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‘different sides of the same coin.’ Instead of diametrically opposed, they advanced largely similar ideas that operate within degrees of contradiction. Those apparent degrees of contradiction are the result of their different starting point of analysis. The Art of War approaches the subject of war at the grand strategy level. On War focuses the analysis mainly at the strategic-operational realm, at the point where diplomacy has failed and fighting is unavoidable.^2 While both authors are generally in agreement of war at the strategic level, they differed in the conduct of war at the operational level, with the apparent contradiction in views on the utility of intelligence and deception in war, most pronounced. We will examine the two works in the areas of 1). definition of
INTRODUCTION
Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Clausewitz’s On War are the most studied philosophies on war and strategy. These two texts were written in eras more than 2,000 years apart; technologically, the Art of War was written in an era of arrows, swords and cavalry whereas On War was written in an era of gunpowder, rifles and railroads. Culturally, one was written in the East and the other, in the West. Given the divergent historical, cultural and technological contexts, analysts have often positioned these two works as diametrically opposed works on the subject of war and strategy.^1
This essay argues that these two works are not significantly different and they describe essentially
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A Study of Sun Tzu’s Art of War and
Clausewitz’s On War
by LTC Ong Cher Howe
Abstract:
Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are both known to be most recognised and proficient writers on the subject of war and strategies. Although they wrote in different times and were from different backgrounds, their philosophies on war and strategy are still proven to be extremely helpful and effective in current times. This essay serves to compare both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz’s famous texts written on the subject of war: Art of War and On War , as well as prove how both works are not extremely different even when they were written in a divergent, historical, cultural and technological context. Instead, what both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz tried to express were not diametrically opposed. Hence, any contradiction arises from their own slightly unique points of analysis. While both of them defined war as means to rational policy ends, they were both well aware of the power of moral influence and the paradoxical trinity. This essay also studies how both their works can be applied to today’s military applications despite the advanced technology of the modern era.
Keywords: Government, People, Philosophy, Technology, Doctrine, Law
war; 2). the meaning of victory and 3). their solutions to the complexity and friction of war.
Although these two texts were written many centuries ago, many of the key concepts on war continue to remain relevant. While the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has created high tech weapons that now kill with greater speed, precision and lethality, the nature of modern war remains fundamentally the same. That is, “a collision of two living forces, with each seeking to impose his will on the other.” This will be discussed in the context of wars post World War II (WWII).
DIFFERENT SIDES OF THE SAME COIN
Defining War The ability of a nation to wage war determines her ability to survive and prosper. Both strategists lived through eras where the use of force was the norm and this seriousness on the topic of war weighed heavily on their minds. Both were unanimously clear that understanding the phenomenon of war was paramount to the survival of a nation. 3 Force as a Means to Attain Policy Ends Clausewitz defined war as a duel happening on a larger scale, that “war is thus an act of force to compel
Recognising the high cost of waging wars, especially in the form of loss of human lives and treasure, Sun Tzu takes the view that the acme skill of a master strategist is to be able to win without fighting.
With large off-road tyres and an independent suspension system, the Terrex Infantry Carrier Vehicle can manoeuvre across various types of terrain.
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Cyberpioneer
the bounds of his analysis. Hence while possible, a military strategy of winning without fighting becomes so difficult that Clausewitz sees it as an exception than a norm.^16
Sun Tzu, on the other hand, looked at the level of the grand strategy. He proposed a four-stage strategy of attacking the enemy’s plans, then his alliances, then the armed forces and finally conquering his walled cities.^17 We can clearly see Clausewitz’s start point of strategy making; in Sun Tzu’s view, this is the third order solution—that of eliminating the enemy’s armed forces. Clausewitz would likely agree with Sun Tzu that where possible, the ideal victory of subjugating the enemy without fighting should be sought.^18 However, he recognised the practical difficulties of achieving such victories at the lower strategic-operational realm. Hence his analysis was focused on realisable, concrete military goals, which were identified as the enemy’s armed forces.
Agree on the complexity of war but differ on the panaceas—Detailed Planning, Intelligence and Deception VS Military Genius, Absolute and Relative Superiority
Fundamentally, both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu agreed that the conduct of war was a complex affair consisting of many infinite unknowns.^19 Sun Tzu employed a metaphor of music, colours and flavours to describe this “infinite complexity.”^20
While both strategists unanimously agreed that war is inherently complex, they propose seemingly different solutions. Sun Tzu takes a more deterministic view that the outcome of war can be predicted. He proposes that the three tenets of 1). Detailed planning and assessment;^21 2). Possession of reliable intelligence;^22 and 3). Extensive employment of deception to deceive your opponent is critical to the battlefield success. 23
Conversely, Clausewitz’s concept of friction in war led him to place little faith in the ability of making and successfully implementing detailed war plans. 24 In addition, he regarded intelligence just as another source of friction that had to be managed. In Clausewitz eyes, the only trustable intelligence source comes from the intuition of the military commander. 25
Clausewitz was especially sceptical to the use of deception as it required the commitment of extensive resources with no clear guarantee on the pay-off. Moreover, the use of deception meant less troops and resources at the disposal of the commander for battle at the decisive point. Clausewitz viewed deception as a tool for the weak and should not be the primary choice. 26
It was interesting to note that despite many differences in the conduct of warfare, both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz concluded that defence was the inherently stronger form of warfare.
On that note, Clausewitz proposed an alternative three solutions: 1). the intuition of the military genius, or the coup d’oeil ; 2). possess overwhelming military strength by mobilising the maximum possible amount of resources for the conduct of war; and 3. the ability to gain relative strength at the decisive point despite weaker absolute strength. 27
The apparent disagreement in solving the complexity in war between the two strategists stemmed from the same fact of differing level of analysis. Sun Tzu analysed war from a wider scope, perspective and at the strategic level. 28 At the grand strategy level, intelligence and deception had significantly more value than at the operational level. That provided him with more confidence on its utility,
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whereas Clausewitz was primarily concerned with its
utility at the operational level where due to the fluid battlefield situation, the value of intelligence was
often fleeting and transient.
Seeing Eye-to-Eye on the Offence-Defence Relationship
It was interesting to note that despite many differences in the conduct of warfare, both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz concluded that defence was the inherently stronger form of warfare. 29 Clausewitz noted that:
“…When one has used defensive measures successfully, a more favourable balance of strength is usually created; thus the natural course in war is to begin defensively and end by attacking…”^30
This is comparable to Sun Tzu’s quote:
“...those who are not able to win must defend; those who are able to win must attack; defend when forces and resources are inadequate; attack when forces and resources are more than abundant…”^31
IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN WARFARE IN THIS
AGE OF TECHNOLOGY
Modern Warfare and the RMA
Strachan looked at modern wars from the perspective of the means of fighting. He defined modern wars as those that were “fought with the fruits of industrial revolution and technological innovation.”^32
Modern warfare cannot be adequately discussed about without considering the RMA. RMAs often occur in the wake of confluence of three factors; firstly, ‘technological development’; secondly, ‘doctrinal innovation’ to update the process and tactics; thirdly, ‘organizational adaptation’.^33 Airplanes and tanks were developed in the period just prior and during World War I (WWI). However, it was only two decades later
in WWII that these technological innovations were combined with organisational adaptations by the Germans to advance their new Blitzkrieg doctrine.
For the purposes of this essay, we will examine the impact of Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s philosophies on wars in the post WWII era. Defining ‘Impact’ In T.S Goh’s analysis of Clausewitz’s impact on strategy,^34 he differentiated impact as either ‘influencing’ or ‘direct’. Where the impact was ‘influencing’, it provided a model for evaluating strategy. Where the influence was ‘direct’, it resulted in elements of thoughts from great strategists being translated into specific methods for war. For the purposes of this essay we will focus on the ‘influencing’ component. Evolving the Understanding of War—the Material Realm (of Economy and Technology) Adds Context War in its most primitive form can be described without any reference to the material realm of technology and economy. However, any detailed discussion of war cannot exclude a discussion about the technology of that era. While Sun Tzu did expound on the high cost of raising armies and waging wars on a country’s economy, there was no mention of the influence of technology. 35
In today’s warfare where industrial and technological factors play a critical role, it may be necessary for a paradigm shift in Clausewitz’s description of war to include a ‘material realm’ and for Sun Tzu’s analysis to include technology. The absence of that material consideration will cause failures in seeing new problems and opportunities that may arise.^36 Moreover, the material realm adds context to the discussion of war in that era.
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real time fashion from a command centre thousands of miles away.^44 In this age of technology, with the efficiency of the sensor-shooter loop, the moment you are seen, you will be killed.
This phenomenon has made intelligence and deception a more critical capability than just fiction as described by Clausewitz. Instead of contending with limited information in Clausewitz’s time, the converse is now true. In order to avoid the potential ‘analysis paralysis’ resulting from information overload, 45 the coup de oeil of the commander in discerning intelligence from noise becomes even more compelling.
With the efficiency of the sensor-shooter cycle as well as pervasive and persistent sensors, deception becomes vital to the survival of one’s own forces. Moreover, the sensors provide significantly improved chances of the enemy seeing your battlefield actions. This increases the return on investment on forces committed for the purpose of deception.
A scout trooper awaiting the signal to launch the Skyblade III.
Cyberpioneer
“instrumental in nourishing the connective tissues that bond activists and the citizenry in general.”^41 It has made the will, emotions of the people more evident and powerful in the Clausewitz’s triad.^42 This also reinforced Sun Tzu’s emphasis that any moral influence is the most important factor.
Contemporary wars are largely small scale insurgency wars conducted by non-state actors. Technological advances such as the internet and social media have allowed groups like Al Qaeda to propagate their message, recruit, equip and train their personnel. Technology has enabled these traditionally weaker non-state actors to take on the larger state actors.^43
Deception, Intelligence and Surprise—More of Necessity than Just Mere Friction in this Age of Technology
Technological advancements in surveillance, communications and precision guidance had enabled targets to be engaged with deadly precision in near
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The Myth of Superiority of the Offence over the Defence
Technology has offered the offensive side a markedly improved superiority. Areas such as strategic mobility, persistent 24-7 surveillance by satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and massive long range precision firepower made possible by stealth aircraft, cruise missiles and nuclear weapons. All these contraptions which promised destruction of the enemy in a single decisive blow have made the offensive strategy the seemingly stronger one. That single pre-emptive first strike could literally end any war before it began.
Nuclear weapons, while powerful and promising to annihilate the opponent in a single decisive blow, were never used. The reason was that the ensuing victory was empty and accompanied by the end state of mutually assured destruction. That end state has zero political utility to the victorious side. The employment of nuclear weapons was therefore in its
non-use and deterrence effect.^46 Ironically, this made nuclear weapons to be more of a defensive nature. It is a weapon that makes any potential adversary think thrice before launching against any offensive military campaign.
In the Vietnam War and the recent Afghanistan and Iraq wars against terror, the United States (US) had superior technology and overwhelming firepower. However, in the Vietnam War, they lost the war to the significantly backward Viet Cong in what observers termed “tactical victory, strategic defeat.”^47 In the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, while the US-led forces were able to secure a swift victory in the military combat phase, a decisive victory in the perspective of policy remains elusive till today as the regions continue to be mired in insurgent warfare and instability.
A recurring theme in the wars that were described was that when the technologically superior attacker was up against a determined defender who was neither
Figure 3: Strategic Surprise in Historical Perspective^48
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VERY HIGH
HIGH COMBUSTION ENGINE, TANKS, AIR POWER
PRE INDUSTRIAL AGE RAILWAYS 1870
1914
1939
1945
1950'S
F
E (^)?
D
B A
C
CONVENTIONAL WAR IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS ICBM'S SLBM'S
MECHANIZED WARAIR POWER
MONTHS - WEEKS THE PERIOD AND REDUCTION OF WARNING TIME
WEEKS - DAYS DAYS - HOURS
SLOW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OPEN TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
ACCELERATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, HIGHLY SECRETIVE. BEGINNING OF FAST TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND SECRETIVE TECHNOLOGY
LOW
CHANCES OF ACHIEVING STRATEGIC SURPRISE
It was MacArthur’s policy in the reconstruction of Japan and the Marshall Plan in rebuilding post-war Germany that helped return the world to peace after the Axis powers were defeated.^56
Sun Tzu’s age old mantra of ‘capturing the whole intact’ holds true as we look at the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. While the destruction of the incumbent’s army was swift and decisive in bringing about a regime change with minimal casualties, the US was still mired in re-establishing the very political stability that they destroyed.
CONCLUSION
It is interesting to note that despite living in vastly different eras and cultural contexts, the two
Map of ground operations of Operation Desert Storm (first major global conflict implmenting RMA) from February 24-28 th^ 1991. Shows allied and Iraqi forces. Special arrows indicate the American 101st^ Airborne Division moved by air and where the French 6 th^ Light Division and American 3rd^ Armored Cavalry Regiment provided security.
strategists have framed war in very much the same manner. While both of them defined war as means to rational policy ends, they are very much aware of the power of moral influence and the paradoxical trinity.
The key philosophies proposed by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz are not diametrically opposed and hence not significantly different. The notable differences between the ideas of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz lay in their notions of victory, utility of intelligence, deception and surprise. However, when we analyse deeper, we see that Sun Tzu defined war at the grand strategy level, with more considerations for diplomatic and economic factors. Clausewitz assumed that these factors were already considered and commenced his analysis at the strategic-operational realm, the point
Wikipedia
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where war was imminent. These two treatises on war and strategy should be seen as a continuation of the discussion of war at the grand strategy level in Sun Tzu’s Art of War to the strategic-operational realm in Clausewitz’s On War.
As with all studies of historical texts, the question was the continued relevance of these two strategists in this age of technology. From catapults to cannons to nuclear bombs and cruise missiles, we have seen how technology impacts the way wars are fought. Other than the political and cultural background, wars in any era must be studied with the technology as well. Having said that, the modern day military commander ignores at his peril the effects of technology interacting with the other traditional factors of rational calculus, emotions, chance/uncertainty espoused by the two great strategists.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Belknap, M. H. "The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?" US Army War College , 2002: http://www. carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/02autumn/ belknap.pdf.
Cotton, A. J. "Information Technology - Information Overload for Strategic Leaders." DTIC , 2005: http://www. dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA431929.
Fitzimonds, J. R., & Van Tol, J. M. "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)." DTIC - JFQ , 1994: http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/jfq0604.pdf.
Goh, T. S. "Clausewitz and His Impact on Strategy." _Pointer 25, n.1 , 1999: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/ back/journals/1999/vol25_1/6.htm.
Handel, M. I. "Clausewitz in the Age of Technology." (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited), 1986.
Handel, M. I. "Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared." DTIC , 1991: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/ fulltext/u2/a239084.pdf.
Hooker, R. D. "Beyond Vm Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War." U.S. Army War College , 2005: http://www. carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/articles/05summer/ hooker.pdf.
Howard, M., & Paret, P. (1976). "In Carl Von Clausewitz: On War." (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1976. Papaj, C. J. "Clausewitz and 21st Century Warfare." U.S. Army War College ,2008: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479659. Singer, P. "Essay: The rise of the tactical general." Armed Forces Journal , 2009: http://www.armedforcesjournal. com/2009/06/4036660/. Strachan, H. "Essay and Reflection: On Total War and Modern War." The International History Review 22, n._2 , 2000: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40108371. Tan, E. H. "Technological Competence And Military Professionalism – Decisive Factors In A Modern War?". Pointer 36, n.2, 2010: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/ imindef/publicat ions/pointer/jour nal s/2010/v36n2/ feature5/ jcr_content/imindefPars/0003/file.res/30-40_5. Technological%20Cempetence%20lowres.pdf. Teague, M. "New Media and the Arab Spring." Al Jadid , 2011: http://www.aljadid.com/content/new-media-and-arab- spring. Valensi, C., & Brun, I. "The Revolution in Military Affairs of the 'Other Side'." Yale Macmillian Centre , 2011: http://www. yale.edu/macmillan/fif/publications/OtherSide.pdf. Wee, C.H. "Art of War." (Singapore: Prentice Hall), 2003. Weintraub, S. "American Proconsul: How Douglas MacArthur Shaped Postwar Japan." Weider History Group , 2011: http:// www.historynet.com/american-proconsul-how-douglas- macarthur-shaped-postwar-japan.htm. Zapotoczny, W. S. "Sun Tzu Compared to Clausewitz." Walter S. Zapotoczny Jr. ,2006: http://www.wzaponline.com/ SunTzuClausewitz.pdf.
ENDNOTES
- Zapotoczny, W. S. Sun Tzu Compared to Clausewitz. Walter S. Zapotoczny Jr.,2006. http://www.wzaponline.com/ SunTzuClausewitz.pdf.
- Handel, M. I. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: The Art of War and On War Compared. DTIC, 1991. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/ tr/fulltext/u2/a239084.pdf.
- “…a matter that is of vital importance to the nation. War determines the death or survival of the country...” ( Art of War ). Clausewitz stated “…the fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or
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- Wee, C.H. Art of War. Singapore: Prentice Hall, (2003),
- Handel, M. I. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, (1986),59.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Singer, P. Essay: The rise of the tactical general. Armed Forces Journal, 2009: http://www.armedforcesjournal. com/2009/06/4036660/.
- Belknap, M. H. The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk? US Army War College, 2002: http://www. carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/02autumn/ belknap.pdf.
- Teague, M. New Media and the Arab Spring. Al Jadid, 2011: http://www.aljadid.com/content/new-media-and-arab- spring.
- Belknap, M. H. The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk? US Army War College, 2002: http://www. carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/02autumn/ belknap.pdf.
- Papaj, C. J. Clausewitz and 21st Century Warfare. U.S. Army War College,2008: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479659.
- Cotton, A. J. Information Technology - Information Overload for Strategic Leaders. DTIC, 2005: http://www. dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA431929.
- Ibid.
- Goh, T. S. Clausewitz and His Impact on Strategy. Pointer 25, n._1, 1999: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/ back/journals/1999/vol25_1/6.htm.
- Tan, E. H. Technological Competence And Military Professionalism – Decisive Factors In A Modern War?. Pointer 36, n.2, 2010: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/ content/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2010/ v36n2/feature5/ jcr_content/imindefPars/0003/file. res/30 40_5.Technological%20Cempetence%20lowres. pdf.
- Handel, M. I. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy. London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, (1986),59.
- Goh, T. S. Clausewitz and His Impact on Strategy. Pointer 25, n._1, 1999: http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/ back/journals/1999/vol25_1/6.htm.
- Valensi, C., & Brun, I. The Revolution in Military Affairs of the 'Other Side'. Yale Macmillian Centre, 2011: http:// www.yale.edu/macmillan/fif/publications/OtherSide. pdf.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Clausewitz, C. On War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1832, 54.
- Hooker, R. D. Beyond Vm Kriege: The Character and Conduct of Modern War. U.S. Army War College, 2005: http://www. carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/articles/05summer/ hooker.pdf.
- Weintraub, S. American Proconsul: How Douglas MacArthur Shaped Postwar Japan. Weider History Group, 2011: http://www.historynet.com/american-proconsul-how- douglas-macarthur-shaped-postwar-japan.htm.
LTC Ong Cher Howe is currently the Commanding Officer of 38 th^ Battalion
Singapore Combat Engineers. A Field Engineer Officer by training, he was
formerly the Head of General Staff Branch in Headquarters, Army Combat
Engineers Group and a Weapons Staff Officer in Systems Integration
Office, General Staff (Development).
LTC Ong was a distinguished graduate from the Goh Keng Swee Command
and Staff College. He was a recipient of the SAF Local Study Award and SAF
Postgraduate Scholarship. He holds a Bachelors of Engineering (Second
Class, Upper Honours) in Civil Engineering a Masters of Science in Defence
Technology and Systems from National University of Singapore and a
Masters of Science in Operations Research from the Naval Postgraduate
School. He was also a 2008 winner of the Stephen Tisdale's Award from
the Military Operations Research Society and a winner in the 2013 Chief
of Army Essay award.
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