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Page 1 Instruction 3. 2009 Edition INTENT
INTENT
I. SPECIFIC INTENT
I have already instructed you that one of the things that the
Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that at the time
of the offense the defendant intended to ____________. A person’s intent
is his or her purpose or objective.
This requires you to make a decision about the defendant’s state of
mind at that time. It is obviously impossible to look directly into a person’s
mind. But in our everyday affairs, we often must decide from the actions of
others what their state of mind is. In this case, you may examine the
defendant’s actions and words, and all of the surrounding circumstances,
to help you determine what the defendant’s intent was at that time.
As a general rule, it is reasonable to infer that a person ordinarily
intends the natural and probable consequences of any acts that he does
intentionally. You may draw such an inference, unless there is evidence
that convinces you otherwise.
You should consider all the evidence, and any reasonable inferences
you draw from the evidence, in determining whether the Commonwealth
Instruction 3.120 Page 2 INTENT 2009 Edition
has proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as it must, that the defendant acted
with the intent to ____________.
Specific intent is “a conscious act with the determination of the mind to do an act. It is contemplation rather than reflection and it must precede the act.” Commonwealth v. Nickerson, 388 Mass. 246, 253- 254, 446 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1983). It is a person’s purpose or objective, Commonwealth v. Blow, 370 Mass. 401, 407, 348 N.E.2d 794, 798 (1976), and corresponds loosely with the Model Penal Code term “purpose,” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405, 100 S.Ct. 624, 632 (1980). Specific intent means that “a defendant must not only have consciously intended to take certain actions, but that he also consciously intended certain consequences.” Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 269, 692 N.E.2d 515, 523 (1998). It is usually proved by circumstantial evidence, since there is no way to look directly into a person’s mind. Commonwealth v. Blake, 409 Mass. 146, 150, 564 N.E.2d 1006, 1010 (1991); Commonwealth v. Niziolek, 380 Mass. 513, 528, 404 N.E.2d 643, 651 (1980), habeas corpus denied sub nom. Niziolek v. Ashe, 694 F.2d 282 (1st Cir. 1982); Commonwealth v. Scanlon, 373 Mass. 11, 17-19, 364 N.E.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (1977); Commonwealth v. Sandler, 368 Mass. 729, 741, 335 N.E.2d 903, 911 (1975); Commonwealth v. Eppich, 342 Mass. 487, 493, 174 N.E.2d 31, 34 (1961); Commonwealth v. Ronchetti, 333 Mass. 78, 81, 128 N.E.2d 334, 336 (1955); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 441, 448-449, 300 N.E.2d 443, 448 (1973).
In defining specific intent, “[w]e see no need for a judge to refer to the defendant’s specific intent to do something as an element of a crime. A reference to intent is sufficient.” Commonwealth v. Sires, 413 Mass. 292, 301 n.8, 596 N.E.2d 1018, 1024 n.8 (1992). Nor should a judge define specific intent by contrasting it with “general intent,” in the sense of unconscious or reflex actions. Such noncriminal “general intent” (which differs from criminal general intent, or “scienter”) does not refer to any mental state which is required for the conviction of a crime, and its use in a specific intent definition is “unnecessary and confusing.” Commonwealth v. Sibinich, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 246, 249 nn.1&2, 598 N.E.2d 673, 675 nn.1&2 (1992).
The judge may properly charge that the jury may draw a permissive inference that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of acts knowingly done. Commonwealth v. Doucette, 391 Mass. 443, 450-452, 462 N.E.2d 1084, 1093 (1984); Commonwealth v. Ely, 388 Mass. 69, 75-76, 444 N.E.2d 1276, 1280-1281 (1983); Lannon v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 786, 793, 400 N.E.2d 862, 866-867 (1980). But it is error to charge that a person is “presumed” to intend the natural and probable consequences of his or her acts, since this unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2459 (1979); DeJoinville v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 246, 408 N.E.2d 1353 (1980), even if the judge indicates that the “presumption” is rebuttable, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985), and such a charge is harmless error only if intent is not a live issue, Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 87-88, 103 S.Ct. 969, 978 (1983).
For two excellent discussions of intent, see R. Bishop, Prima Facie Case, Proof and Defense § 1362 (1970), and G. Mottla, Proof of Cases in Massachusetts § 1201 (2d ed. 1966).
