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The Social and Idiolectal Nature of Language: A Foundational Perspective, Exams of Communication

The complex relationship between language, thought, and social factors. The author discusses the idiolectal and social conceptions of language, their implications for the explanation of linguistic phenomena, and the normative aspects of language. The text also touches upon the role of social phenomena in shaping individual idiolects and the acquisition of a first language.

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Languages and Idiolects: Their Language and Ours*
James Higginbotham
University of Southern California
When my eldest son, some years ago, volunteered about some escapade or another, “It
was so fun,” I was astonished. I knew that people said, “It was a fun thing to do,” as
though fun could be a nominal modifier. But “It was so fun?” Sounds like, “It was so
water.” Ridiculous. However, as I was to learn, the word fun has in my lifetime adopted
adjectival behavior (not yet recorded by Cambridge, or Merriam-Webster). The younger
generation, therefore, did not learn their grammar lesson properly. They got it wrong.
But is it wrong? After all, that generation merely extended the word fun from its use as
an abstract mass noun, like information, to an adjective, presumably taking their cue from
already prevalent nominal compounds such as fun thing, or fun fur. Anyway, who says
fun is only a Noun?
We are all used to novel words. But my son and his peers had not just extended the
vocabularies they were taught; rather, they had created something that, to my ears,
perceptibly conflicted with what had been established. Unlike simple extensions of
vocabulary, then, theirs was a deviant addition. Other examples abound, such as
paranoid as a transitive adjective meaning greatly afraid of (“I’m paranoid of snakes”).
The reader’s experience will surely provide still more. Besides additions, historical
studies especially reveal many examples of deviant subtractions, linguistic departures
that actually shrink linguistic resources, such as the loss of infinitives in Greek. Or
consider the obligatoriness in contemporary English of subject-raising with become,
replacing the expletive subject it with the subject of the non-finite complement clause.
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Languages and Idiolects: Their Language and Ours* James Higginbotham University of Southern California When my eldest son, some years ago, volunteered about some escapade or another, “It was so fun,” I was astonished. I knew that people said, “It was a fun thing to do,” as though fun could be a nominal modifier. But “It was so fun?” Sounds like, “It was so water.” Ridiculous. However, as I was to learn, the word fun has in my lifetime adopted adjectival behavior (not yet recorded by Cambridge, or Merriam-Webster). The younger generation, therefore, did not learn their grammar lesson properly. They got it wrong. But is it wrong? After all, that generation merely extended the word fun from its use as an abstract mass noun, like information , to an adjective, presumably taking their cue from already prevalent nominal compounds such as fun thing , or fun fur. Anyway, who says fun is only a Noun? We are all used to novel words. But my son and his peers had not just extended the vocabularies they were taught; rather, they had created something that, to my ears, perceptibly conflicted with what had been established. Unlike simple extensions of vocabulary, then, theirs was a deviant addition. Other examples abound, such as paranoid as a transitive adjective meaning greatly afraid of (“I’m paranoid of snakes”). The reader’s experience will surely provide still more. Besides additions, historical studies especially reveal many examples of deviant subtractions , linguistic departures that actually shrink linguistic resources, such as the loss of infinitives in Greek. Or consider the obligatoriness in contemporary English of subject-raising with become , replacing the expletive subject it with the subject of the non-finite complement clause.

The alternation with seem , as in (1) and (2), used to be permitted with become , as in (3) and (4); but (4) is ungrammatical in contemporary English: (1) It sometimes seems that the accounts are illegible. (2) The accounts sometimes seem to be illegible. (3) The accounts sometimes become illegible. (4) It sometimes becomes that the accounts are illegible. To complete the circle of possibilities, there are examples of what may be called deviant replacements , where one form or construction alters its significance, to be replaced by another that acquires the significance that it used to have. The history of the tense systems of the Romance languages is a well-known example. In all of these cases of historical change (or, in the case of adjectival fun , of historical change in the making) learners project something other than the grammars to which they were exposed. My examples have involved semantics and syntax; but of course they are rife in phonology as well. Historical phenomena apart, an elementary survey of the stratification of language by social class, geographical region, and other variables rapidly reveals cases where x ’s speech is, from y ’s point of view, deviant in one or another respect; i.e., neither merely extending or contracting y ’s resources, but perceptibly at odds with y ’s grammar. My son’s “It was so fun,” or the common use of livid to mean flushed rather than pale , are cases in point; likewise the vulgar use of fish to include lobsters. In all of these cases the same question arise: are the deviant mistaken, or are they merely different? The question is often symmetrical, as deviation can be, but need not be, a two-way street: if I don’t use fun as an adjective I am merely conservative; but if I use livid to mean exclusively pale , I

thoughts as we may possess and apprehend. How should one think of these factors in an account of language and thought? This article is devoted to an investigation of that foundational issue. The issue is foundational along at least three dimensions: (i) as it concerns the factual or evidential background that goes into the explanation of linguistic phenomena; (ii) as it bears upon some normative aspects of language, including deviant speech in the sense illustrated above; and (iii) as it influences our view of the relations between the thought a person expresses and the linguistic forms she uses. Let us say that a conception of language, as bearing on the questions just mentioned, is idiolectal to the extent that social phenomena---deviant speech, partial understanding, historical change, and the like---are to be viewed as deriving from the interactions of the several grammars of individuals, without any essentially social residue, and say that it is social to the extent that it relies upon social variables. Even with these rough and ready labels we may clarify some issues. First of all, a social conception of language does not deny the existence of idiolects; rather, idiolects would be construed as idiolects of a common language, and would for example take this article as written in an idiolect of English, reflecting its author’s particular style and background. Diversity in speech, as in much else, has its place within community. When my English friends say that something costs “fifty quid,” I understand them to mean it costs fifty pounds. I wouldn’t say “fifty quid,” and I wouldn’t expect them to refer to an American ten dollar bill as a “sawbuck.” But we are, in our different ways, speaking English. Second, there are many aspects of social life for which a social conception of language is essential. If we think of “languages” in the sense of languages recognized at the

United Nations, or languages in which it is possible to give expert testimony in court, take a written driving test in the state of California, or publish a daily newspaper, then broad sociopolitical divisions amongst languages come to the fore. These, however, are not of any obvious interest in the scientific project of describing the organization of human speech along the familiar dimensions of semantics (and pragmatics), syntax (including morphology), and phonology (including at least parts of phonetics). Moreover, and crucially for our dialectic, they come on the social scene only after the fundamentals of human first languages, the ordinary medium of communication, are in place. Thus, if we take native linguistic competence in Noam Chomsky’s sense as the target of linguistic explanation, then the sociopolitical dimension of language appears to drop out of the picture. Third, it is commonplace to say that languages are conventional ; that is, that a language belongs to a population because of the intertwining, and mutually agreeing and reinforcing, mental states and dispositions of its members.^1 Conventions are essentially amongst several individuals; hence the social conception may inherit plausibility from the assumption of conventionality. Certainly, some relatively sophisticated aspects of language, many of them pragmatic, are conventional, as conventional as the use of “Please” and “Thank you.” In further support of the conventionalist view, we may observe that, just as the exchange of commodities for money requires agreement on value given and value received, so the successful exchange of thoughts in communication requires intent to line up with interpretation. The hearer must interpret the speaker as the speaker intends to be interpreted, and the speaker must intend something that the

much, even if in the end it is but an empty reminder, is a matter of logic. It is granted that where a social conception sees idiolects as variations within a larger scheme, an idiolectal conception takes the scheme itself to be built up through such regularities as present themselves in common background and interaction amongst individual speakers. But the individual is not therefore to be considered as if in isolation. People can depend upon one another for their words and their grammars. To take a simple analogy: the properties of a pine forest, whether it grows or contracts, flourishes or withers, its density and fecundity, arise from the properties of its individual trees and saplings; it by no means follows that what goes on with an individual tree is independent of its neighbors. A further disclaimer: to say that a conception of language is idiolectal is to say that generalizations over “the language” are summary accounts that are made true or false through the states and transitions between states of individuals. But that is not to say that the summary accounts are in any sense reducible to statements about individuals, in practice or in principle. Reducibility in practice of, say, the advent of obligatory pronominal subjects in French is out of the question, and would be so even if we possessed an exhaustive list of utterances in French from Roman times to the present. But reducibility in principle is also questionable, as learners and those from whom they learn are tied by relations of authority and love (among others) that are essentially social, and whose influence is substantial. An idiolectal conception of language is compatible with a substantive role for external things---objects, including other people---in the characterization of idiolects. Illustrations of this role are not hard to come by. The point of looking outward from the individual is pretty evident for the case of reference to perceptually encountered objects: had the world

been significantly different, a person with the same molecular history would have acquired, and called by the same familiar names, different physical and other concepts (see Burge (1986) for careful elaborations). An idiolectal conception of language is by no means committed, and has some reason to be opposed, to internalism, and to individualism in Burge’s sense; that is, to the view that the organization of the body, abstracting from external things, is constitutive of any linguistically significant aspect of language (for discussion of various senses of internalism, see Bezuidenhout, this volume; and see both Bezuidenhout and Farkas, this volume, for exposition and analysis of individualism and anti-individualism in the sense of Burge). It remains to examine several areas where, as I shall argue, internalism fails. First of all, consider my son’s extension of fun to an adjective, presumably by some internalized formula, or lexical entry, such as (5): (5) fun : adj., true of an activity x iff for a person to engage in x is fun for that person. I may have any number of reasons for “correcting” my son: perhaps he’ll miss a question on an English achievement test. But these reasons for my action have no tendency to show that he was somehow linguistically wrong in extending fun as in (5), or that I am right in not doing so. Similar remarks go for the person whose livid means flushed , and those who call lobsters fish. On the other hand, there are active linguistic mistakes that are not so readily dismissed. Thus, to deploy an example due to Burge (1982), many people believe, falsely, that two parties have made a contract only if their agreement is supported in written form. In learning otherwise, they stand, and conceive themselves to stand, corrected. The critical point is that they change their views for cognitive reasons; i.e., because, in point of fact,

purpose, there are cases where one’s internalized assignment of meaning goes astray; and in those cases the speaker’s intentions actually conflict with their internal assignments of meaning. The difference between the cases, it is to be stressed, is itself owing to differences in the thoughts of individual speakers. If I don’t care how icthyologists use the word fish , I shall not change my ways just because of some pedant’s alleged correction, and if I don’t mind being etymologically challenged I shall not refrain from saying that someone red with anger was “livid with rage.” But for those cases that I care about for good reason, my intentions in speaking, and the form of my lexical entries, will reflect my position as one user among many of an expression we have in common. I am not bowing to authority, but recognizing, in language as elsewhere, substantial differences in knowledge. In support of internalism, it is sometimes presupposed that the individual speaker is an infallible authority on what her words mean. Of course, individual speakers are in an important sense authorities on the meanings of their words. So the presupposition to be questioned is not that people, or those of appropriate maturity anyway, have first-person authority over their meanings, as they do over their beliefs, desires, and intentions, but rather that, if language is idiolectally based, then a speaker’s words must mean whatever she thinks they mean; i.e., that it is her conception of what they mean that endows them with such meaning as they have. On a non-internalist view, however, the speaker’s contribution is only part of the story. In language as elsewhere, one’s conception of things may deviate from a norm to which one is already committed (for further discussion of the normativity of meaning, see Wilson, this volume).

In illustrating the non-internalist view I have been speaking of an extreme case, namely of an actual mistake in the interpretation of an expression. More common is the case of merely partial understanding. Suppose the car won’t go properly. I take it to the mechanic, and am told there is “a leak in the gasket.” I can convey this information to others even though I don’t know what a gasket is. In so doing, I am no mere parrot, as I would be if in Iceland I should repeat to an Icelander something said to me in Icelandic, without the least comprehension of what it was. Rather, so the example suggests, I am using, and intending to use, a word with its meaning , even if I myself have only a slender understanding of what that meaning is. And so it would be for me, and no doubt the reader, with many other words. No amount of internal investigation of us will determine what we meant. I have remarked that, as a matter of logic, internalism is not implied by an idiolectal conception of language, and have subsequently argued by example that it fails in general anyway, on account of a variety of cases of errors and incomplete understanding on the part of the mature speaker. These phenomena apart, there are serious questions about the acquisition of a first language, whose answers, insofar as they can be discerned, are critical for understanding the role of social phenomena in the speech of individuals. I shall put some of these questions very abstractly, illustrating below with reference to a particular representative example. Linguistic theory, as I am considering it here, aims to describe and to explain the genesis under normal conditions of the internalized grammars of human beings, their linguistic competence in Chomsky’s sense. The objects of explanation are widely various, and all but a few of them arise in the context of ongoing theory. We would view

(7) Mary called the waiter over. It’s evident that if (6) is true then the table comes to be clean as a result of John’s wiping it; likewise that (7) means that the waiter comes to be “over (to her)” as a result of Mary’s calling him; hence the name of the construction. Two notable points: (i) the resultative construction is very common in some languages (English, Chinese, Dutch), absent or very nearly absent in others (Italian, Japanese); (ii) it is lexically particular , in the sense that not every construction that fits the kind of meaning attaching to (6) and (7) is acceptable. For point (i), we need to explain how the speaker of English comes to know about the construction and its meaning, and why speakers of Italian, say, don’t have it, or bother to make it up. For (ii), as noted in various work, including especially Bowerman (1982), we need to explain the unacceptability of (8) and (9) (the latter actually volunteered by a child speaking English): (8) John wiped the table dirty. (9) I pulled [the papers] unstapled. Obviously, a table can become dirty as a result of wiping it; and papers can come unstapled as a result of pulling on them. But (8) and (9) are odd, to put it mildly. The resultative construction is not universally attested, and therefore must be acquired. The child learning English, or Chinese, hears instances of it, and must somehow recognize them as such. The instances must be generalized, through some procedure. Once these matters are in place, this particular aspect of ordinary competence is set. The intellectual process, guided by some prior conception of the nature of human language, may or may not, for all that as been said, be guided also by social factors. But even if it is not so guided; that is, even if it represents only the flowering of a native capacity under

appropriate conditions, it will support communication: for, all that is required is that the learner wind up in the right place; that is, the same place more or less as everyone else. No appeal to convention in any serious sense is wanted, or so it would appear. Further questions, if anything more difficult than those just considered, arise in connection with linguistic differences, and the child’s volunteering e.g. of the unacceptable (9). From the fact that the child learning Italian hears only sparse instances of the resultative, it by no means follows that the construction is generally excluded; but such is the case. Likewise, the child learning English has to tailor the generalization of the resultative, so as to exclude (8) and (9) among others. But how is this feat accomplished? In the Italian case, the system that would generate the resultative construction has to be put out of commission. In the English case, it’s a matter of tailoring usage. Whether social features play a role in either remains open. In this article I have reviewed several prominent considerations in favor of an idiolectal, but non-internalist, conception of language, insofar as linguistic investigation is concerned with the nature and genesis of the grammars of speakers, acquired under normal conditions, and the relations between the thoughts they express and the meanings they conceive expressions to have. That is not to deny that essentially social conceptions are wanted for other purposes. However, if I am right, appeals to language as convention, or to success in communication, do not of themselves carry much force against the idiolectal conception. Conversely, that conception does not support internalism as much as may at first appear. The complexity of the relations between language and thought, exemplified by the phenomena of linguistic error and partial

Notes *To appear in the Oxford Handbook in Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  1. Lewis (1975) is an important exposition of this view.
  2. I take this point from (my understanding of) Davidson (1986).
  3. For a recent survey, see Guasti (2004).

References Bowerman, M. (1982). "Starting to Talk Worse: Clues to Language Acquisition From Children's Late Errors." In Strauss, S. (ed.), U-Shaped Behavioral Growth. New York: Academic Press. Burge, T. (1979). "Individualism and the Mental," in French, P. et al. (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 4: Studies in Metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Burge, T. (1989). "Wherein is Language Social?" George, A. (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 175-191. Chomsky, N. (1986). Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origins, and Use. New York: Praeger. Davidson, Donald (1986). "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs." In LePore, E. (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 433-446. Guasti, M.-T. (2004). Language Acquisition: The Growth of Grammar. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Higginbotham, J. (1991). "Remarks on the Metaphysics of Linguistics." Linguistics and Philosophy 14 , 4. pp. 555-566. Higginbotham, J. (1988). "Knowledge of Reference." In George, A. (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 153-174. Lewis, D. (1975). "Languages and Language." Gunderson, K. (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 7. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Lewis, Philosophical Papers , vol. I. Oxford: Oxford U.P. pp. 163-188.