First, sudden economic change produces anomie, whether that change is “fortunate” or not, because it disrupts social constraints. (This is the “acute” argument.) Second, wealth increases the risk of anomie, since (a) desires are more easily satisfied—and therefore the imagination grows and (b) the individual is accustomed to satisfaction, and cannot cope with frustrations of desire when they arise. (This is the “chronic” argument.) (^17) Chronic anomie is simply structural anomie—the suffering caused by a society that perennially fails to constrain desire. Acute anomie, meanwhile, is caused by a sudden change in social state, where constraints are torn asunder.

Durkheim then explores the history of constraint, linking the decline of feudalism to a change in social hierarchy. Whereas birth formerly determined one’s status, “inherited wealth [and] merit” are now responsible (1897/2006: 274). It is not who you are, the old adage goes, but what you do. Yet as Tocqueville also observed, the emphasis on equality has obscured the need for constraint. Real meritocracy does not exist—“intelligence, taste, scientific, artistic, literary and industrial worth, courage and manual dexterity” are randomly distributed—but we believe that it does (1897/2006: 275). So it becomes difficult for individuals to accept moral authority: each of us strives to be “equal” to the most affluent, the most prestigious, the most powerful. “A spirit of anxiety and discontent is latent, and appetites which are only superficially contained break out” (1897/2006: 275). Equality is necessary, Durkheim warns, but also dangerous, and must be approached with caution.^18 We will explore Durkheim’s approach to justice later in this work. 19 For now, let us turn to Durkheim’s discussion of domestic, or “conjugal” suicide. “What is marriage?” Durkheim asks, and then answers the question: “A regulation of sexual relations which extends beyond the physical instincts involved in such intercourse” (1897/2006: 298). Marriage provides “a rigorously defined object for the need to love,” and shuts off the possibility of other partners (1897/2006: 299). In young adulthood, men^20 may benefit from an unconstrained state—to force them into an early marriage would be to “pitilessly (^18) In addition to Tocqueville, Friedrich Nietzsche also makes this point. In The Birth of Tragedy , he writes: People should not be surprised when the fruits of this optimism ripen, when a society that has been thoroughly leavened with this kind of culture, right down to the lowest levels, gradually starts trembling in an extravagant turmoil of desires, when the belief in earthly happiness for everyone, when faith in the possibility of such a universal knowledge culture gradually changes into the threatening demand for such an Alexandrian earthly happiness, into the invocation of a Euripidean deus ex machina! (1872/1999: 58). (^19) See my “Critiques of Anomie Theory.” (^20) Durkheim is very clear: domestic anomie is chiefly a problem for men, not women. Durkheim believes that women have fewer sexual desires than men because they are insufficiently socialized; thus, domestic anomie is less a concern for them. We will discuss this observation in the “critiques” section.